Discussing Turkey, changing EUrope by Spindler, Bernhard
 
 
 
DIPLOMARBEIT 
Titel der Diplomarbeit 
„Discussing Turkey, Changing EUrope“ 
Changing imaginations of EUrope through debating EU-Turkey relationships; exemplified by the 
German Christian Democratic and Social Democratic Party as empirical case studies 
Verfasser 
Bernhard Spindler 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
Magister der Philosophie (Mag. Phil.) 
Wien, 2011  
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 300 
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Politikwissenschaften 
Betreuerin / Betreuer: Dr. Karin Liebhart 
 
 
 
 
 Table of Contents 
1 Introduction __________________________________ 1 
2 Central Terms and Theoretical Perspectives ___________ 4 
2.1 Talking Identity _____________________________________________________________ 5 
2.2 Constructing Identities _______________________________________________________ 6 
2.3 Nations, Culture & Ethnicity __________________________________________________ 8 
2.4 Self-Other Relationships _____________________________________________________ 12 
3 Imagining EUrope ____________________________ 15 
3.1 The idea of Europe (pre-1945) ________________________________________________ 16 
3.2 The Idea of EUrope (post-1945) _______________________________________________ 18 
3.2.1 EUrope as Integration Process ______________________________________________________ 18 
3.2.2 EUrope as Identification Process ____________________________________________________ 21 
3.3 Defining EUrope, Defining EUropean __________________________________________ 23 
3.3.1 Constructing a EUropean History ___________________________________________________ 23 
3.3.2 Universalist and Particularist Imaginations of EUrope ___________________________________ 24 
3.3.3 EUrope in Nationalist Terms and Concepts ___________________________________________ 26 
3.3.4 Othering & Enlargement __________________________________________________________ 28 
4 Turkey Debate _______________________________ 33 
4.1 EUrope-Turkey-Relationships ________________________________________________ 34 
4.2 Debating Turkey in EUrope __________________________________________________ 42 
4.3 Imaginations of EUrope in Debating Turkey ____________________________________ 48 
5 Research Design and Methodology ________________ 53 
5.1 Theoretical Approach: Critical Discourse Analysis _______________________________ 53 
5.2 Empirical Approach ________________________________________________________ 57 
5.3 Methods __________________________________________________________________ 62 
5.3.1 Research ______________________________________________________________________ 62 
5.3.2 Analysis _______________________________________________________________________ 64 
6 Results _____________________________________ 66 
6.1 German National Context ____________________________________________________ 67 
6.2 German Debates on Turkey & EUrope _________________________________________ 74 
6.2.1. pre-2004 ______________________________________________________________________ 74 
6.2.2 Opening Accession Talks with Turkey _______________________________________________ 82 
6.2.3 Treaty of Lisbon ________________________________________________________________ 96 
6.2.3 Debating Turkey and EUrope in 2011 _______________________________________________ 107 
7 Conclusions ________________________________ 118 
Appendix: Codes and Categories __________________ 139 
Literature ___________________________________ 145 
Sources of empirical material _____________________ 151 
 Abbreviations 
9/11  The terror attacks on New York’s World Trade Center on September 11th 
2001 
CDA   Critical Discourse Analysis 
CDU   Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) 
CSU   Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) 
DHA   Discourse Historical Approach 
ECECs  Eastern and Central European Countries 
EEC   European Economic Community 
EFTA   European Free Trade Area 
EU   European Union 
FDP  Freie Demokratisch Partei (Free Democratic Party) 
MP Member of Parliament 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
SPD  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of 
Germany) 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
1 
1 Introduction 
The focus of my diploma thesis lies in the analysis of the relationship between the 
construction of imaginations of EUrope and the debate around the possible accession 
of Turkey into the European Union (EU). The specific research question I will pose 
can be summarized as follows: 
How are imaginations of EUrope influenced and reconstructed through 
debates on the relationship between Turkey and the EU?  
I will try to answer this question in respect to an empirical case study in Germany’s 
political field. The issue around Turkey’s ‘European character’ is highly 
controversially debated, and also the question, if this issue should play a significant 
role for Turkey-EU relationships, is far from being a straight forward one. The impact 
of imaginations of EUrope upon Turkey-EU relationships is debated and analyzed in 
a wide range of scientific papers, which is one reason that I believe it is interesting to 
look at this relationship from the opposite direction. Thereby I will integrate my 
thesis within perspectives focusing on the role of ‘Others’ in the construction of 
identities, although it must be pointed out that the role of Turkey in constructing 
EUrope cannot clearly be defined as one of an Other. 
I hope that this approach will lead to a critical perspective on the often highly 
emotionalized and essentialized Turkey-Debate. Hereby also my continuing interest 
in this issue can be explained. It led me to a range of confrontations with the issue of 
Turkey-EU relationships, in combination with approaches to imaginations of EUrope, 
within my studies of political science and cultural anthropology. In my eyes it seems 
that arguments arising out of ideas about a culturally defined EUrope play a far too 
significant role in contrast to more or less valid arguments about Turkey’s lack of 
political reforms or the Cyprus-conflict. Through my thesis I want to show the 
arbitrariness of this argument, which often leads to unreasonable stereotypes and 
anxiousness, which can especially be observed in the Austrian context I am 
embedded in (see i.e. ESI-Report 2008). 
I intend to reach this critical perspective through the deconstruction of ideas about 
EUrope, and in showing how those imaginations are anything but straight-forward. I 
want to show how constructions of EUrope are influenced by unequal power-
relations and different interests – in my case, in the context of discussing the possible 
accession of Turkey to the EU. I hope to show how the utilization of imaginations of 
EUrope, in debating the Turkey question, is in turn changing the ways in which 
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EUrope is imagined, also in contexts beyond debating Turkey. The theoretical frame 
through which I conceptualize imaginations of EUrope, is placed in the scientific 
branch of discourse analysis. I specifically want to utilize approaches of critical 
discourse analysis. Furthermore, I want to deconstruct those imaginations of EUrope 
through the analysis of discourse contributions by political parties in Germany; more 
precisely, I want to focus on the Christian-Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) and Social 
Democratic Party (SPD). 
In the first part of the thesis, I will discuss scientific approaches and papers on topics 
which are essential to the answering of my research question. Thereby, I will begin 
with discussing some of the central terms and theoretical concepts which are utilized 
in these discussions. The most prominent term in the debate on imaginations of 
EUrope is identity. Hence, I want present some of the central theoretical approaches 
to identity. Firstly, I want to focus on the role this term plays in scientific, as well as in 
public and political debates, and secondly, I will present some work on the theoretical 
conceptualization of constructions of identities. This will lead me to some of the 
central ideas, through which identity is understood and constructed today: 
nationalism, culture, and ethnicity. A central approach in explaining these identities 
is through the relationship with Others, as I will show in the conclusion of this 
theoretical discussion. With these theoretical concepts in mind, I will try to de- and 
reconstruct imaginations of EUrope in the next part of my thesis. In order to do so, I 
will start with a summary of the historical development understandings of EUrope 
went through. Subsequently it will become clear that the idea of EUrope is not stable 
and definite, but rather dynamic and changing. First of all, I will discuss 
understandings of Europe prior to World War Two and its strong connection to 
EUropean integration which has resulted in today’s EU. However a stronger 
emphasis will be placed on developments that took after World War Two. Following 
this, I want to present some theoretical perspectives on the ways EUrope is defined 
today. Thereby I will present several aspects: first, I will show what role 
representations of (EUropean) history play. Second, I will come to talk about the 
difference between picturing EUrope as universal or as particularistic. Third, I want 
to describe the nationalist bias in imagining EUrope. And finally, I want to show how 
Others, i.e. in the process of EU-enlargement, influence the qualities EUrope is 
defined through. The numerous impacts of EU-enlargement on imaginations of 
EUrope will also come to the fore in the next chapter, where I will discuss the 
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relationship of EUrope and Turkey, and the debate on it. Therefore, I wish to begin 
with presenting an historical overview of these relationships. I will show how EUrope 
influenced the development of Turkey, whereby the central focus will lie on the role of 
the EU and Turkey’s EU-accession process. In the next part of this chapter I want to 
summarize the debate within the EU on the relationship between Turkey and 
EUrope, and show the role of different imaginations of EUrope.  
This discussion will lead to the second part of my thesis, where I will, in reference to 
empirical data, try to reconstruct how the Turkey-debate changes the ways EUrope is 
imagined by German political parties. I will introduce this section by giving a more 
detailed description of my theoretical and empirical approaches. Thereby, I will come 
to talk about critical discourse analysis, on which I want to base my analysis, and 
about the ways I came to and processed my research data. After doing so, I will 
present the central results, which will be based on my empirical research, as well as 
on literature about the political debates in Germany about Turkey and EUrope. 
Thereby I, first, want to describe the national political context the case study is 
embedded in, before presenting the detailed results of my research. Last but not least, 
I will summarize the most important results of my paper, try to arrange it within the 
existing literature or approaches on the issue, and present some possible conclusions 
to draw out of this work. 
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2 Central Terms and Theoretical Perspectives 
In this introductory part of my paper I want to present some key theoretical 
approaches to constructions of social entities. This is necessary for building a basis to 
understand how processes of imagining EUrope, as my example for such a social 
entity, work. The most common term used in the context of constructing EUrope is 
the one of identity. In the context of this thesis, I want to avoid focusing solely on 
identity, due to the many diffuse ideological connotations associated with this term. 
Theorists and laypeople alike often wonder if a EUropean identity even exists. 
Thereby they are implying that there would be some special minimal qualities and/or 
quantities of identifications with EUrope, to talk about the existence of EUropean 
identity. These ideas go hand in hand with the tight connection of the term identity to 
nationalism. It is because of this that I prefer to talk about imaginations of EUrope, 
since it is not unreasonable to state that most people have some understanding of 
EUrope; they have some image in mind when they talk about EUrope, and hence are 
imagining EUrope. Also, it must be mentioned that the term imaginations carries 
similar connotations, since its understanding in a social scientific context is to a large 
extent crafted by Benedict Anderson’s (1983) approach to nationalism. He stated that 
national and ethnic communities would be imagined communities, and that they only 
exist through more or less common imaginations of them, by people within and 
outside them. In contrast to the case of identity, the influence of this approach is 
widely restricted to the social scientific community. It is hence not as strongly 
influenced by ideological utilization and connotation in every-day-usage. It is this 
relative neutrality of the term in a mainstream context, and not so much the 
theoretical affinity with Anderson, which leads to my preference for the term 
imaginations of EUrope. Another reason to not primarily focus on the term identity is 
that it is of second order relevance for my paper, if people are identifying themselves 
with their imagination of EUrope, or if they see it as central part of their identities. It 
does not mean that I intend to ignore the aspect of identification associated with 
imaginations of EUrope. It only means that I want to avoid the restrictions and 
implications, which solely talking about identity would lead to. 
Apart from this approach, it is still useful to look into theories of identity in order to 
understand the change in imagining EUrope that arises when debating the Turkey-
question. This is, first, caused by the popularity of the term amongst scientific 
approaches to EUrope and, second, by its popularity in public debates. For this 
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reason I want to start with an overview of the different meanings associated with this 
term in various debates and contexts. 
 
2.1 Talking Identity 
The term identity not only has a prominent role within the social sciences, but is also 
in widespread use in mainstream and political thinking and debating. It is necessary 
to begin with looking at the concepts which dominate these discourses since they 
partly determine the way in which EUrope is imagined. If you ask somebody for her 
or his identity you will usually be provided with a set of different qualities like nation, 
gender, age and other such things. The way, such qualities are chosen and treated 
against each other, is to a large extend determined by social influences and contexts. 
On the other hand, identity is often treated as an individualistic feature. Hence, there 
can be an analytical differentiation of identity concepts made between personal 
identity and collective identity. In spite of this differentiation, these two sides are 
seen in a relationship of mutual dependency. Tilly (2002) describes the consequences 
of this as a contradictory situation: “on the one side, we find uniqueness, on the 
other, common properties. Analysts of social identities have never quite resolved the 
contradiction” (ibid.: 11). This embedded contradiction resembles irregularities inside 
groups with a stated homogeneous identity. It helps in constructing a hegemonic 
group identity by circumscribing those irregularities with individualistic concepts like 
‘evil’, ‘sick’ and so on. Those concepts also help to cover or legitimize different power 
distributions, in constructions of dominant group identities. 
This task is further tightened by the naturalization of identity features. Typical 
features which are constructed as natural or self-evident are qualities like gender or 
heterosexuality, but also culture and in consequence national or EUropean culture. I 
will come back to this point later when I elaborate on concepts of culture or 
nationalism, which are often assigned to imaginations of EUrope. The naturalization 
of identity features is further supported by ideas of ‘deep identity’, which is a 
widespread idea in mainstream and political discourses. Identity is seen as some self-
evident basis of civilized societies, and treated as something static, which has to be 
protected. In highlighting a need for identity and in “proceed[ing] as if identity was 
fractured today and we must find some way to solidify it” (Connolly 2002: 172), such 
understandings are pushing identity discourses into arenas of political conflict. 
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Conversely there is an understanding, promoted by constructivist approaches, which 
emphasizes the dynamic and heterogeneous character of identities. Also Stuart Hall 
(2005) describes this gap, in writing that “in common sense language, identification 
is constructed on the back of recognition of some common origin or shared 
characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural 
closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation. In contrast with 
the ‘naturalism’ of this definition the discursive approach sees identification as a 
construction, a process never completed – always in ‘process’” (ibid.: 2). This divide 
will be apparent through the whole course of my thesis, and in my approach to 
imaginations of EUrope. I will differentiate between Universalistic and Particularistic 
perspectives on EUrope. My personal approach is, in consequence of my research 
question, placed within the constructivist tradition. In the following section of this 
chapter I wish to present some of those constructivist approaches. (Connolly 2002; 
Hall 2005; Tilly 2002) 
 
2.2 Constructing Identities 
The prime question of researchers, which deal with group identity construction, often 
focuses on the relationship between group and individual identities. A researcher will 
begin by looking at psychological processes of identification with different groups or 
qualities. One of the most influential approaches to this question came from Erik H. 
Erikson, who sees two processes as central in every identity construct: first, the self-
perception of one’s own sameness and continuity in time, and, second, the social 
affirmation of this by others. Constructivist scholars question the contents of this 
perceived continuous sameness. They try to find out how these contents come into 
being and change over time. Hence, they are asking about the process of 
identification, whereby they are deconstructing the notion of continuity. Stuart Hall 
(2005) can be named as one of the most influential authors in approaching identity 
through processes of identification. He tries to connect theories on the constitution of 
the subject out of psychoanalysis, like concepts by Lacan or Freud, to the way subjects 
are included within social or collective identities, through Foucault’s concept of 
discourse. By conceptualizing identity as a process, this approach “accepts that 
identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and 
fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting 
and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions” (ibid.: 4). According to Quenzel 
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(2005), collective identity occurs through the identification of multiple subjects with 
the same object, whereby the subjects are conscious about this mutuality. Collective 
identity is (re)produced in a reciprocal process, through the repeated invocation of 
the subjects as part of a group, and the acceptance and internalization of this claim by 
the subjects. Through the permanent repetition of this communality it comes to the 
construction of identities, which are perceived as space- and time-wise constant 
(ibid.: 267). As a consequence of this permanent repetition and affirmation the 
constructed character of identity becomes less and less visible, until a point where it 
is forgotten, and seen as matter of course. Identity then is seen as a natural quality; it 
is naturalized. 
Also Quenzel’s approach, towards analyzing these construction processes, is the one 
of discourse theory. The social process of identity construction can be encompassed 
within the concept of discourse, whereby identity becomes the result of various 
discourses. Hence, identity is constructed within the processes of social 
communication through many different texts. I will present some more remarks 
regarding discourse analysis and its value for understanding imaginations of EUrope 
later in this thesis, when I will formulate my theoretical and methodological approach 
in more detail (see 5.1). In essence, discourse can be described as the sum of 
communication acts and formulations of identity claims. The goal of their analysis 
lies in the search for structures and rules within the discourses. One important factor 
determining the course of these discourses is power. Discursive power means in this 
context the possibility to influence discourses and its outcomes; it is the power to be 
heard, understood and agreed with by a large number of the discourse participants 
and recipients. In order to further analyze these power distributions, it makes sense 
to recontextualize some of the analytical tools provided by Pierre Bourdieu, and his 
elaboration on different kinds of capital, within the field of discourse analysis. 
Bourdieu distinguishes between cultural, economic and social capital; and it is access 
to these capitals that determines the discursive power of different actors. The three 
forms work in combination, and determine each other. Cultural capital represents 
the, often unconscious, knowledge and ability to perform ably with and within 
dominant cultural fields. People who possess cultural capital know how to behave and 
be accepted in different contexts of society, and, hence, within different social 
discourses. Social capital represents various forms of relationships, or group 
memberships, which a person can activate in aggregating discursive (and other forms 
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of) power. Economic capital stands for the economic and material resources, one can 
rely on, in accumulating power. The forms of capital work hand in hand with a 
symbolic order which legitimizes them, and determines their legitimate forms of 
application. The access to these forms of capital and power are to a large extent 
determined by ancestry. It gives different people different chances in terms of 
generating socially approved and influential statements. (Quenzel 2005) 
 
2.3 Nations, Culture & Ethnicity 
Here I would like to give a brief introduction to some of the most popular and 
dominant ideas in the construction and imagination of social entities: nation, culture, 
and ethnicity. All three sources of identification, but especially culture and nation, are 
to a large extent naturalized in public perceptions; they are seen as a matter of course. 
From the perspective of the social scientist they are not interesting for their ‘objective’ 
existence, but for their existence as a notion in public discourses. Thereby they affect 
the way people build groups and how the implications of these differentiations 
manifest themselves. The three sources also work in a relationship of mutual 
dependency, and are often seen as synonymous. Hence, nations are often imagined as 
cultural and/or ethnic communities. Eriksen (1997) shows this relationship in stating 
that, “like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its 
adherents and, by implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby 
become outsiders” (ibid.: 35). On the other hand, the scientific theoretical approaches 
to these ideas try to differentiate them. This goes back to the emergence of the terms 
culture and ethnicity out of the social scientific field. Also the idea of nationalism was 
conceptualized by a countless number of scholars. 
For the case of nationalism the defining quality, in contrast to the other two concepts, 
lies in its relationship with statehood. The nation is defined by its, at least claimed, 
correlation with a state or political unit. One of the most influential approaches 
towards nationalism comes from the previously mentioned Benedict Anderson 
(1983). He defines the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as 
both inherently limited and sovereign” (ibid.: 6). In stating that nations are imagined, 
Anderson highlights the fact that the members of a nation never know most of their 
fellow-nationals. The community solely exists through the common imagination of it 
by its members. The consequential focus, of the scientific approach to nationalism, is 
on the style and qualities in and with which nations are imagined. First of all, they are 
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imagined as limited: no nation claims to contain the whole of humankind. Nationality 
is not seen as a universal quality, and is always imagined as opposed to other nations. 
The aspect of sovereignty was inspired by Enlightenment values and revolutions. 
Thereby the nation was defined as a new base for power legitimization in opposition 
to the old dynasties. Furthermore it is imagined as a community, in setting the claim 
of a deep horizontal comradeship. In the explanation of the rise of nationalism 
Anderson, like others, point to aspects of literacy, printing technology, reformation, 
the development of languages and – most prominent of all – capitalism. 
The point of capitalism was famously brought forward by Ernest Gellner (1983), who 
sees industrialization as the central initiating factor for the rise of nationalism. It was 
the central trigger because of its need for a relative homogenization of societies. 
Nationalism became the central tool in accomplishing this need. The industrial form 
of production needs a proletarian mass with a minimum of common qualifications. 
Those minimum standards should expand the face-to-face dimension by far. Hence, 
there was the need for a common education system or ‘exo-socialization’, which was 
delivered by nation-states: “the imperative of exo-socialisation is the main clue to 
why state and culture must now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was 
thin, fortuitous, varied, loose, and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what 
nationalism is about and why we live in an age of nationalism” (Gellner 1983: 38). 
This imperative can be realized in various forms, through which power relations 
come into play. One of the central power factors was the access to literacy, since it 
were written and replicated texts, through which a national ideology could be spread 
and become stabilized in a context, which extents the face-to-face dimension. In 
dependency of the persons and groups with access to this kind of power and 
education, different types of nationalism developed, whereby different groups (not) 
managed to gain positions as cultural norm-founders for a broader nation. The 
special quality, which turned nationalism into the primary source of identification, is 
the implicitness and naturalization it gained: “The idea of a man without a nation 
seems to impose a strain on the modern imagination […]. A man must have a 
nationality as he must have a nose and two ears. [...] Having a nation is not an 
inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such” (Gellner 1983: 
6). Nations are seen as matter of course, whereby they are pictured as constant and 
indefinitely old. Hobsbawm (1983) describes and deconstructs this claim with his 
concept on ‘the invention of traditions’. Traditions as symbolizations of nations and 
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other communities are usually detached from their formation and development. 
Hobsbawm tries to show the arbitrary and man-made-ness of traditions, through the 
historical reconstruction of their backgrounds. 
These conceptualizations of nations as implicit and natural are very often realized 
through the utilization of the term culture. Also in scientific approaches on nations, 
the term culture is often given a central place. For example Gellner defines a nation 
as political principle that claims the congruency between the cultural and the 
political. ‘The cultural’ though can be defined in various ways. What the relevant 
culture should be, and how it is conceptualized, is certainly not a straight forward 
question. In following Adam Kuper’s (1999) elaboration on anthropological culture 
debates, one principally can, like in the case of identity, differentiate between 
universalistic and particularistic conceptualizations of culture. This gap can be 
observed within the anthropological debates on the term, whereby it first was 
represented by evolutionistic and cultural relativistic approaches. The main 
difference is that, from the universalistic perspective, culture is basically seen as 
universal item with common rules between all cultures, although different criteria 
can lead to different realizations of these rules. The particularistic side sees cultures 
as somewhat original and matchless, that can only be understood for itself. This gap 
could never quite be resolved within anthropological debates, and represents the 
general variety in concepts of culture. The term culture could anyway gain popularity 
in mainstream understandings of society and group differentiation. Parts of the 
explanation for this popularity can be found in its strong connection with nationalism 
and nationalist culture. Very often it is in fact equated. 
While this scientific gap can also be found within public discourses, this is not the 
case for another scientific development in conceptualizing culture. Thereby I mean 
the development to abolish ideas of stable, homogenous, and circumscribable 
cultures, and to establish fluid, heterogeneous, and non-circumscribable 
conceptualizations. This development towards a weaker conceptualization of culture 
resulted in the postmodern abolishment of the term regarding its meaning as 
something objectively observable, while still acknowledging its influential role as an 
idea or imagination. Public discourses proved, according to Grillo (2003), rather 
unimpressed by these developments, and it is hence an ‘old’ essentialist – and, from 
the social scientist’s perspective, wrong – version of culture, which continues to play 
an important role in public discourses on the differentiation of groups. Also Scott 
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(2003) describes the approach to culture in broad political and public debates as 
mostly particularistic. Thereby culture is pictured as “internally homogeneous, 
immobile, self-closed, seamless, and so on” (ibid.: 101). This is often framed as 
problematic and many social scientists, like Hervik (2004), see its consequences in 
the development of a cultural racism. The term culture is thereby replacing the rather 
discredited term race, while accomplishing the same discriminatory result. Culture is 
in this manner seen as something predetermined, more or less given by history (if not 
by nature), and cultural differences are pictured as absolute and conflictual. The 
existence of cultures is usually not questioned, which gives it – like nationalism – 
such a strong, and often hidden, power. 
For the case of ethnicity or ethnic communities very similar points, like those relating 
to culture or nationalism, can be made in respect of its meaning in public discourses. 
In comparison it is a relatively new term, which gained popularity especially in the 
context of minority issues. Ethnic is – like culture – often used as a further 
alternative replacement for the term race, in describing social groupings. While 
cultures are in public debates often equated with nations, ethnic groups frequently 
stand for minorities. The rather arbitrary meaning of ethnicity in public discourses 
goes hand in hand with definition struggles in the social sciences, where it is often not 
clear what the term really stands for. As for a minimal agreement, it can be said “that 
ethnicity has something to do with the classification of people and group 
relationships” (Eriksen 1997: 34). In Eriksen’s (1997) approach to the concept of 
ethnicity he sees its value in highlighting the role of group relationships in the 
construction of groups and their identities. It tries to overcome problems in 
understanding the development of group differentiation based on classical criteria, 
like language, political organization, territory and so on. Often, from this perspective 
apparent culturally similar groups nevertheless tend to construct a high cultural 
difference between themselves. This constructed difference is based on ethnicity, 
which in this case describes “an aspect of social relationship between agents who 
consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with 
whom they have a minimum of regular contact” (Eriksen 1997: 39). Thereby Eriksen 
states that the relationship or contact between groups, which he terms ethnicity, 
plays a central part in the construction of cultural uniqueness and differentiation. 
From this perspective he makes the point that: “A nationalist ideology is an ethnic 
ideology which demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group” (ibid.: 119). Thereby he 
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brings forward the point that national ideologies accomplish the task of constructing 
a ‘cultural community’ through its relationships with Others. This I want to discuss 
on a more general level in the upcoming part of this chapter. 
 
2.4 Self-Other Relationships 
The imagination of sameness, between members of a group, goes hand in hand with 
the construction of difference from people outside this group. According to Gingrich 
(2004), these two sides of identity construction receive a different emphasis in 
different identity conceptualizations. On the one hand, there are approaches 
concentrating on the aspect of difference, whereby identity is the consequence of it. 
Other scholars put, in contrast, their focus on questions of belonging. The role of 
difference is relegated to the background, and processes of ‘Othering’ often are, in a 
moralizing way, demonized. The relationship, between sameness within, and 
difference to the outside, very much resembles the question regarding the chicken 
and the egg, and which came first. Gingrich positions himself against these one-sided 
approaches, and proposes “a working definition of such personal and collective 
identities as simultaneously including sameness and differing. These identities are 
multidimensional and contradictory, and they include power-related, dialogical 
ascriptions by selves and by others which are processualy configurated, enacted and 
transformed by cognition, language, imagination, emotion, body and (additional 
forms of) agency” (ibid: 6). The aim of the analysis of identities can therefore never 
lie in clear and definite answers, but only in an approximate reconstruction of the 
processes behind its construction. Its goal can only be to find different logics and 
relationships within such processes. 
An analytical, and in my opinion very useful, categorization of processes of identity 
construction comes from the anthropologist Baumann (2004), who is building upon 
and in collaboration with Gingrich’s working definition of identity. He describes the 
different relationships between ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’, which determine the existence 
of three different ‘grammars of identity’: 
• Orientalization 
Based on Edward Said’s elaboration on Orientalism in Europe; identity is 
constructed through the encounter with Others. The demarcation between Self 
and Other is relatively clear. The Self is, through a complex process of 
‘Othering’, constructed as counter image to the Other. The Self is classically 
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seen as superior in comparison, although the process is more complex than a 
simple good-bad imagination. In a few points the Other can also represent an 
envied exotic originality, although altogether it is seen as clearly inferior. 
• Segmentation 
Based on Edward E. Evans-Prichard’s research on political systems amongst 
the east-African Nuer; identity is constructed on different levels, which 
classically follow the logic of genealogy. The whole (identity) comprehends 
different segments, which are differentiated on different levels of belonging. 
Which identity is relevant depends on the context, and the Other one is 
encountering in this context. The different segments are ideally on a par, and 
consequentially comprehend equal shares of power, although this never 
applies in reality. An example for such logic can be found in federal state 
systems. 
• Encompassment 
Based on Lois Dumont’s research on caste systems in India; identity is 
constructed through the imagination of different levels of consciousness. 
Stated differentiation is denied and explained by a low level of consciousness. 
The (sub-)group, who wants to formulate an independent identity, is 
deliberately encompassed on a higher level. The identity of this ‘higher’ whole 
is usually defined by a dominant sub-group. In this logic it could i.e. be stated 
that ‘in the end we are all humans’, but what this is about is defined by a 
dominant segment; i.e. in stating a basically ‘Christian soul’ for all humankind. 
Those grammars represent different logics of Self-Other, or Whole-Part relationships. 
They are possible alternatives of identity construction. Through the process of 
choosing, the factor of agency comes into the analysis: “each of these must construct 
his or her or its ‘Other’ and has a choice then, whether to declare this ‘other’ into an 
orientalized mirror image, a segmentary ally or adversary in one or another specified 
context, or an Other who exaggerates his difference while he is ‘really and deep-down’ 
just an encompassable part of ‘us’” (Baumann 2004: 27). Thereby those actors follow 
different motives and strategies. The specific grammars are specified, and possibly 
switched or combined, in dependency of perceived interests: “when one party argues 
that it encompasses the other, the other party will often respond by postulating a 
grammar of segmentation; when one party wants to exclude another from a 
potentially shared segmentary order, it will often fall back on the orientalizing 
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grammar to emphasize the alterity of the other” (ibid.: 31). In looking at those 
elaborations the variability and dynamism of identity constructions becomes clear. 
Identity is not simply there, but steadily reconstructed and adapted in engagements 
with different contexts. Hence, Baumann and Gingrich overcome the simplifying 
tendency of only seeing Selves and Others. Although three different logics might seem 
relatively restricted, “there might be good logical reasons why such a limited 
repertoire of only three grammars of identity/alterity can be offered as a useful 
analytical tool. Thinking of wholes and parts, of selfings and otherings, only three 
permutations appear to be possible: whole vs. whole (orientalization), whole as part 
and part as whole (segmentation), and whole as part (encompassment)” 
(Baumann/Gingrich 2004: 199). 
A further useful analytical differentiation, regarding the roles of Others in the 
construction of the Self, which focused on the classical logic of ‘Orientalism’, is 
formulated by Triandafyllidou (2001). She distinguishes ‘significant Others’ from 
‘Others’ in general, and shows that not every Other is significant in constructing the 
Self. These significant Others are generally seen in a close relationship with the in-
group. This closeness strengthens the need to differentiate from them in a more 
critical way, than from Others whose dissimilarity is more obvious. Significant out-
groups can be internal or external, and threatening or inspiring. Triandafyllidou sees 
a higher share of the threatening ones – for national identities, this threat can be a 
territorial or a cultural one. Typical external Others are neighboring nations, but one 
could also include more abstract notions, like globalization, in this category. Others 
inside the nation-state are typically ethnic minorities or immigrant groups, who are 
often perceived as challenge to the cultural purity of an in-group. 
Self-Other relationships are thereby, as pointed out, nothing stable or definite, and 
positions in- and outside of an imagined group can change with time and context. 
Like this relationship the constructions of identities, or imaginations of a groups, are 
constantly changing in dependency of different contexts. From this point of view, I 
want to present some elaborations on the imagination of the group central to my 
thesis: EUrope. Thereby, I will build upon the theoretical tools and terms presented 
in this past chapter, and show how they are applicable in the context of imaginations 
of EUrope. 
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3 Imagining EUrope 
What is EUrope? What are people referring to with this term? On which concepts and 
ideas is this EUrope built up? In this part of my thesis I want to give an overview of 
different answers for these questions. Based on the prior elaborations regarding 
different theoretical concepts surrounding identity, culture and imaginations of social 
entities in general, I want to show how imaginations of EUrope changed over time, 
and how the debate is structured today. In giving a short introduction about the 
changing meanings of Europe over time, I want to show that imaginations of Europe 
are certainly nothing new. After a short introduction of historical notions of Europe 
before 1945, the main part of this chapter will focus on meanings of EUrope after the 
Second World War. 
The somewhat peculiar and deliberate spelling of EUrope, with the capitalized EU at 
the beginning, should point to the interconnectedness between imaginations of 
Europe and the EU. The more people talk about ideas like European identity, in 
relation to the legitimization of the EU, the more confusion exists between these 
terms. In this chapter I will show that the central role of identity, in the development 
of the EU, came to prevalence in the 1980s, with a shift from an emphasis on 
integration to identity. In acknowledgement of this confusion I do not refer to an 
imagination of Europe or the EU, but I refer to this confused image – hence I will use 
the, in this sense confused, term EUrope. This does not mean that imaginations of 
Europe or the EU are unambiguous and straightforward/clear in themselves. 
Through the widespread use of a combined understanding of the two terms they very 
often stand for, or overlap, each other. Hence it can be stated that EUrope, in this 
context, absorbs the other two terms; although the actual vocabulary used is usually 
one of the two original ones, and thereby blanks out the described confusion. 
After reconstructing the chronological development of imaginations of EUrope, I 
want to present some qualitative aspects, which seem central in defining EUrope and 
Europeanness in the era of discussing identity. Thereby I will come to talk about the 
role of historic discourses, universalist and particularist approaches to identity, and a 
nationalist bias in understanding EUrope. Finally, I want elaborate on the aspect of 
Othering in imaginations of EUrope, and the special role EU-enlargement plays 
in these debates. 
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3.1 The idea of Europe (pre-1945) 
Nowadays the debate on EUrope is strongly focused on, and limited by, analyzing it 
through its connections with the EU after World War Two. Disaccording to that, I 
want to introduce this chapter with a short introduction to prior debates and 
understandings of Europe, in order to challenge the casualness and the unquestioned 
character of the utilization of the term. In doing that, it makes sense to also look into 
Padgen’s article ‘Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent’ (2002), where he presents 
different and changing understandings of Europe through history. 
He traces the idea of Europe back to ancient times, when the name Europe was 
conceived through various myths about the princess of Tyre, a city in today’s 
Lebanon, who was called Europe. These myths might be of a symbolic value, with 
tales of abduction and confrontations between what later became known as Europe 
and Asia. However, the myths do not say much about the development of the term 
Europe with regard to imagining a geographical and/or cultural space. I can only 
present a selection of notions and episodes that convey the different and changing 
ways in which Europe was imagined. The main goal of this introduction cannot lie in 
the sake of completeness, but rather in referencing the variety of ideas associated 
with Europe. It should also be stated clearly that, from ancient times on, defining 
Europe was never simply a geographical question, although geographical obstacles 
played a role, in collaboration with other factors. For example, from the perspective 
of Athens, it might make sense to view the Aegean Sea as Europe’s Eastern natural 
border, which would also make the Ionian sea the Western natural border. That 
accords with the understanding of Europe as an area around Athens, which Padgen 
presents as one of its meanings at this time. But also according to this understanding, 
Europe was more than simply a geographical space: it was – as with all other 
meanings this term came to carry – also one of identity and cultural connotation. It 
was understood to be connected with a certain way of living and social order, which 
was considered to have originated in this area; i.e. the role of the city aka Polis, as 
characterizing Europeanness. (Padgen 2002) 
In another version Europe came to describe that which lay West of Athens, which 
shows the significant role of the center of defining imaginations of Europe. 
Consequently, when Athens was superseded as this center by Rome and the Roman 
Empire, the dominant definition of Europe changed. During, and after, this time 
other defining connotations entered the meaning of Europe, namely Roman Law and 
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later Christendom. It was the imposed religion in particular that gained a central 
defining role for Europe in terms of its demarcation from Others and especially from 
Islam, lasting far beyond the fall of the Roman Empire(s). The confrontation with the 
East as central Other continued to be an integral point in defining what Europe is 
(not). The figures that represented this Eastern Other changed, i.e. between the 
Ottoman Empire, Islam in general or Russia. These confrontations did not only 
determine the Eastern border of Europe, but also the contents and qualities this 
Europe was (not) characterized by. (Padgen 2002; Stråth 2000b) 
A later defining aspect that Padgen points to is the role of Europe in symbolizing 
technical progress and, based on that, worldwide domination through colonialism. 
The era of colonialism can – according to Stråth (2000b) – also be seen as a founding 
moment for a feeling of European superiority, further enforced by racist and 
Darwinist-evolutionist undertones. In this sense “the colonial order was a special 
kind of European unification, a concerted European attempt at market penetration 
outside Europe based on various expressions of a European self-understanding” 
(ibid.: 410). The era of Enlightenment, besides a further sophistication of Eurocentric 
attitudes, also imposed more idealistic qualities on understandings of Europe: i.e. 
ideas about humanism, secularism, rationalism or a new understanding of science. It 
was also the time when nationalism began its rise, and – seemingly quite paradoxical 
from today’s perspective – it was, according to D’Appollonia (2002), the time when 
ideas about a united Europe were crafted by philosophers like Kant or Rousseau. 
Thereby a united Europe was seen as a first step towards a united, yet in Eurocentric 
ways conceptualized, humanity. Enlightenment and its ideas challenged the role of 
Christendom in defining Europe, and the Catholic Church’s power of definition was 
further diminished through reformation and the protestant movement. (D’Appollonia 
2002; Stråth 2000b) 
Those developments, with an increasing distribution of normative and discursive 
power, in defining Europe, led to a greater diversity in meanings of Europe. At that 
point the understanding of Europe was very much dependent on different 
perspectives, i.e. determined by different nationalistic or power positions. My later 
elaboration, on the development of German understandings of Europe, will show 
some more of these varieties (see 6.1.). Europe was rarely perceived as a 
homogeneous block: some parts of Europe were seen to be more European than 
others. This was very much determined by the distribution of normative power in the 
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definition of Europe. With this thought in mind, it is thus understandable why, as 
described by Stråth (2002b), the imagined South-North divide in imagining Europe 
(with the South as the more European part), turned into a West-East divide, around 
the Enlightenment period. Eastern Europe, even partly so today, is often considered 
to be a less European part of Europe. Although Eastern Europe was not seen to be as 
different as ‘real’ Others, it was connected with a certain ‘backwardness’. The line 
between Eastern and Western Europe was never clear-cut. It shifted in-between 
times and perspectives, i.e. between the eastern and western border of Germany, and 
overlapped with the concept of Central Europe. 
In consideration of these factors, it can also be explained how different imaginations 
about the structure of the continent came into being. In some meanings Europe was 
seen as determined by one normative center, and in other perspectives and/or times 
Europe denoted a ‘family of nations’. Also the idea of a united Europe continued to be 
an important point on the agenda, especially in confrontations with non-European 
Others. Around 1900 the idea of a united Europe was also meant to secure the 
dwindling hegemonic position of European powers. The motto can be described as 
‘unite or die’, and was hence less idealistic than the Enlightenment version of a united 
Europe. That aspect partly also explains the rise of those ideas after the two World 
Wars, when the power position of Europe hit rock bottom. (D’Appollonia 2002; 
Stråth 2000b) 
 
3.2 The Idea of EUrope (post-1945) 
Stråth (2000b) defines EUrope in its post-World War II version as “a continuous 
discourse on unification, and as such [it] is basically a political project” (ibid.: 420). 
Within this discourse he detects two key concepts that form its implementation, 
which “have been, first, integration, and then, when integration had lost its power to 
mobilize, identity” (ibid.: 420). In the following section I want to show, first, which 
factors lead to this discourse on unification and, second, how the described shift in 
approaching unification looked. 
 
3.2.1 EUrope as Integration Process 
After the Second World War, it was commonly perceived that the principles of the 
Treaty of Versailles, built on the idea of a balanced and peaceful side by side existence 
19 
of self-dominated nation-states as its core notion, widely failed; and that there was 
the need for a new order in Europe. The experience of the two World Wars, with their 
many cruelties, lead to a turn towards pacifism as a paradigm of unification. EUrope’s 
own past became the central Other, in defining what the new order should (not) look 
like. The idea of a more united EUrope became common sense, although its goals, or 
rather its relationship with the nationalist order, continued to be ambivalent. 
EUropean cooperation also was seen to back up a continued dominance of 
nationalisms in consideration of new geopolitical challenges. On the other hand it 
was also perceived as alternative to, and hence in opposition to, the nationalist order. 
(D’Appollonia 2002; Stråth 2000b) 
A further trigger of unification was a new world order, characterized by new super-
powers and their spheres of interest, whereby a more united EUrope was seen as 
necessary a base to withstand domination by those new powers. However, this new 
world order led to a split through EUrope, or rather to the exclusion of communist 
Eastern and Central European Countries (ECECs) from Western notions of EUrope 
and the unification project. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union gained the central 
role as Others. The Communist threat from the East also initiated a shift from the 
attitude of hindering Germany from regaining power, to one where a renewed, yet 
controlled, German power was seen as necessary to protect EUrope from this threat. 
The dilemma between renewing and controlling German power at the same time was 
seen to be solvable through a deeper cooperation between Western EUropean 
powers. (Stråth 2000b) 
Although the need for unification was more or less political common sense, the way it 
should be done was not. Thereby two different concepts of implementing this goal 
dominated the debate: federalism and functionalism. While the functionalists wanted 
to put the focus on pragmatic and technical cooperation at lower political levels, the 
federalists promoted the development of a supranational kind of EUropean federal 
state. Those two sides were brought together by the neofunctionalist concept of 
integration, which said that cooperation at some lower fields (economic to begin 
with), will lead to a spill-over-effect and cause deeper and widened cooperation in 
other fields. This cooperation then leads beyond the economic, and was envisaged to 
ultimately culminate in the development of a supranational federal state. The general 
attitude towards uniting EUrope was that it could only be done through a relatively 
slow process – and integration was the core notion in this concept. With these goals 
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and theoretical approaches in mind, the idea of the European Coal and Steel 
Community was a corresponding starting point. Although the neofunctionalist 
paradigm of constantly expanding cooperation proved to be successful in the 
following years, the development of a federalist version of EUrope, which would 
include the growing identification of its citizens with the project, was not realized. 
(Stråth 2000b) 
A united EUrope was not accomplished between the nations on the Western Side of 
the Iron Curtain, which shows the continuing strength of nationalist attitudes and the 
continuing top priority of nationalist interests. The split between the European 
Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area, and hence the split of 
Western EUrope, is seen as one trigger for the orientation away from ‘integration’ 
towards ‘identity’, as a new buzz word for the EUropean unification project. A further 
trigger of the identity-shift lay in the economic oil crises of the 1970s, the growing 
strength of neoliberal ideology, and the growing skepticism towards state-controlled 
economies. This development also led to a renewed role for ideas of individualism, 
with a focus on individual identification, in opposition to the integration of collective 
state-systems. The continuing strength of nation-state-centered legitimacy, in 
combination with the wide perception of different crisis situations, lead to a growing 
challenge for the permissive consensus through which EUropean integration 
obtained its legitimacy. The notion of permissive consensus points out that there was 
a wide lack of interest and knowledge about the EUropean political project amongst 
its population. This led to the absence of an opposition towards its actions, and was 
as such interpreted as silent agreement. The permissive consensus was also 
challenged through the widening of EUropean influences and a growing 
cognition awareness of it. Its legitimacy was increasingly questioned, and this led to a 
growing EUroskepticism. 
This development triggered a re-orientation of EUropean policy makers, and a new 
focus on identity. This was often seen as cornerstone in gaining widely perceived 
legitimacy. Another explanation for the legitimacy crisis and the turn to identity is the 
nation-state bias in constructing and understanding the EUropean project, as I will 
show later (see 3.3.3). This bias is not easy to avoid, since “many do not know how to 
escape intellectually and linguistically from the dominant model of the nation state” 
(Bellier/Wilson 2000:5). Since the EU, or rather its predecessors, are widely 
understood in nation-state-terms, and also the constructors of it took the nation-state 
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as model, the aspect of identity, as a legitimating base in the nation-state model, 
could no longer be neglected. (Bellier/Wilson 2000; Kaina 2010; Stråth 2000b) 
 
3.2.2 EUrope as Identification Process 
As a consequence of this described development, the concept or idea about identity as 
a base for EUropean unification in the 1980s succeeded the paradigm of integration. 
This lead to a heightened political role for debates about imaginations of EUrope, and 
about the implications those imaginations (should) have for the political project of 
unification. The questions are: what the state of identification with EUrope looks like, 
how it could be promoted, and on what qualities this EUrope should be or is based 
on. 
The identity-shift was, amongst others, initiated by the most prominent 
representative of the idea of a united EUrope, the European Commission. The 
Commission, at least partly, also turned away from the neofunctionalist spill-over 
assumption – where identity follows integration automatically –, towards a more 
active identity policy. The new goal was to inform the EUropean citizens about their 
own EUropeanness, in order to gain legitimacy for the EUropean unification project. 
As pointed out by Shore (2000), “the ‘problem’ according to the European 
Commission, is that Europeans are not sufficiently aware of their common cultural 
values and shared European heritage and are inadequately informed about what the 
Community is doing for them” (ibid.: 25). The political elites of the EU approached 
this task through different channels, whereby one was the formal implementation of 
an EU-citizenship. This citizenship was connected to the achievement of certain 
community rights, and should be one base for the shift of loyalty and identification 
towards EUrope. It was solely given out based on the criteria of nation-state 
citizenship in EU member states. Hence, the legal consequences of its 
implementation were kept within close limits. This leads to the assumption that its 
introduction was rather motivated by another approach towards identity-building, 
through its symbolic content. The idea is to achieve a high presence of EUropean 
symbols in the everyday lives of EUropeans, in order to gain a certain normalization 
and naturalization of the idea of a united Europe: the EU should be seen as matter of 
course. In this way, EUrope is expected to possibly gain the same kind of implicit 
power, which Gellner describes as the peculiar strength of nationalism (see 2.3). In 
this respect, Shore (2000) talks about creating ‘agents of European consciousness’ as 
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embodiment of EUrope: „all those actors, actions, artefacts, bodies, institutions, 
policies and representations […], singularly or collectively, help to engender 
awareness and promote acceptance of the ‘European idea’. These agents of 
consciousness range from the abstract and intangible to the concrete and the 
mundane: from EU institutions and civil servants, the single market, the euro, the 
metric system for weights and measures, and the proliferation of EC laws and 
regulations, to educational exchanges, town-twinning, invented Euro-symbols and 
traditions, European Union historiography, and the harmonization of European 
statistics by the Eurostat office” (Shore 2000: 26). The goal of such initiatives is, at 
least in the second instance, to provide the symbolic foundation for the imagination 
of a EUropean community, and to promote the identification with this community. 
(Shore 2000; Shore/Black 1994) 
In evaluating the success of those initiatives and, hence, the grade of identification 
with EUrope, most authors come to a rather pessimistic conclusion. One of these 
evaluations is given by Delanty and Rumford (2005), who deny the broad existence of 
the kind of EUropean collective identity that is promoted by the EU-institutions. 
Instead they talk about numerous personal identities linked with the EU on the one 
hand; and on the other, about a wider European cultural identity, not strongly linked 
to the EU, but with ideas about a European cultural heritage. This means that 
EUropeanness is becoming a feature of more and more personal (and also collective, 
i.e. national) identity set-ups, without the creation of a common EUropean ‘we-
feeling’, which would be a potential base to legitimate collective action and 
solidarity. Also Kaina (2010) comes to the conclusion that EUropean identity is still 
outshined by national identifications. The reasons for that may lie within the 
relatively large (and as such perceived) differences between EU member states, i.e. in 
economic terms. That makes it difficult to advocate the idea of EUropeans as equals, 
and leads to the perception of losers and winners of the EUropean project, which 
diminishes the development of EUropean solidarity. Kaina comes to this conclusion 
by analyzing attitudes towards EU-enlargement. Her analysis shows that a big 
sentiment wishes for a clear territory of a finalized version of the EU, and widespread 
skepticism towards further enlargement in general. In further analyzing this 
skepticism, she brings forward that there is a variation between old and new member 
states. This points to the conclusion that it is rather a protectionist nation-centered 
interest, than a perception of common EUropean values, which is determines those 
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positions. But Kaina also shows that the values perceived as typically EUropean are 
widely the same between EU-citizens, although it is not clear to what extent 
these values are seen to be shared between all EUropeans. (Delanty/Rumford 2005; 
Kaina 2010). 
The description of EU-initiatives promoting imaginations of EUrope within identity-
constructions, and the short introduction into the state of EUropean identity, 
conveyed how this EUrope is imagined. In the following section I will present some 
more notions on these questions, and reconstruct some of the, in my eyes most 
relevant, aspects regarding imaginations of EUrope. 
 
3.3 Defining EUrope, Defining EUropean 
3.3.1 Constructing a EUropean History 
In the previous chapters I tried to reconstruct how meanings of Europe developed. I 
did this in a very narrow manner, differentiations of perspectives were widely left out, 
and I focused on a few dominant aspects. In this manner I also reconstructed an 
image of EUrope’s history, which could be seen to rely on a few dominant and 
generally accepted parts, but leaving out a lot of alternative perspectives on EUrope’s 
past. Thereby, frankly, I joined into constructing EUrope through a selective 
representation of history and past, which is a very popular activity. On the other hand 
the goal of my elaboration was to show the variation in imaginations of EUrope, while 
the more usual approach is to construct EUrope as continuous and homogeneous 
community. Representations of history and collective memories are central parts in 
constructing EUrope as, in time and space, a continuous entity. Its construction is a 
process of forgetting, repressing, acknowledging and highlighting different parts of 
history. In answering what EUrope is about, one can often find notions about an 
Ancient tradition, in a symbiosis with other parts of EUropean history like the spread 
of Christendom, Enlightenment thinking, industrialization, or reformation. 
In imaginations of EUrope representations of the past not only play a positive role, as 
already mentioned earlier. The past is in other contexts also seen as Other of a new 
EUrope. This perspective sees EUrope as a negative commemoration community. The 
central part of this aspect is the Second World War and the Holocaust, as a generally 
accepted contrast for a new EUrope. The high relevance of the Holocaust in 
constructing Europe’s criminal past is also criticized, especially by the ‘new’ 
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EUropeans in the post-communist ECECs. Their tale of woe under Stalinist regimes 
is often seen as neglected, which Leggewie (2009) calls an ‘asymmetry of European 
memory’. As other rather suppressed negative memories, he names histories of 
expulsion, EUrope’s colonial history or the Armenian question. The reason for its 
relative suppression in imagining a EUropean past may lie in the, in comparison to 
the Holocaust, existing disagreements within EUrope in judgments about them. 
To a large extent these disagreements exist due to the dependency of EUropean 
memory constructions on single national representations of history. Different 
historical events are appreciated differently, in different national historiographies. In 
mentioning this, it should be obvious that the construction of EUropean memory is a, 
partly conflicting, discursive process of negotiation. Mälksoo (2009) puts it as 
follows: “Europe’s history has been written as that of the sum of national histories 
that have been considered to be more important, thus leading to the marginalisation 
or complete exclusion of smaller or ‘peripheral’ states and alternative topics [...]. 
There has been a noticeable bias in favour of Western and Southern Europe to the 
detriment of Northern and Eastern Europe in writing the history of ‘Europe’” (ibid.: 
672). It also should be mentioned that there are not only internal differences in 
writing EUropean history. In its context within worldwide history perception, some 
episodes of EUrope’s past are put differently; i.e. the history of colonialism is not as 
marginalized in many outside perspectives on EUropean history, as within many 
EUropean self-imaginations. (Leggewie 2009; Mälksoo 2009) 
 
3.3.2 Universalist and Particularist Imaginations of EUrope 
The elaboration about differences in writing EUropean history should point to the 
fact that qualities, which are seen as defining EUropeanness, are not unequivocally 
valid, but only dominant in certain representations of EUrope. Many of these 
differences, in imagining EUrope, can be traced back to a difference in theoretical 
concepts and approaches towards social entities and identities in general. Based on 
the analytical distinction of perspectives on identity I presented earlier (see 2.1), it 
makes sense to classify universalistic and particularistic perspectives on EUrope and 
the way in which its qualities are imagined. Universalists see these qualities as 
universally valid, and hence potentially enforceable in non(yet)-EUropean areas. In 
contrast to that, particularists build their imagination of EUrope upon the idea that 
there would be a certain originality and exceptionalism within EUropean qualities. 
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While the naming of certain qualities and values in defining EUrope does not 
necessarily vary a lot between these two sides, their explanatory concepts do. 
The universalist side often imagines EUrope as represented by and founded on the 
institutions of the EU and their principles, like the promotion of (universal) human 
rights and prosperity. In this perspective, EUrope does not constitute a time- and 
space-wise stable and unchangeable entity, but is pictured as something new and 
progressive. Furthermore it is a concept which can be expand the borders of ‘old’ 
EUrope and, hence, stands for a more inclusive image of EUrope, which i.e. becomes 
apparent in attitudes towards EU-enlargement (see 3.3.4). In opposition to this 
perspective the other, particularist, side constructs EUrope through the notion of its 
century-long existence and continuity. Thereby, they often build upon a certain 
approach to identity via imaginations of culture. EUropean culture, in this 
perspective, represents something that was born in the Antiquity the latest and raised 
over centuries – it is not something which could be changed easily. People who did 
not share these historical experiences can never become EUropean, since the values 
and norms that EUropeanness is about, were created and inherited through them. It 
is hence a rather exclusive imagination of EUrope. What EUrope is, is predetermined, 
if not by nature, by history. 
By looking into mainstream imaginations of EUrope, it becomes clear that the 
particularistic option is rather dominant, although elements of both sides can be 
found in most positions. A popular combination, and the confusion, of those two 
sides is illustrated by the following quote of the European Commission:  “Europe’s 
cultural dimension is there in the collective consciousness of its people: their values 
are a joint cultural asset, characterized by a pluralist humanism based on democracy, 
justice and liberty. The European Union which is being constructed cannot have 
economic and social objectives as its only aim. It also involves new kinds of solidarity 
based on belonging to European culture” (Commission of the European Community 
1988: 3, quoted in Shore 2000: 26). Values entitled humanistic, whereby the term 
‘pluralist’ points to a Universalist understanding of them, are mixed with a cryptic 
notion of a cultural dimension and a joint cultural asset, which is separated from 
social or economic dimensions. Although the term culture does not necessarily point 
to a particularist understanding, in everyday usages it is its common understanding, 
as laid out earlier (see 2.3). It also shows that primarily there is no disagreement 
regarding the values and norms which define EUropeanness, but about the 
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theoretical concepts those terms are seen through. It is hence not as important to 
look at the actual named qualities which should describe EUrope, than to elaborate 
on the different theoretical assumptions they are understood through. While the one 
side sees enlightenment values or humanism as something exclusively EUropean, the 
other side recognizes a potentially universal inclusiveness of EUrope, those values 
stand for. Other terms in definitions of EUrope are i.e. civilization/civilized, 
rationality, modernity, secularism, civil rights and democracy, justice, science, social 
welfare, diplomacy, pacifism; this list could be extended indefinitely, and shows that 
it is impossible to define EUrope without contradictions. 
The definition of EUrope is further restricted by national particularities. A very 
popular way to deal with these is represented by the slogan ‘unity in diversity’. On the 
other hand imaginations of EUrope should not be too universal, or as Delanty & 
Rumsford (2005) put it: “the EU is […] caught in the contradictory situation of 
having to define a common European culture that is universal – but not so universal 
that it is global and thus not distinctively European – and at the same time does not 
negate national and regional cultures” (ibid.: 60). The roots of this problem can be 
found in the nationalist bias of conceptualizing identity and legitimacy, which will 
become apparent in the next chapter. 
 
3.3.3 EUrope in Nationalist Terms and Concepts 
Nationalism as an identity concept is not only powerful in itself, but also for 
understandings of EUrope, since it promotes a nation-style identity construction as a 
basis for any government legitimacy. Hence, in many explanations of EUrope’s 
perceived identity deficit, and in proposing solutions for it, many scholars resort to 
nation state theories. In that manner Gerhards (according to Quenzel 2005) sees the 
central reason for a perceived democratic deficit, in the absence of a EUropean 
‘Demos’. The term Demos is crafted in order to describe an imagined whole of all 
citizens that symbolizes the political sovereign. It exists through the widespread 
perspective of citizens, who see themselves as part of this whole. Hence, they identify 
themselves with the Demos. It is a theory based on nation state concepts, and often, 
as a matter of course, transferred into an explanation of the EU’s democratic deficit 
through the absence of a EUropean Demos (or identity). The same bias is apparent in 
another explanation of the problems associated with promoting EUropean identity, 
which sees a lack of a continuous EU-territory, and hence continuing enlargement 
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debates, as one of the main obstacles. Another approach in explaining EUropean 
identity-shortcomings, i.e. represented by Habermas (according to Wimmel 2006), 
sees the problem in the absence of EUropean publicity or spheres of communication. 
Although this concept is also inspired by the nation-state, it is more open than the 
respective concepts presented before. In order to develop such a sphere of 
communication as a basis for a stronger identification with EUrope, it is necessary to 
establish more synchronic and parallel media debates, with similar topics and frames, 
and to open the national restriction of public debates, through a stronger inclusion of 
nation-external inputs. (Quenzel 2005; Wimmel 2006) 
All of these proposals, on how to promote EUropeanness as the basis of the EU as a 
nation-like entity, are problematic because there is no foreseeable final version of it 
yet. A possible approach to EUropean identity, which avoids this inconsistency, is 
through the imagination of a common EUropean culture that could be seen to be 
relatively independent from the EU, and should provide a stable foundation for 
an EUropean identity. Also the term culture can be defined in a Universalist and 
Particularist form; EUropean culture can represent universal values or exclusive 
EUropean characteristics, and is in this context used as a synonym for identity. On 
the other hand, within common understandings in the broad political and public 
debates, the term culture is seen from a Particularist perspective, as I have argued 
earlier (see 2.3). Hence, in addition the term culture does not offer an undisputed 
concept through which one could construct an undisputable European identity. 
In questioning the notion, that legitimacy is dependent on identity or identification, 
Cerutti (2008) comes to the conclusion that a nationalism-biased thought process in 
imagining EUrope, leads ultimately to a competition between the EU and the nation-
states. Since the EU is in a weak position in such a competition, “a chance for 
European identity to put down roots is given only if we conceive it as a purely political 
identity, not competing with national identities on the same level” (ibid.: 16). 
Hence, its identity must be based on the political tasks the EU is, and arguably should 
be, occupying. The argumentation should be focused on the legitimacy of fulfilling 
tasks, without an orientation towards nationalism-style legitimacy talk. A further 
critique of the nation-state bias comes from Delanty & Rumford (2005), in opposing 
themselves to approaches focused on the institutional side and the equation of 
Europeanization with the EU: “the process we are calling Europeanization cannot be 
reduced to state-centric approaches or to governance theories. In emphasizing 
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globalization, as the wider context in which Europeanization is occurring, diverse 
logics of the social construction of Europe can be identified, ranging from collective 
identities and imaginaries to new state-society relations and social models” (ibid.: 
20). With constructivist and genealogical approaches European society or identity 
could be enfranchised from the reductionist conceptions of nation state identity. In 
order to acquire a new approach, for a newly perceived phenomenon, they use 
concepts of globalization and arrange EUropean identity in a context of global 
processes, which determine this new EUropean order. 
 
3.3.4 Othering & Enlargement 
I already noted that it is impossible to define the qualities which constitute 
EUropeanness. The utilized concepts, first, often contradict each other. Second, there 
are many national sensibilities which render them unapplicable in in a uniform 
manner for every nation. And third, the aspects, which all of EUrope could identify 
with, are usually not exclusively EUropean. Neumann (2006) summarizes the 
dilemma of these latter two aspects in pointing out that “it is impossible to find a 
cultural trait that is shared by all Europeans and not shared by any non-Europeans” 
(ibid.: 9). This dilemma is not only applicable in the case of EUropean identity 
building, but for every identity construction, hence also for national ones. It is 
overcome through different discursive strategies, which make the imagination of a 
homogeneous community possible; one which can withstand those contradictions. 
The internal differences are partly reduced through unequal discursive power 
distributions, which in effect give some qualities, promoted by relatively powerful 
actors, a higher assertiveness in defining a social entity than others. I already 
mentioned how, in this logic, the South-West dominates the North-East in the 
construction of EUropean memory and history.  
A way to overcome the obstacle, that there is no EUropean quality which could not be 
found outside EUrope, lies in differentiated contexts in which certain qualities are 
highlighted or suppressed. Here with these contexts I mean the respective Others 
that EUrope deals with in different encounters. For example in differentiating 
EUrope from the USA there are other qualities brought forward than in the case of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In analyzing the role of certain Others in the definition of 
EUrope, it has to be remembered that not all Others have the same significance. In 
the development of a post-1945 understanding of EUrope, the officially named Other 
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was war or rather the EUropean past of warfare, and hence has triggered the notion 
of a pacifist vision. Through the development of the Cold War, this pacifist vision 
soon was joined by one of armed peace, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
gained a central role in defining what EUrope is (not). 
The differentiation towards the East, also after the Cold War, stayed high on the 
agenda of EUropean identity construction. For centuries it has been central to 
crafting ideas of Europe. It is not only about the definition of EUropean qualities, but 
also about defining where EUrope ends. It is not only a process of differentiation, but 
also one of in- and exclusion, and hence one of drawing borders. This leads to in- and 
outside positions and/or a perceived imperfect EUropeanness of certain eastern 
border-regions. There is no unequivocally valid border-line which could be drawn to 
the east. Due to the absence of clear geographical borders, it can only be based on 
political and cultural criteria; both are disputed and relatively unstable. Processes of 
internal Othering towards the east, through stating a certain deficiency of the 
EUropeanness of i.e. the Balkans or post-communist countries, lead to the 
construction of the western EUropean parts as superior. Besides the distribution of 
discursive power, differences in the exercise of influence on defining EUrope are also 
determined by the factor that the will to imagine oneself in the center of this EUrope 
is not shared equally by all EUropeans. Some parts of EUrope are not only on the 
margins of imaginations of EUrope because they are put there by more powerful 
discourse segments. But they also might choose so in dependency of i.e. different 
national identity constructions, whereby EUrope can even play the role of an Other. 
That is for example apparent in looking at British imaginations of EUrope. 
Eastern EUropeans, and other internal Others, are often pictured as a little backward, 
but are still included within EUrope. Hence, they are not seen to be as different as the 
East, which is commonly excluded from this notion and known as the Orient. Thereby 
it has to be mentioned that there is also a region, whose in- or exclusion into EUrope 
is disputed, and whose role in defining EUrope is of a very peculiar kind. In reference 
to Baumann’s ‘grammars of identity’, presented earlier in this paper (see 2.4), these 
regions are approached through all three grammars. Hence they are, dependent of 
context and perspective, seen as an “orientalized mirror image, a segmentary ally or 
adversary in one or another specified context, or an Other who exaggerates his 
difference while he is ‘really and deep-down’ just an encompassable part of ‘us’“ 
(Baumann 2004: 27). Eastern EUrope, in contrast, is usually only approached 
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through the latter two of these grammars. Since Turkey is a representative of this, in 
terms of imaginations of EUrope peculiar, region, I will elaborate on the role of those 
‘inbetweeners’ for imaginations of EUrope later in this paper (see 4.3, 6 & 7). 
The role of the Orient, in defining EUrope, might be clearer than for the 
aforementioned actors, but still is contradictory and complex. That is most popularly 
shown by Edward Said’s elaboration on Orientalism; roughly summarized, the mirror 
of the Orient envisions a relative EUropean superiority, and in a few points shapes an 
envying exoticism. In the last few years the central representation, of this Eastern 
Otherness, shifted from the Soviet Union towards the Islamic World. This 
development was significantly boosted by 9/11 and other Islamist terror attacks. 
Thereby, mainly values like democracy or secularism are highlighted in the 
construction of EUrope and also, in a usually more implicit way, a Christian heritage 
of EUrope. Although EUrope is generally not pictured as explicitly Christian, it is 
emphasized implicitly through the exclusion of Islam, and the constructed 
impossibility of Islam being an inherent part of EUrope. (Asad 2002; Stråth 2006b) 
As a further significant Other in imaginations of EUrope, Stråth (2000b) names the 
USA. In reference to the analytical tools of Triandafyllidou (2001; see 4.2) I presented 
earlier, the significance of i.e. Africa as Other, can be described as quiet low in 
comparison. In this latter case we can find more differences on the one hand, and 
clearer ones like prosperity or a peaceful order on the other. It is easier to present 
these latter values as EUropean when we compare it with Africa, than it would be 
with the USA as the benchmark. The role of America (as a synonym when talking 
about the USA) can partly be described as the opposite of the Orient. America is often 
seen as new and modern opposition to the old, non-dynamic, and sort of rusty 
EUrope. On the other hand the USA is also seen as wild (‘Wild West’), uncultivated 
and sometimes immoral (‘Hollywood’) ‘child’, in opposition to the more experienced 
and grown up EUropean culture. As another aspect in the differentiation from the 
USA, for example Castellina (2009) utilizes economic issues: “European  society has 
retained a certain distance from the market, from ‘economism’. However, this is 
slowly disappearing— especially since the entry of the Eastern states, which are very 
openly pro-American” (ibid.: 63). Another text, working on the differentiation to the 
USA, came from Habermas and Derrida (2003); in the opposition of EUropeans – 
represented by big demonstrations in cities all over EUrope – to the US-invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, they see an important case in the making of EUropeanness.  The 
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importance of these events for establishing the feeling of a EUropean togetherness, 
those two famous philosophers attest, is caused by the character of the USA as a fairly 
similar, and therefore significant, Other. 
Lucarelli (2008) points to the importance of the EU’s common foreign policy in the 
establishment of a EUropean ‘We’-feeling. It leads to direct encounters of Others with 
an ‘us’, which people can identify themselves with on a EUropean level. It is through 
foreign politics that EUrope creates its representation and external image to the 
outside-world, whereby it gets the chance to realize an internally formulated political 
identity, based on i.e. human rights or stability, through international politics. Also 
Manners (2002) promotes the field of international politics in the search of 
distinctive EUropean qualities. He argues that EUrope’s special role in international 
relationships lies in its normative power. Thereby, he refers to EUrope’s efforts to 
define and spread its norms in a global context. Manners exemplifies this thesis with 
the EUropean approach to the death penalty and the promotion of its abolishment. In 
trying to find something which is only EUropean, and in constructing a contrast to all 
possible Others, Manners wants to find a possible base for the construction of a 
EUropean identity. The, already mentioned, impossibility of this search for 
distinctive qualities becomes clear when looking at the critique Manners provoked, 
whereby Diez (2005) makes the argument that this normative power is not only a 
EUropean thing.  
Besides crafting EUropean self-definitions through this envisioned role in 
international relationships, EUrope’s foreign policy is also influencing the way in 
which it is perceived by Others. This in turn leads to a backlash onto EUropean self-
imaginations. Thereby it is, as Fioramonti and Lucarelli (2008) show, often more the 
image of singular EUropean national powers than the EU that crafts this outside-
perspective on EUrope. For example in former colonies, the former colonial power is 
often seen as the main representative of EUrope. These external images are 
sometimes close to self-representations of the EU, i.e. as a role model for regional 
integration. They also often differ, i.e. concerning the economic role of EUrope, which 
is in poorer countries usually seen as neo-liberal and negative like the USA. This 
would be put very differently in most EUropean self-imaginations. 
One of the most influential fields of foreign policy, in the formulation of a EUropean 
identity, is the enlargement policy towards the ECECs after the Cold War. Besides the 
picture of relative inferiority of the East, those regions are to a large extent still seen 
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as part of EUrope, which becomes clear when looking at the EU-enlargement process 
that was concluded in 2004 and 2008. In the explanation of the successful and 
uninterrupted conclusion of this process, i.e. by Sjursen (2006) or Schimmelfennig 
(2003), factors based on dominant imaginations of EUrope and EUropean history 
played a central role. This is not to say that pragmatic or materialistic interests did 
not play their role in the formation of the pro- and contra-enlargement coalitions. 
The success of the pro-side is however to a large extent explained with the utilization 
of moralist arguments, which are based on a constructed, and also by the contra-side 
supported, EUropean identity. Buzzwords like re-unification, or the construction of a 
historic and kinship-based duty towards ‘our EUropean brothers and sisters’ to 
overcome the ‘unnatural division’ of EUrope, were crafted in the context of the Cold 
War. In the 1990s those phrases turned into one of the important driving forces of the 
enlargement process. The discourse surrounding this EUropean ‘us’ is 
not predetermined, but is changing along with the discourse about enlargement. This 
highlights the interdependence between the enlargement process and imaginations of 
EUrope, and thus shows the fluidity of the latter. In utilizing identity arguments this 
fluidity is often denied, which becomes apparent in the Turkey-Debate, as I will show 
later. In orientating towards these imaginations of EUrope in the debate on EU-
enlargement, the confusion between the terms EU and Europe becomes an important 
political factor. Thereby it is often forgotten that “where Europe ends is one question 
but where the EU should end is a quite different and more political question” 
(Delanty/Rumford 2005: 36). Through the enlargement rounds in 2004 and in 2007 
the eastern borderline of the EU is now scratching the discursive border area of 
Europe. Hence, disputes in answering this question come to the fore. This will 
become clear in the following chapter about the relationships between Turkey and 
EUrope, and the debate it provoked in EUrope. 
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4 Turkey Debate 
In the previous chapter I tried to illustrate how the contexts in which EUrope is 
debated are triggering different imaginations of it. The context which is of central 
relevance for this paper is the relationship between EUrope and Turkey. In the 
following part I want to give an introduction to this relationship, in order to provide 
the necessary background knowledge to understand the debate in EUrope about it. I 
will begin this chapter by describing the relationship between Turkey and EUrope, 
and how this relationship developed over time. This will show the significant role 
EUrope, or rather the Turkish perception of EUrope, played in the development of 
Turkey. Following that, I wish to reconstruct the debate in EUrope regarding the 
relationship(s) between Turkey and EUrope. This will contain an overview about 
different positions and arguments on Turkey, and a possible Turkish EU-
membership. Last but not least I will show which role imaginations of EUrope play in 
this debate. 
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4.1 EUrope-Turkey-Relationships 
Turkey’s relationships with the area to its West, aka EUrope, are manifold and yet 
ambiguous, rife with repeated periods of wars and conflict, alternating alliances, 
cooperation and hostility towards different European actors and governments. They 
can be drawn back at least until the era of the Ottoman Empire, as widely recognized 
predecessor of today’s Turkey. Over significant periods of the Ottoman Empire 
(which lasted seven centuries) it represented a uniting Other for European countries, 
and was partly responsible for defining European qualities, i.e. those based on 
religion. The Ottoman Empire, which started to develop in the 13th century, was at its 
most powerful state in the 16th century, and was also central to European power 
constellations. In looking at this period, one perspective is to present the Ottoman 
Empire as a central player in European power struggles, and hence as inherited part 
of Europe. From another perspective the Ottomans can be seen as Europe’s central 
Other and thereby can be considered as a representation of Asia and Europe’s eastern 
border. Its in- or exclusion depends on the perspective, and on the respectively 
highlighted parts of history. One can focus on coalitions between (other) European 
powers against the Ottomans, but also on coalitions between the Ottomans and 
(other) European powers. (Markhgott 2007; Padgen 2002; Pocock 2002) 
In the posterior period of Ottoman prevalence its significance in the definition of 
Europe dwindled due to their weakened and less powerful condition. Since the 17th 
century Ottoman superiority diminished in comparison to the Empires to its West, 
who were strengthened by economic developments and colonialism. Furthermore the 
success story of nationalism also affected parts of the Ottoman Empire, i.e. the 
Balkans. Also conflicts with an invigorated Russia added to the weakened position of 
the Ottomans. In this period a fledgling orientation towards a European role model 
can be reconstructed, with the so called Tanzimat period and various reforms of the 
Ottoman legal system, such as the equalization of all citizens under public law in 
1839. The further development of such reforms was impeded by wars and the 
consequent consolidation of absolutist structures. At the same time the wish for 
liberal reforms remained strong within segments of the upper class and the military, 
which was represented by the ‘Young Turks’ movement. These Young Turks saw the 
model for a better Turkey in Western examples. They disempowered the Ottoman 
Sultan in 1909. The Young Turk period, which lasted until the end of World War I, 
was interrupted by independence movements in the Balkans, consequential wars, 
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internal power rivalry, a coup and finally the loss of World War One. The cease-fire 
and the end of World War One in 1918 meant a subversion and reboot for Turkey. 
The liberal wing of the Young Turks around Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was able to fill 
this power vacuum. Atatürk took over power and used his connections to important 
parts of the elite to put a definitive end to the Ottoman era, and built up new political 
structures. Ankara was established as the new center and seat of the national 
parliament. Atatürk managed to restrain the wishes of the victorious allies to further 
divide Turkey, and militarily ensured the establishment of a Turkish republic which 
encompassed the whole Anatolian core land. (Markhgott 2007; Tocci 2001) 
With the peace treaty of Lausanne in 1923 the Turkish republic was born, and Atatürk 
intended to construct its identity around the notion of Kemalism. In theory Kemalism 
is built upon six pillars: nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism 
modernism, and statism. The Kemalist reforms were thereby influenced by a strong 
orientation towards Western models of state, nationalism and culture. Atatürk 
wanted to implement a civic nationalism, which should ensure the unity of the 
Republic and eradicate the perceived lack of identity in the multi-ethnic Ottoman 
Empire. In this new Turkish nationalism religion was, in theory, irrelevant and every 
inhabitant was first and foremost a Turkish citizen. The rest did, or rather should, not 
matter from the state’s perspective. Thereby Atatürk wanted to follow the French 
example of civic nationalism. This process is often seen as trigger for the development 
of two nations within the Turkish state: the elitist, urban, secular and hat-wearing 
Turks on the one hand, and the traditionalist and rural Muslims on the other. 
(Markhgott 2007; Tocci 2001) 
In this secularist system religion was seen as a threat. It was seen as a task of the state 
to control religion, and to reduce its role within Turkish life in general. This led to 
various reforms of the legal system, like the abolishment of any Sharia influence and 
polygamy, the formal equation of men and women, and the introduction of a 
European-style Civil Code. These reforms were clearly inspired by the idea of 
Westernization. They were accompanied by the introduction of Latin scripture, family 
names, the Gregorian calendar and a new conception of Turkish history. All of these 
reforms were carried out in an authoritarian style, and resistance was suppressed, by 
violent means if necessary. The state was, according to the principle of statism, the 
central institution, and the aspired homogeneity should be realized through a strong 
and centralized state. The ideals of republicanism, democracy and populism were not 
36 
met until Atatürk’s death in 1938, and the state was dominated by a one-party 
system. In the 1940s, partly as a consequence of Western pressure, the first steps 
towards democracy and a multi-party system were made. During this time new 
parties were established, with the Democratic Party as the main opposition to the 
formerly unchallenged People’s Party. (Tocci 2001) 
During the initial time the Turkish Republic was merely dealing with its own 
consolidation and stabilization, and tried to stay out of international conflicts; hence 
Turkey played almost no role in World War II. On the other hand Turkey tried to 
establish good relationships with the West. After the World War Turkey clearly chose 
a side and joined NATO in 1952. Thereby Turkey not only took a stand against the 
USSR, but also created a certain distance from other predominantly Muslim 
countries. Turkey was the only NATO member with a direct border to the Soviet 
Union, and played a central role in the Cold War. Turkey furthermore was a founding 
member of the OEEC, and signed an association agreement with the EEC/EC in 1964. 
This association, from the Turkish perspective, was seen as first step towards full 
membership within the framework of the later EU. Also the EUropean side did not 
preclude this possibility and generally accepted Turkey’s EUropeanness. (Madeker 
2007; Markhgott 2007) 
In 1950 the People’s Party had to hand over power for the first time, and the 
Democratic Party took over. As a consequence of democratization, the Kemalist claim 
of populism found a more accurate realization. This brought religion, and a more 
sensible handling of religious sentiments, back into politics, whereby the Democratic 
Party represented a more convincing approach. Besides this power shift, the path of 
modernization, economic development and liberalization was successfully followed 
until the economic crises of the late-1950s. What followed was corruption, constraints 
of basic rights, rumors about electoral fraud and, in 1960, the first coup d’état by the 
military and the prohibition of the Democratic Party. That was the first of at least 
three military coups, and shows the central role of the military as guardian of 
Kemalism. Through the ‘National Security Council’ (MGK), the political influence of 
the military was institutionalized. This council, which officially was only consultative, 
repeatedly enforced its claim for power. After those military coups the democratic 
competition was always put back in place, usually with a marginally adjusted 
constitution and a few new parties, often in succession of banned old ones. The 
military perceived those steps as necessary to secure the dominance of Kemalism. 
37 
Hence, democratization faced some obstacles and discrepancies between ideology 
and reality. (Madeker 2007; Tocci 2001) 
Until the 1960s, the Kemalist revolution was characterized by its restriction to the 
centers and elites, and some kind of permissive consensus of a disinterested and 
unaffected periphery. Through democratization and modernization this political 
disinterest diminished, and the autocratic imposition of Kemalism was questioned 
more often. The aspect of strict laicism was criticized early after democratization, and 
more radically from the 1970s on, with the development of political Islam as a 
challenge to laicism. Political parties struggled to accomplish the balancing act 
between the Kemalist pro-Western and laicist course, and public calls for a more 
prominent role for Islam. This helped Islamist movements in gaining votes. In the 
1990s this movement was represented by the Welfare Party. Under their leader 
Necmettin Erbakan they gained power in 1995, and were prohibited by the military in 
1998. On the other hand there were also problems with the claim of Turkish 
homogeneity and minority uprisings, which were discriminated in this nationalism, 
especially Kurds and later Alevis. These developments reflect the imperfection of the 
intended civic nationalism, in its claim of being free from ethnic or religious factors. 
In fact ‘Turkish’ was and is implicitly equated with Turkish Sunni-Muslims, and is 
thereby partly excluding non-Turkish and non-Sunni citizens. In trying to realize this 
idea minorities were not acknowledged and their languages were to a large extent 
suppressed. This, also due to issues of poverty, led to a Kurdish uprising from the 
1960s on. The reaction lay in its repression and in its framing as a terrorist threat to 
the Republic. The ethnic content of Kemalist nationalism is also visible in the 
relationship with Turkish minorities outside of Turkey. Thereby, Turkey claimed 
responsibility for those, non-civic, but ethnic, Turks. The most prominent case for 
this can be found in the Cyprus conflict, where Turkey, in order to protect the Turkish 
minority, militarily occupied the northern part of the island, and initiated the 
founding of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The latter exists until today 
and is only recognized by Turkey itself. This issue remains the central obstacle to the 
acceptance of Turkey into the EU. (Madeker 2007; Markhgott 2007; Tocci 2001) 
These factors, in combination with economic crises, kept Turkish politics from 
stabilization, and led to further military coups in 1971 and 1980. This also led to a 
backlash of the relationships with EUrope and the aspiration of being part of it. 
Although those issues, and especially the Cyprus conflict, remain central obstacles to 
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a successful conclusion of the Turkish EU-accession, the relationship between Turkey 
and EUrope was widely consolidated in the years after the military coup in 1980. A 
process of Turkish re-democratization reversed the trend, and the connection 
between Turkey and the EEC was recovered. In 1987 Turkey applied for full 
membership to the EEC, which was – preliminary – with reference to Turkey’s 
deficient achievements, rejected, although the general possibility of its membership 
was accepted. Turkey continued to work on its EUropean aspirations and in 1995/96 
they became part of the EU’s Customs Union. On the other hand, due to the 
escalation of the Kurdish problem, and the orientation of Erbakan towards the 
Muslim World, the relationship(s) cooled off again temporarily. After a ‘soft coup’ 
through the military and the stepping-down of Erbakan’s Islamist government this 
trend was, again, reversed. In 1997 Turkey tried one more time to approach the EU, 
in asking for acceptance as an official enlargement candidate, and experienced a 
further rejection only to gain this status two years later in 1999. (Madeker 2007; 
Tocci 2001) 
After 1999 the reform process in Turkey, also due to the prospect of a possible EU-
membership, gathered momentum. Turkey made much progress towards fulfilling 
the political criteria to begin accession talks. The first steps were made by a coalition 
government between 1999 and 2002. The reform process was strongly accelerated by 
the AKP-government after the 2002 elections. This represents a shift of actors in the 
advocacy of the EU-accession: instead of the Kemalists, who worried about the 
conservation of the Kemalist status quo in the context of EUropeanization, the new 
political power of moderate Islam, represented by the AKP, turned into the pro-EU 
force. The reforms concerned democratic standards, civil liberties, the Kurdish issue, 
or the separation of powers. In the following years Turkey made much further 
progress in adopting the EU’s ‘aquis communautaire’, abolished the death penalty 
and the state of emergency in the south-eastern provinces, boosted their efforts in 
fighting torture, improved the implementation of fundamental freedoms, and signed 
the European Convention on Human Rights. This progress was also accredited by the 
EU, and led to the opening of accession talks between Turkey and the EU in 2004. 
(Avcı 2006; Madeker 2007) 
The era of reformism is very often explained through the incentives of the potential 
EU accession, which puts domestic issues in Turkey in the background. Disaccording 
to that, as laid out by Johansson-Nogués & Jonasson (2011), the changes in Turkey 
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only could happen because of significant identity changes from the 1990s on. They 
summarize this change in stating that “there are [...] three principal sub-groups 
engaged in the current dialectic on the Turkish national identity (Kemalists, AKP and 
Kurds). This marks a difference compared to only two decades ago when the national 
discourse was the jealously guarded exclusive terrain of fairly repressive and 
orthodox Kemalism” (ibid.: 118). This growing pluralism and challenge of the 
Kemalist hegemony, through, amongst others, Islamic and Kurdish groups, led to the 
potential for reforms, and the social demand for greater political and personal 
freedoms.  
The reform process was only successful as far it accorded with those different 
approaches to Turkish identity, and only in areas where they did not lie too far apart. 
The lack of national homogeneity is visible with the end of this reform era after 2004, 
and the consequential slowdown of progress towards fulfilling the EU’s accession 
criteria. While priorly the reforms went down relatively smoothly, their interpretation 
and implementation, as well as upcoming reform projects, caused more conflicts. For 
example, the difference between Kemalist and AKP approach towards religious 
freedom became virulent, in debating the legalization of wearing a headscarf in 2008. 
On the other hand, there is also a bipartisan conservatism in many issues, which 
became visible in the Turkish reluctance to abolish Article 301 of the penal code. This 
article penalizes the ‘insult of Turkishness’, and provoked a lot of criticism by 
EUropean, and other, actors. This conservatism also becomes visible in the reform 
process concerning minority, or rather Kurdish, rights. Thereby the AKP stood 
somewhere between Kurdish interests and conservative Kemalism. Initiatives to 
liberalize the use of the Kurdish language or the status of Kurdish political parties, 
like for example brought forward by the AKP in 2009, usually met a lot of resistance 
and were undermined by discriminatory court decisions. Another important field of 
reforms concerns the (re-)alignment of power between different Turkish state 
institutions. The AKP-government struggled to take away power from the military, as 
well as from the judiciary. They tried to overcome the orthodox Kemalist attitude 
towards the protection of the state from democracy, in order to gain more power for 
the government and, hence, themselves. Although the AKP won most of the fights for 
power, the way to a clear separation of power and the diminishment of the military’s 
political power still has to overcome a lot of obstacles. (Avcı 2006; ESI-Report 2010; 
Johansson-Nogués/Jonasson 2011; Küçük 2008) 
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Despite all the justified critique of Turkey’s development, it cannot be said that its 
EUropeanization halted. In the last number of years Turkey made progress 
concerning the division of powers, minority rights, and the liberalization of the 
political field in general; i.e. through a positive referendum on a reform package in 
2010. Often those reforms are seen as inspired by the accession process towards 
EUrope. Its eventual stagnation is often explained by the critical discourse on Turkey 
within EUrope, and the discouraging effect of culturalist arguments or announced 
referendums in some European countries in the case of the successful conclusion of 
the accession talks. According to Schrijvers (2007), this brings reform-supporting 
Turkish governments into domestic legitimization problems, and leads to a weaker 
and less visible role of EUrope in Turkish politics. That goes hand in hand with the 
stagnant accession process. While Croatia, whose accession talks started at the same 
time, has completed the negotiations by now, Turkey has only completed one of 35 
negotiation chapters. In 2006 the ratification of the Ankara-protocol, or rather the 
realization of the Customs Union with Cyprus, was still incomplete. That led the EU 
to freeze eight of the negotiation chapters, and made the provisional closing of any 
more chapters impossible. Twelve chapters are being negotiated on until 2011, and 
since 2008 only one chapter was opened. The situation is further exacerbated by EU 
members such as France, Cyprus or Germany, which block the opening of a number 
of negotiation chapters through their veto power. In consequence, only a small 
number of chapters remain to be opened. Some commentators think that this could 
lead to a ‘natural death’ of the negotiation process, since soon there could be nothing 
left to negotiate. On the other hand, the accession process is not only compromising 
the official negotiations and Turkey continues to work on frozen or blocked chapters, 
and once they are officially opened they could find a conclusion fast. (Avcı 2011; BBC 
2011; ESI-Report 2010; European Commission 2011; Schrijvers 2007) 
The reasons for the often perceived reform crisis are usually seen in the large and 
rising opposition against the Turkish EU-accession in EUrope, in combination with 
the falling support of it in Turkey. From 2004 to 2010 the popular support for 
accession fell from 71% to 47% in Turkey, according to Eurobarometer data (see 
Zalewski 2011). Also the Cyprus problem, as it seems at the moment, is going 
nowhere and its solution is hard to imagine. This, amongst other things, led to a 
perceived re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy: “by insisting that Turkey was as 
European as it was Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian and Centralasian, the AKP had 
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launched a foreign policy revolution” (Zalewski 2011: 98). The Turkish government 
tries, according to their new foreign policy approach of ‘zero problems’, to achieve 
better relations with all of its neighboring countries. The main goal and tool of this 
program lies in economic cooperation, whereby questions of human rights and 
democratic standards are usually not considered. This has led to, amongst other 
things, concerns in the West about the Turkish attitude towards Iran. It is often 
framed as a turn, away from the West, towards the Muslim World. In the opinion of 
Zalewski (2011) this is not the case, since he thinks that “instead of deferring to 
American or European interests in the Middle East, Turkey has begun to promote its 
own agenda. Where this coincides with western ones, fine. Where it does not, too 
bad” (ibid.: 102). On the other hand the Turkish government repeatedly expressed its 
continuing commitment to the accession process. Although they do not want to 
express their dependency on EUrope, the accession process is still the number one 
issue on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. By pointing to the stagnant reform process, 
this is often framed as lip service. All in all it can be observed that there is a 
(perceived) lowering of incentives associated with the EU accession process, i.e. 
through a weakened credibility of the EU's commitment to the accession process, and 
a rise of political costs at the Turkish domestic level. The latter factor was partly 
defused through the strengthening of the AKP-government in the 2011 general 
elections, after which the AKP's main spokesperson for EUropean affairs Egemen 
Bağiş was promoted to a minister status. The ESI-Report (2010) comes to the 
conclusion that the chance of a shipwreck of the accession process is minor at the 
moment. This would simply not be in the interest of most EU-actors, as well as 
Turkish ones. Neither is it very likely that the accession process will come to a 
conclusion soon. Hence, the status quo, an open-ended accession process, will 
probably stay intact for some years to come. (Avcı 2006; Avcı 2011; ESI-Report 2010; 
Johansson-Nogués/Jonasson 2011; Zalewski 2011) 
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4.2 Debating Turkey in EUrope 
After summarizing some literature concerning the relationship between Turkey and 
EUrope, in this part I want to reconstruct the way in which the political elites in 
EUrope view this relationship. I want to give a first impression of the EUropean 
debates on a possible Turkish EU-accession. These debates, or rather their 
contentiousness, are often named as central reasons for Turkey’s limping accession 
process. The Turkey question was one of the most controversial EU-issues in the last 
decade. It certainly is the most polarized enlargement debate. The debate is very 
emotional and there is a strong polarization between supporters and opponents of a 
Turkish EU-accession. This polarization is obvious at the political and governmental 
level, which goes hand in hand with strong concerns in wide segments of the EU’s 
population, as surveys show. Turkey is in this respect, compared to every other 
potential future EU member state, facing the strongest opposition. 
Hence,Eurobarometer 69 comes to following result, after asking about attitudes 
towards potential EU enlargements (Figure 1: European Commission 2008): 
The reasons for these strong public concerns regarding Turkey are often explained by 
the size and relatively high poverty of the country. Other aspects are – highly 
dependent on the specific member state – discourses on a history of conflict between 
Europe and Turkey or the Ottoman Empire, or by those on the Turkish Diaspora in 
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Europe. In the last few years – at least since 9/11 – the dominant explanatory factor 
for public anxiety is often seen in Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population. (De 
Vraese et. al. 2008; McLaren 2007)  
The political debate stands in a relationship of mutual dependency with public 
opinions. It became strongly heated over the course of the ongoing accession process. 
Schimmelfennig (2009) summarized some of the governmental positions, at 
European Councils concerning Turkey’s accession process, in the following table (+ 
stands for pro-, – for anti-Turkey positions): 
  
(Figure 2: Schimmelfennig 2009: 417, Table 1) 
According to Schimmelfennig these respective positions proved relatively stable. 
Changes in this table were mostly due to governmental changes, and not to processes 
of policy learning. The table presents positions of actors which were very present and 
engaged in the debate. It shows a significant decline of support for the Turkish 
accession process in the latter period. This was mostly due to power changes in 
Germany and France, where Turkey-skeptic governments came into place. The 
Turkey debate played a visible role in the election campaigns which preceded those 
governmental changes, whereby the parties which echoed public doubts on Turkey 
won. 
The Turkey question hence developed into a major issue on EUropean agendas. The 
debates partly were very intense and brought forward a wide variety of perspectives 
and arguments. In order to summarize the content of those debates it makes sense to 
start with one major difference between them. This differentiation is presented by 
Wimmel (2006), and is about sub-questions of the overall context of discussing the 
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question of a Turkish EU-accession. Wimmel thereby sees two major questions, 
which are discussed in debates on Turkey: 
• debating the time frame, form and criteria of the accession process, different 
perspectives on Turkish achievements and shortcomings in fulfilling different 
criteria 
• debating the general possibility of a Turkish full membership, and whether 
there are relatively unchangeable characteristics of Turkey which speak 
against it 
The second question was formally on the political agenda (informally it is still in place 
today) in 1997, when Turkey asked for the approval of its official candidacy status. 
This bid was rejected, whereby religion and the strength of Conservatives amongst 
EUropean governments played a significant role. In 1999, only two years later, 
Turkey, successfully, tried again to reach candidate status. This went hand in hand 
with a more inclusionist attitude of EU-actors towards enlargement in general. That 
was, amongst other things, due to the strong position of social democrats in 
EUropean governments. Also criticism about the EU’s passive foreign policy attitude 
during the Kosovo-War played a role. On the other hand Turkey, as described earlier, 
went through a range of political developments and reforms, which found recognition 
at the EUropean political elites. Turkey boosted this by carrying out an intense 
lobbying strategy, and the rise of sympathies was further enhanced after an 
earthquake catastrophe in Turkey. In 1999, all these factors added up to a very 
positive constellation for Turkey’s ambition to gain official candidacy status. The 
decision was also influenced by the perception that a Turkish membership would be 
possible only in the very long-term anyway. Hence, it was seen more as a symbolic 
act, than a decision with concrete political consequences. (Font 2006; 
Schimmelfennig 2009) 
Due to the successful and fast reform process in Turkey after 1999, actors in the EU 
countries started to realize, that a possible Turkish EU-membership was becoming 
more realistic. Hence, the debate became strongly heated. A stronger polarization of 
the Turkey debate took place, mostly through the introduction of culturalist 
arguments into the debate, but also through the concern over more materialistic 
interests. The process of accession continued despite this, and soon the question of 
the opening of accession negotiations was on the table. In 2002 Turkey’s candidacy 
status was re-confirmed by the European Council, and December 2004 was, following 
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a mediating initiative by Germany and France, named a possible start date for 
accession talks. The European Commission, in their annual progress reports on 
enlargement candidates, expressed a qualified support for the start of accession talks. 
Thereby they formulated concerns about the continuously deficient implementation 
of the conducted political reforms in Turkey. They supported maintaining further 
postponements and the abandonment of accession talks as explicit options. The 
European Council widely followed this position, although it was a difficult 
negotiation, with veto threats by Cyprus and Austria. Anti-Turkey actors thereby 
managed to include further conditions, like options on extended transition periods in 
the case of a Turkish EU-membership. Their attempts to explicitly formulate 
alternatives to full membership within the negotiation agreement failed. 
(Schimmelfennig 2009; Tassinari 2008) 
The surprisingly straight forward accession process until 2005 is often explained by 
the norms which came into force through the granting of candidacy status. Also 
Schimmelfennig (2009) describes this aspect: “to the extent that Turkey complied 
with liberal-democratic norms, member states opposed to Turkish membership for 
economic or cultural reasons could not legitimately block the path to accession but 
were rhetorically entrapped” (ibid.: 415). In relation to this point, Font (2006) 
describes institutional arrangements and polity norms within the EU as important 
aspects in understanding the progress made so far and the decision to engage in 
accession talks with Turkey. Following the 1999 decision to accept Turkey as an 
official enlargement candidate, “the agenda and the possible range of outcomes were 
strongly conditioned by both European fundamental norms and institutional 
dynamics” (Font 2006: 211). Through those socialized norms, and the legitimately 
perceived demand of compliance with them, the pro-Turkey coalition was able to 
keep the accession process on track. Thereby the Commission, and its progress 
reports on Turkey, gained a relatively powerful role in the enlargement process. In 
consequence, the European Council did not override the Commission’s 
recommendations. (Font 2006; Schimmelfennig 2009)  
Nonetheless, it was only the start of a very difficult negotiation process, with many 
obstacles for Turkey’s possible accession. Through governmental changes in Germany 
and France, the anti-Turkey coalition was significantly strengthened. The Austrian 
and French threats, to carry out decisive referendums in case of the successful 
conclusion of accession talks, had cast one more cloud over the process. In general, 
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much skepticism existed towards future EU-enlargements, after the fast pace of 
enlargement in the last few years, with the accession of twelve countries in the last 
decade. Also the negative votes on the European Constitution in France and the 
Netherlands in 2005, were to a large part interpreted as votes against an overhasty 
enlargement process. The strengthened anti-Turkey coalition was however bound to 
the rules of the enlargement process, and dependent on the opinion of the 
Commission. After 2004 this opinion, represented by the progress reports, became, 
in the light of the stagnant reform(-implementation) process in Turkey, more critical. 
The main obstacle for the accession talks was seen in Turkey’s deficient realization of 
the Customs Union, which is not yet fully extended to Cyprus. This led the 
Commission to recommend that eight of the 35 negotiation chapters should not be 
opened and none should be provisionally closed until Turkey fixes this problem. The 
Council, again, acted in accordance with these recommendations, which 
“demonstrates that rhetorical entrapment cuts both ways. As long as Turkey complied 
with EU norms, it backed the supporters of Turkish accession and constrained the 
skeptics. However, when Turkey failed to comply, it gave legitimacy to the claims of 
the skeptics to slow down the accession process and forced the supporters of Turkey’s 
membership bid to join in.” (Schimmelfennig 2009: 428-429). Although the 
accession process experiences a worrying stagnation, the anti-Turkey actors did not 
succeed in ending the accession process. (Schimmelfennig 2009) 
The entrapment approach, in reference to EU-norms, might explain the relatively 
successful argumentation of the pro-Turkey coalition, but it cannot explain why 
different actors joined the respective coalitions. To explain opposition or advocacy of 
the Turkish accession, it is necessary to take different interests and arguments into 
account. Subsequently I want to describe some of the, according to respective 
literature, central issues. A major argument lies in the size and poverty of Turkey, and 
the economic and financial impacts of a Turkish EU-membership. Since Turkey’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is far under the EU-average, the concern 
over high financial short- and medium term costs was frequently formulated. In this 
context the thesis around the EU’s lack of absorption capacity for new member-
states, after the past enlargement, was brought forward. On the other hand pro-
Turkey sentiments brought arguments about potential long-term profits due to the 
dynamic and fast growing economy and the young demographic conditions of Turkey 
into the debate. Turkey’s opponents translate those demographic conditions into a 
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threatening migration flow from Turkey towards EUrope. This argument is especially 
present in countries with big and visible Turkish or Muslim diasporas. The high 
relevance of this question is for example shown by de Vraese et al. (2008) for the 
Netherlands. Thereby they bring their empirical research to the conclusion that 
negative attitudes toward immigrants are the most influential factor in the formation 
of public opposition towards a Turkish accession. (De Vraese et al. 2008; Font 2006; 
McLaren) 
The size of Turkey is also central in debating institutional interests. These relate to 
the serviceability and power distribution within the EU institutions. The concern for 
the potentially high impact of a Turkish inclusion was often brought to the fore. 
Actors skeptical to the enlargement argued, that Turkey would, according to the 
current conditions, gain one of the most, or the single most, influential position(s) in 
terms of voting numbers within EU decision-making processes. On the other hand a 
Turkish accession also could lead to a potential, yet not certain, strengthening of the 
EU-impact within the NATO-institutions, and international organizations in general. 
Also when debating the geopolitical impacts of Turkey’s EU-membership – originally 
the major source of a Turkish inclusion in EUrope –, opposed prognoses and 
interpretations can be observed between pro- and anti-Turkey speakers. The 
predominantly Islamic confession of Turks, and EUrope’s relationship with the 
‘Islamic World’, are shaping the debate. 9/11 and other Islamist terror attacks are 
referred to, as well as to the generally perceived threat of clashing civilizations. 
Turkey is often framed as a bridge between those civilizations, and its EU-
membership could heighten the possibility of the EU playing a mediating and peace 
advocating role. The Turkish accession is hence seen as a possibility for EUrope to 
heighten its power in international politics, and to potentially relativize the unilateral 
world order and the USA’s monopoly on the status of superpower. Opposed to this 
argument are culturalist concerns about Turkey’s Muslim population. This would 
make Turkey just too different to join EUrope, and a potential threat to peace within 
EUrope. Also worries about possible external-borders of the EU with countries like 
Iraq or Iran, and about increased difficulties to control migration movements are 
often brought up in the debate. (Baban/Keyman 2008; Font 2006) 
These arguments explain parts of the formation of different attitudes towards Turkey. 
They also go hand in hand with different imaginations of EUrope. They are related to 
different perspectives on the state, as well as on the future ideal of the EU and 
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EUrope. Different actors want EUrope to take over different tasks, and thereby a 
Turkish EU-accession has different consequences on those different imaginations of 
EUrope. In the following section, I will focus on the role these imaginations of 
EUrope play in the EU-Turkey debate. 
 
4.3 Imaginations of EUrope in Debating Turkey 
Differences between imaginations of EUrope played the central part in turning 
Turkey into the most debated EU accession candidate so far. For example according 
to Wimmel (2006), the start of a broad public debate on the Turkey-question is 
connected to a statement by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former president of France and 
the European Convention. In an interview with the newspaper Le Monde in autumn 
2002 he said, in relation to Turkey, that “its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its 
population lives outside Europe, it is not a European country.” Regarding a possible 
Turkish EU-accession he said that “in my opinion, it would be the end of Europe” 
(BBC 2002). In reaction advocates of the Turkish accession, like the British and 
Spanish governments, and Turkey itself, resolutely rejected this culturalist approach 
in defining EUrope. They warned of the negative impact such statements could have 
for Turkey and EUrope. Madeker (2007) argues similarly, that the Turkey debate is 
organized around the masterframe of EUropean identity. She says that the 
assumption of EUropean identity is widely unchallenged in general, and determines 
the validity of arguments. Madeker further argues that the masterframe of the 
existence of a EUropean identity can be seen as Derivate in the sense of Vilfredo 
Pareto; a Derivate is used in discourses to legitimize one’s position by masking the 
real motivations with seemingly rational arguments or (master-)framing, which do 
not coincide with an empirical scientific reality. The masterframe of EUropean 
identity that is obvious in the Turkey-Debate is in Madeker’s eyes such a Derivate, 
since she falsifies its existence in pointing to Eurobarometer-surveys, which show 
that most people feel stronger bound to their nationality than to EUrope. In this logic, 
the notion of EUropean identity would only be used to legitimize one’s position. This 
position actually would be determined by other motivations, which are obscured by 
the Derivate of EUropean identity. Such motivations would lie for example in the 
more materialistic interests I talked about above. In my eyes Madeker reinforces the 
reasons why I try to avoid the term identity. It can lead one to forget that the non-
existence of a nationalist-inspired collective identity on the EUropean level does not 
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mean that there might be imaginations of EUrope, with action-relevant and 
consequential contents, despite that. 
In my opinion imaginations of EUrope play, apart from framing the debate, a crucial 
role in the formation of pro- and anti-Turkey positions and coalitions, although 
EUropean identity does not exist in a nation-style way. In justifying this opinion, I 
can rely on Küçük (2008), who, beyond that, points to the complexity of Turkey’s role 
in constructing EUrope. Turkey is a provocation or trigger for altering imaginations 
of EUrope, since its role as an ‘Other’ is not clear. Küçük describes the Turkey-issue 
as a challenge to imaginations of EUrope, and as a boarder mark between two 
different ways to define EUrope. I described these two ways of imagining EUrope 
earlier (see 3.3.2) as universalist and particularist approaches. Turkey can potentially 
be included into the universalist version of EUrope, under the condition of specific 
and reachable criteria. It is very often excluded from the particularist version, without 
any real chance of inclusion. The role of imaginations of EUrope, in positioning 
actors in the Turkey debate, becomes very obvious when comparing it to the debate 
on the enlargement towards the ECECs. In this latter case, the imaginations of 
EUrope through these two different perspectives did, in contrast to the Turkey-
question, not lead to different positions. The accession of those countries has widely 
been presented as a historical step and moral duty, i.e. in order to re-unite Europe. 
This kind of rhetoric is usually absent in respect to Turkey, as pointed out by 
Lundgren (2006): “the Central and Eastern Europeans were considered to be part of 
‘us’ and there was a feeling of responsibility towards them which did not exist 
towards the Turks” (ibid.: 138). 
On the other hand, arguments around EUrope’s responsibility towards Turkey are 
formulated by advocates of an inclusive EUrope. They have less persuasive power in 
comparison, since they are not common sense. In respect to Turkey this notion is 
built upon a perceived role of EUrope, as a promoter of universal values. They 
construct a responsibility to support Turkey’s positive development. On the other 
hand they formulate the concern that negative signals of the EU could result in the 
stalling of Turkish reforms. The most usual way, in providing an inclusive notion of 
EUrope, is hence based on a universalist perception of EUropean values. Those are 
for example represented and summarized by the Copenhagen Criteria for accession. 
Through fulfilling those criteria Turkey can become EUropean, and hence can 
become part of the EU. Another common, yet in comparison to the notion of 
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universal values still unusual, way to include Turkey into notions of EUrope, lies in 
the utilization of historical and cultural notions and the construction of a common 
history. It is argued that the Ottoman Empire was a central player in the European 
system of states and powers. Turkey would have had a big influence on Europe, and 
also on Christendom. The least common way in imagining an inclusive EUrope, is the 
one which is based on geographic terms and frames. In focusing on the argument of 
universal values, the inclusionist side of the debate on Turkey suffers from the 
absence of explicitness. They cannot deliver a stable and lasting definition of EUrope, 
which is often asked for in reference to the promotion of a EUropean identity. 
(Beban/Keyman 2008; Madeker 2007) 
In constructing an exclusive version of EUrope in respect to Turkey, the role of 
geographically framed arguments is much stronger. The geographic definition of 
EUrope is seen as natural, logical and definite. It is for example realized in references 
to school books where the Bosporus is the most common borderline between Asia 
and EUrope. The imagination of an in- or exclusive geographical notion of Europe, 
nearly always goes hand in hand with supporting Turkey’s in- or exclusion into the 
EU; they are hence usually taken up by the anti-Turkey side. The geographical frame 
is usually only used to back up other exclusive frames. A very popular frame of 
exclusion lies within the construction of a historical and cultural otherness of Turkey. 
Madeker (2007) calls these arguments ‘primordial codes’, whereby she points to the 
imagination of inheritance and ancestry. EUrope is, in this perspective, built upon 
historical roots. Turkey is missing the mental background, which EUrope was 
constructed on during i.e. the Antiquity, the Renaissance, the Reformation or the 
Enlightenment. Because this cultural cognitive element is missing in Turkey, the 
development of a profound EUropean style civil society, which would include the 
internalization of EUropean values by the masses, is seen as an impossibility. 
Whichever reforms the Westernized elite may conduct, Turkey, in this opinion, would 
at most be a recipient of EUropean values. It could never become a fully-fledged part 
of EUrope. The same logic of inheritance is also used in the construction of an alien 
typical Turk. This Turk has a different folk culture, tradition, or patterns of mentality. 
In this context Turkey is referred to in terms of gender ratios, attitudes towards 
corruption and loyalty, or general life-styles and habits. The fundamental difference 
between the Turk and EUrope is explained by, and synchronized in, imagining a 
difference between Islam and EUrope. Christendom is seen as one more historical 
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experience in the creation of EUrope. It is also seen as an influential factor in the 
system of inherited conceptions, which define the typical EUropean, in this approach. 
The result of these primordial codes of differentiation and exclusion is the definition 
of a clear-cut border between the Self and the Other. These borders are, in their 
connection with the past, seen as unchangeable. They build upon widely existent and 
internalized stereotypes and interpretations of culture and history. This includes the, 
in some EUropean countries widespread, image of the Turk and/or Muslim as a 
threat and fundamentally different. Those differences are constructed in an 
Orientalist tradition; hence the Other is seen as inferior to the Self. (Madeker 2007) 
The Turkey question is generally framed as a decisive moment for the future of 
EUrope. Madeker (2007) talks, in the context of the German debate on Turkey, about 
its framing as a Schicksalsfrage. The decision on Turkey’s in- or exclusion is generally 
perceived as a decision on EUrope’s destiny. This construction is connected to a crisis 
perception: the EU and hence EUrope is seen in crisis. A possible accession of Turkey 
would mitigate or intensify this crisis. In the exclusive imagination of EUrope the 
crisis is often described in terms of overextension or overstraining. The admission of 
Turkey into the EU would be the last straw, which would mean the end of EUrope. It 
goes hand in hand with the construction of a contradiction between widening and 
deepening. Only one of these potential goals can be achieved, in this approach. It is 
argued that, if the EU continues the fast pace of the enlargement process, it could 
mean the end of further political and cultural integration. It could result in an EU 
which is nothing more than a free trade area. On the other hand there are, besides 
actors who would actually prefer such a reduction of EU-influence for the sake of 
national autonomy, visions of EUrope, which see the multicultural character of 
EUrope as a central chance to promote a new kind of identity. Baban & Keyman 
(2008) argue that Turkey could significantly add to this multicultural quality. Such a 
quality would give EUrope the chance to offer different solutions to i.e. ‘cultural’ or 
‘civilizational’ conflicts. A EUrope, which comprehends Turkey, is often seen as a 
possible solution for the conflict between the Western and the Muslim worlds. 
Similarly to the achievement of an era of peace through cooperation within EUrope, 
cooperation with Muslim countries could bring a peaceful solution or rather avoid the 
escalation of this potential conflict. The handling of the Turkey-question could 
thereby promote a new international role and identity for EUrope. It would, in this 
approach, also bring a new self-understanding, which overcomes nationalist pledges 
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for cultural homogeneity and promotes a post-national era. This would deliver a 
certain EUropean originality, which is seen as necessary in order to promote 
EUropean identity. (Baban/Keyman 2008; Madeker 2007) 
All in all it can be said that the Turkey question provokes a debate in which different 
visions of EUrope clash. Baban & Keyman (2008) note in this context that “the 
debate about Turkey is in essence a debate about the future of Europe in terms of its 
identity, its geography, its political and institutional structure, and its role in our 
globalizing world” (ibid.: 110). This framing of the Turkey-issue as a vital question 
may explain the high intensity of this debate in certain political arenas in EUrope. 
One of the central hypotheses of this paper is that the Turkey question not only 
provokes the clash of different imaginations of EUrope, but produces new 
imaginations and reconstructs old ones. In this chapter I reconstructed the literature 
which mainly elaborates on the role imaginations of EUrope play in the Turkey 
debate. In the upcoming empirical case study on the political debate in Germany, I 
want to show, what role the debate on Turkey plays for imaginations of EUrope. 
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5 Research Design and Methodology 
5.1 Theoretical Approach: Critical Discourse Analysis 
The approach of my thesis is based on the general understanding that the idea of 
EUrope is constructed through social processes. Hence, it is determined by different 
social actors. This means that I see EUrope as a socially constructed imagination. My 
goal is the de- and reconstruction of the historical processes, in which ideas of 
EUrope were crafted and established. I will specifically focus on the influence of 
processes related to the debate on the possible accession of Turkey into the EU. The 
process of crafting and establishing imaginations of EUrope can be described as 
discursive process. Hence, imagining EUrope can be labeled as a discourse, and 
approached through the utilization of discourse analysis. The notion of discourse, in 
this framing, was put forward by Michel Foucault, who utilized the term in crafting 
his discourse analysis. Thereby he intended to reconstruct representations of social 
phenomena. The concepts of discourse and discourse analysis were, following this, 
utilized and rebranded by a wide range of social scientists. It led to the establishment 
of various discourse analytical branches. The branch I will approach for my paper can 
be referred to as ‘Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)’. This choice is based on the 
consideration of its successful application in the reconstruction of imaginations of 
nation states and other social entities. Some members of this scientific branch 
contributed to the volume ‘Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis’ (Eds.: 
Wodak/Meyer 2009), which was a very useful introduction to the utilization of these 
approaches in my research context. In consequence, the further elaborations on the 
central terms and concepts of discourse analysis will follow the works out of the CDA-
branch. Within this CDA-tradition I will follow the discourse historical approach 
(DHA). This was, amongst others, developed by the Viennese linguist Ruth Wodak. 
Its specific strength lies in the historical reconstruction of interdiscursive 
relationships. It was also successfully used in the analysis of identities. 
To begin, it is first necessary to describe what I mean when I talk about ‘discourse’, 
since it is a term that can take various forms of meanings and contents: “discourse 
means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political 
strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, 
topic-related conversations per se. We find notions such as racist discourse, gendered 
discourse, discourses on un/employment, media discourse, populist discourse, 
discourses of the past and many more – thus stretching the meaning of discourse 
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from a genre to a register or style, from a building to a political programme” 
(Wodak/Meyer 2009: 2-3). In general it can be said that a discourse consists of some 
form of texts around a topic. This also means that “as an analytical construct, a 
‘discourse’ always depends on the discourse analyst’s perspective” (Reisigl/Wodak 
2009: 89). The delimiting of discourses is not a straight forward process. It does not 
follow any form of clear or objective borders. The texts that discourses are constituted 
by can take very divers forms. Despite classical forms of text, it could for example also 
be a picture or statue. Texts or semiotic practices are relevant for a discourse analysis 
through the meaning they transport. Language is understood as a social practice, 
through which meaning is constructed. Discourses stand in a dialectical relationship 
with the social or specific social phenomena. The social determines the contents of 
discourses, but discourses also change the social or rather representations of it. The 
same dialectical relationship can be described between discourses and power; 
through constructing the social, discourses have an impact on power distribution. At 
the same time power distributions determine the things going on in discourses. 
Power does so through its ability to give certain actors the possibility of making a 
stronger impact on the course of a discourse, i.e. through some sort of socially 
recognized authority. Power is understood as a “systematic and constitutive 
element/characteristic of society” (Wodak /Meyer 2009: 9). 
The DHA-perspective proposes a historical or chronological perspective to 
discourses, which makes intertextual and interdiscursive relationships visible. The 
term intertextual relationship points to the connections between different textual 
units. It leads to questioning how one text builds upon other texts. In taking on some 
elements of a past semiotic practice, these elements can become recontextualized. 
Elements which are established in another discursive context can be inserted into 
another context, related to another topic. Thereby they do not have to lose the 
discursive validity, they possessed in the original context. This particular 
phenomenon can be described by the term interdiscursive relationships. It also 
highlights that discourses should not be seen as closed entities. There are always 
countless connections to various societal or discursive elements outside the drawn 
borders of a discourse. With the fading out those relationships, it is possible to make 
a discursive representation or narrative seem simply as a given matter of course. 
Through the visualization of them, the DHA makes it possible to demystify those 
imaginations. 
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A central characteristic of CDA is a certain claim of being critical in its approach to 
discourses and social representations. This critical approach means at first that 
practitioners of CDA are asked to reflect on their own role in the discourse. They 
should challenge their own objectivity and make the goals and interests of their 
research known publicly. To take an impact on the analyzed discourse is not seen as 
undesirable or in opposition to scientific standards; it is, on the contrary, one of its 
central goals. CDA should further be critical through its deconstruction of discursive 
representations as unquestioned facts, and through demonstrating the 
interconnectedness of things and meanings. Those unquestioned characteristics of 
discursive representations are embedded in the CDA’s notion of ideology; in this 
context ideology means a set of, mutually sustaining, definitions and understandings 
of certain things, which in effect produce and legitimize certain worldviews. 
The realization of those ideologies is based on different discursive strategies. They are 
used by the actors of a specific discursive field, in order to exert legitimized influence. 
Hence, one way to analyze the workings of ideologies is the investigation and pointing 
out of those strategies.  Reisigl & Wodak (2009) therefore propose five specific 
questions with which to approach the research material. They are related to five 
different types of discursive strategies: 
1. “How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named 
and referred to linguistically? [related to strategy of nomination] 
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, 
objects, phenomena/events and processes? [related to strategy of predication] 
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? [related to 
strategy of argumentation] 
4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments 
expressed? [related to strategy of perspectivization, framing or discourse 
representation] 
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or 
mitigated? [related to strategy of intensification/mitigation]” (ibid.: 93) 
In order to ask and answer these questions Reisigl & Wodak further point to three 
different dimensions, which should be acknowledged in doing so: “after (1) having 
identified the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse, (2) discursive 
strategies are investigated. Then (3) linguistic means (as types) and the specific, 
context dependent linguistic realizations (as tokens) are examined” (ibid.: 93). 
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Before, but also during, conducting those steps of analysis, the research material 
should be gathered. The research objects of discourse analyses are, in the most 
general form, texts. The form of the texts of interest varies with, and depending on, 
the discourse of interest. What the typical text units in a specific analysis are can only 
be said for those specific contexts. Wodak and Meyer describe the CDA method of 
research and analysis as hermeneutic, rather than analytical-deductive. That means 
in this case, that there are no clear cut steps of research. The gaining of knowledge is, 
dependent on to the research interest, a rather circular process of alternating data 
collection and analysis. The process of data collection does not have to be terminated 
before the analysis. A way to structure the semiotic contents of discourses is to assign 
them to different genres. The term genre thereby stands for socially ratified ways of 
language use, which are connected to particular types of social action (Reisigl/Wodak 
2009: 90). One of the first steps of a discourse analysis must be the identification of 
typical genres for the discourse of interest. 
Despite the hermeneutic character of discourse analysis, which makes universally 
approachable ways of carrying it out impossible, Reisigl and Wodak (2009) propose 
an eight-step-programme. This is not a simple to-do-list, but only gives an overview 
on the different things, which might have to be done and considered, typically in a 
recursive way: 
1. “Activation and consultation of preceding theoretical knowledge […] 
2. Systematic collection of data and context information […] 
3. Selection and preparation of data for specific analyses […] 
4. Specification of the research question and formulation of assumptions […] 
5. Qualitative pilot analysis […] 
6. Detailed case studies […] 
7. Formulation of critique […] 
8. Application of the detailed analytical results” (ibid.: 96) 
The first step was in parts already laid out in earlier sections of this paper (see. 2, 3 & 
4). It is continued in the further parts of my paper, whereby it leads to the second 
step (see 6.1). Steps three and four are to a certain extent conducted as described in 
my introduction. They are, as step five, not entirely laid out in the thesis, although I 
will describe the way in which I carried this step out in the upcoming part of this 
chapter. The same is true for step six, although it is to a large extent illustrated in the 
description of my results (see 6.2). Step seven and step eight partly inspired my 
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conclusions (see 7). Reisigl and Wodak recommend that such a study should ideally 
be carried out by a team of researchers. However, they also acknowledge the 
possibility of carrying it out alone, under the condition of a reasonable and clear 
limitation of the research field and material for analysis. Hence it was an essential 
challenge to downsize the research field on which I approached my research question. 
I had to limit the sources of data to a manageable, yet significant, size. This proved to 
be quite a difficult task. I will describe the result of this process in the upcoming part 
of this chapter. 
 
5.2 Empirical Approach 
Here I will describe in detail the empirical case study with which I hope to answer my 
research question. The first thing to do must be the elaboration and description of the 
specific discourses that I am working with. I have to define, construct and 
circumscribe those discourses. The central discourse of interest relates to the topic of 
EUrope. I am interested in the interdiscursive relationships of this discourse, with the 
discourse surrounding the topic of Turkey-EU relationships. The discourses, of which 
I am interested, could (self-creation; following Figure 4.2 in Reisigl/Wodak 2009: 92) 
be pictured as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Over time, various actors take part in both discourses by producing texts, which 
relate to the two topics. The arrows in Figure 3 point to the interconnectedness of 
various texts in the discourses. Thereby the text-producers take arguments out of 
prior texts, and recontextualize them. The central interest of my paper lies in the texts 
that can be placed in the overlap of those two discourses. It is also my job to 
reconstruct the arrows of influence coming from texts, which lie primarily within the 
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Turkey-EU discourse. The constraints of this drawing should not hide the fact that 
such arrows could also point in the other direction. Furthermore they also should be 
drawn to or rather from texts, which are primarily related to further discourses. 
These latter connections lie in the different topics that the text-authors utilize in their 
approach on the two discourses. In my case those topics could i.e. deal with questions 
of religion or human rights, which are both topics one could reconstruct their own 
discourses around. My final goal is to reconstruct, the way in which the texts from the 
Turkey-EU discourse, and the ones in-between the two discourses, influence texts 
lying primarily within the discourse on EUrope. 
Before doing so, I had to put more thought into the circumscription of the discourses 
for my analysis. In general, the discourses contain every realized notion on these 
topics. For the EUrope discourse, this would include every possible semiotic practice, 
done in order to define and (re)construct imaginations of Europe, the EU or any 
other term EUrope is referred to with. The second discourse of my interest contains 
every argument and textual expression in the debate about the relationships between 
Turkey and the EU. This means that both discourses contain a field of discursive 
inputs, which could not possibly be managed in the context of a discourse analysis. 
Those inputs come from a huge range of different actors. They are realized in many 
different genres, over a long period of time. In order to approach my research 
question, it is hence necessary to restrict my analysis to the contributions of a rather 
small number of definable actors, a reasonable range of genres and relatively short 
time periods. My concrete restrictions are as follows: 
• Actors: the German political parties ‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD)’,  and the ‘Christliche Demokratische Union (CDU)’ in collaboration 
with its Bavarian sister party ‘Christlich Soziale Union (CSU)’  
• Genres: (public) plenary debates in the main national parliament, which would 
be the German Bundestag, and the political manifestos published by the 
parties. Furthermore I will consider related scientific work, in order to put 
these texts in their respective political and national contexts 
• Time period: In general I want to focus on the time at which a possible 
admission of Turkey into the EU became a present political issue. To my 
knowledge, it was the late 1990s in advance of the acceptation of Turkey as 
official candidate country by the EU in 1999. In order to restrict my data 
retrieved from parliamentary debates to an assessable quantity, I will lay a 
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more specific focus on three different time periods, when three different issues 
were debated. First, I chose the debates around the opening of accession talks 
in late 2004 and early 2005. Second, I will focus on the debates about the 
Lisbon Treaty in late 2007 and early 2008. Third, I will take debates from the 
first half of 2011 into account. 
Hence the material, upon which I will approach my research question, will consist of 
contributions by these two German political parties, in relation to the EUrope and 
Turkey-EU discourses. Out of these contributions I will take only those into account, 
which were realized in parliamentary debates or through political manifestos from 
the time on, when the acceptation of Turkey as an official EU-candidate began to be 
debated within the EU institutions and beyond. I will focus on debates in three 
specific time periods. This restriction, in my opinion, makes sense for a number of 
reasons. 
The political parties, I chose to focus on, are for a range of reasons interesting as 
cases for my research question. First of all, they constitute more or less assessable 
entities, and consist of a limited range of relevant persons, who take part in the two 
discourses of interest. Secondly, they are required to deal with the discourse topics in 
their participation within the EUropean political field. They are required to discuss 
the Turkey-issue, and to formulate their perspective on EUrope. Another quality, 
which makes those parties interesting, is their rather privileged and powerful 
discursive position. They are able to reach a wide audience and enjoy a certain sort of 
discursive authority (especially in relation to the relatively high number of persons, 
officially or unofficially associated to the parties). Furthermore, they do not only 
enjoy discursive power, but also political power in their frequent participation in 
government. Thereby they can partly decide on the form of the EU, and in 
consequence, again, have an (indirect) impact on the discursive construction of 
EUrope. Their position of (temporary) executive power makes it furthermore 
interesting to reconstruct their imaginations of EUrope, to illustrate the effects they 
can have on party and government policies. A further quality, which makes those 
parties interesting for my case, is their claim of representing the ‘center’ of the 
political spectrum. The claim of being center parties is connected with the claim to 
represent the vast majority of public opinions in the particular nation states. In this 
role they might rather try to fit into established discursive positions on EUrope, 
without the explicit or strong interest in changing it (which might, more probably, be 
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the case for younger and smaller parties). With this hypothetical proximity to 
established discursive positions, I again will deal with the more powerful and 
hegemonic imaginations of EUrope. Amongst other reasons I chose Germany as a 
country-wise focus, because the debate on Turkey in Germany is rather controversial 
and intensive. It brings forward, otherwise rather small, differences between the 
parties in imagining EUrope. In consideration of respective literature, I will discuss 
the specific country-wise peculiarity in the discourses of interest later (see. 6.1).  
Furthermore, Germany is the biggest country of the EU, and hence exerts a lot of 
influence in the EU- and in world-wide discourses of my interest. Its relatively high 
discursive (and otherwise) power heightened my interest. A more practical aspect of 
this selection lies in my knowledge of the German language.  
The next restriction I have to justify is one concerning the genres. First of all they, 
again, constitute an assessable and more or less easily accessible set of data. The 
plenary debates are transcribed and published via the Internet presence of the 
Bundestag. Furthermore, the form of parliamentary discussions matches the 
discourse analytic approach rather well. The connections in-between certain text 
contributions from the parliamentary debates are often rather obvious and explicit. 
Whenever it seems reasonable and necessary to follow discursive traces to texts from 
outside the parliament, I will try to reconstruct them with the help of scientific 
contributions or through their direct citation. Furthermore, it makes sense to focus 
on parliamentary debates because of the relatively wide range of different party 
actors, which take part in them. This is i.e. the case in terms of their regional 
affiliation, job specialization or their places in the party hierarchies. The party 
manifestos, as a result of an internal search for consensus, provide an additional 
back-up for the analysis of the party positions. I will take manifestos into account, 
which were published over the course of elections to the national and EUropean 
parliaments since the 1990s. Also the manifestos can be found on the Internet. In the 
analysis of manifestos, I will have to consider the political atmosphere during the 
time from which they originated. 
Last but not least it was necessary to restrict the time period I will take into account. I 
will set this fictive zero-point, with the intensification of the debate about the possible 
accession of Turkey into the EU in the late 1990s. As described earlier (see 4.2), the 
debate on Turkey became noteworthy with the acceptation of Turkey as official 
enlargement-candidate by the EU in 1999 at the earliest, and in an more intensified 
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form around 2004. Out of practical and administrative reasons it would be 
impossible to include materials from all times in which the relationships between the 
EU (or its predecessors) and Turkey (or its predecessors) were discussed. It would 
lead me back to the end of World War Two at least, if not to the times of the Ottoman 
Empire and beyond. However, influences from beyond my time restriction cannot be 
neglected, i.e. because arguments, which refer to those times, are often heard in 
today’s debates on EUrope and the EU-Turkey relationships. In the introduction of 
the results (see 6.1 & 6.2.1), and in a more general form in the prior literature-based 
chapters, I summarized these times and laid a base for comprehending their impact 
on current debates. My restriction simply means that I will put a stronger focus on 
the developments after the artificial, hence not arbitrary, starting point of my 
analysis. Furthermore, it is still impossible to include every parliamentary debate and 
statement on Turkey and imaginations of EUrope within this time restriction. For 
this reason I have to focus on relatively short time periods. Since I want to know how 
the debate on Turkey affected imaginations of EUrope, it seemed reasonable to start 
with a period when the Turkey question was at the center of political debates. This is 
definitely the case for the debates around the European Council in December 2004, 
when the decision regarding beginning accession talks stood on the agenda. The next 
focus lay on the time when the Lisbon Treaty dominated the Bundestag’s debates. 
This was mostly the time between the signing of the treaty in December 2007 and its 
ratification by the German Bundestag in April 2008. Thereby different imaginations 
of EUrope were observable. In this way I intend to analyze and visualize the impact of 
the earlier Turkey debate on latter imaginations of EUrope. Last but not least I want 
to look into current debates on those two issues. Although neither of them stood in 
the center of German political debates in the first half of 2011, they were brought up 
in various contexts. The ‘Arab Spring’ or the bailouts of Greece and other EU-
countries were just some of these contexts. Beyond the advances of having a further 
differentiation of contexts in which EUrope was constructed, this should give me an 
insight into the current situation and possible future developments. 
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5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Research 
The first step of the empirical work is the accumulation of texts to analyze. As 
described earlier, the materials I will consult for my analysis are, first and primarily, 
parliamentary debates. Since the transcribed parliamentary debates are published on 
the web presence of the parliament – ‘www.bundestag.de’ –, these materials are 
easily accessible. The search function of the website further facilitated the gathering 
of material. In that manner I was able to filter and locate debates, concerned with the 
discourses on EUrope and Turkey-EUrope relationships, within the time periods I 
focused on. The search terms were thereby dependent on the specific sub-debates I 
wanted to access, and inspired by the main topics of these debates. For the 2004 
debate, they are the German translations of, first, ‘Turkey/Turks/Turkish’ and 
‘enlargement/accession’. In this way I culled debates in which the opening of 
accession talks with Turkey played a role at all. In the further course of my research I 
browsed through the texts in search of relevant material. I focused on texts which 
dealt with different imaginations of EUrope. On the other hand I tried to collect a 
range of data that represents the whole variety of arguments in debating if, when and 
under which conditions the EU should open accession talks with Turkey. I further 
restricted the research to the time period three months before and after the European 
Council on December 17th 2004, when the opening of accession talks was affirmed. In 
the end texts from twelve different parliamentary debates remained. Out of these 
transcripts I copied relevant paragraphs into text documents, sorted by party, date 
and speaker. 
For the other time periods of analysis I went through the same process, with different 
search terms and a different focus. For the debate on the Lisbon Treaty in early 2008, 
the first search terms were i.e. ‘Lisbon’ or ‘European Constitution’. In this way I found 
the major debates, which took place on seven different dates in the German 
Bundestag. The time period reached from the signing of the treaty at the European 
Council of Lisbon on December 13th 2007, until its ratification by the Bundestag on 
April 24th 2008. Within those transcribed debates I focused, besides notions around 
i.e. EUropean identity, on references to the Turkey question or enlargement in 
general. For the debates in the first half of 2011, I basically combined the two prior 
search focuses. I searched for texts that dealt with Turkey, EU-enlargement, and 
further concepts, which are often utilized in imaginations of EUrope. Thereby I found 
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text fragments out of 16 debates. The topics of those debates varied dependent on 
different happenings in EUrope and around the globe, which initiated and inspired 
the members of parliament (MPs) to debate their imaginations of EUrope, and the 
Turkey question. 
The text collection, I thereby developed, constituted the base for the further analysis. 
The word count thereby displayed following text quantities, for the respective time 
periods and political parties: 
 
 
Figure 4 (self-creation, 
text quantities in words) 
 
The variability of text quantities already reflects a varied set of factors. In the case of 
2004 it points to the fact that the conservatives were the prime-initiator of the debate 
on Turkey in a high intensity. It also points to the general observation that 
conservative politicians are more verbose in the illustration of their imaginations of 
EUrope then the social democrats. I will come back to some of these points in the 
course of the paper. 
A further corpus of texts is constituted by the election manifestos that the parties 
published in the course of elections to the Bundestag and to the European 
Parliament. Through my Internet research I located all manifestos published in the 
course of those elections since 1987. This time included seven general elections in 
Germany: 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009. The European Parliament 
was elected in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 (for the European elections 1989 the 
parties did not publish their own manifestos). In the case of general German elections 
the CDU and CSU published their manifestos together, while in the case of European 
elections they created separate ones. In the latter case I only integrated the CDU-
manifestos into my analysis. Out of all these manifestos I, again, tried to filter out the, 
for my case, relevant paragraphs. I copied text fragments, which dealt with 
imaginations of EUrope or the Turkey question into text documents, sorted by year 
and party. Those fragments comprehended 5350 words in the conservative case, and 
2800 words out of the SPD’s manifestos. 
Party/Year 2004 2008 2011 Sum 
SPD 5550 3850 4550 13950 
CDU/CSU 9350 4000 5000 18350 
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5.3.2 Analysis 
In the course of the further treatment of this material, I exposed it to a process of 
coding and categorization. This supplied me with a more compensated and well-
arranged version of it. Since the analysis follows the principles of the DHA, as laid out 
by Reisigl & Wodak (2009), the same is true for the way I developed a corpus of 
different codes and categories, which consists of two levels. The first one refers to the 
respective topics and concepts, a text-fragment is about. The second is about the 
positions on the respective issue a statement represents. I also noted the position 
towards the in- or exclusion of Turkey within the respective imagination of EUrope. 
For positions including Turkey I added ‘++’, for exclusive positions ‘--’, and for 
unrelated or neutral arguments‘+-’ to the code. I further assigned the codes to sub-
groups, which point to the debates they are mostly referring to. A first set of codes is 
mainly about constructions of EUrope, one is about takes on rather institutional 
aspects of the EU, another one about perspectives on Turkey, and a fourth one 
contains prognoses on consequences of a Turkish EU-accession. In this manner I 
want to carry forward the gradual compression of my results. 
My view on codes or categories, or rather on their qualities and function, thereby to a 
large extent follows the suggestions of ‘grounded theory’. According to Muckel (2011), 
grounded theory proposes a relatively flexible perspective on codes and categories. In 
contrast to other methodological proposals, it is not as important to exactly 
circumscribe and define what a category is about before the actual analysis. The set of 
categories, as well as their content, is and should be adaptable in the course of the 
analysis. The meaning and content of a respective category or code is exposed to a 
constant process of reflection. The changes, this reflection brings, can aim towards 
the content of existing categories, different codes and categories can be added, and 
others can be abolished. To begin, I started with the composition of a set of codes and 
categories, in consideration of the theoretical part and impressions in the research 
process. At this stage this seemed to summarize the central concepts that I recognized 
in imaginations of EUrope and positions towards Turkey. In the course of the analysis 
this set of around 30 codes, which contained roughly a 100 different sub-codes, was 
more or less tripled. 
In the course of the analysis I assigned those codes to respective fragments of the 
empirical material that I had gathered. Since the codes often represent positions, 
which describe the poles of a spectrum of stances on an issue, the assignment to a 
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statement often stands for the relative closeness to a respective pole rather than for 
its exact congruence. This aspect illustrates the vagueness and uncertainty that the 
analysis, as a process of constant and repeated reflection, is characterized by. Since 
the different codes can overlap each other, and many do not contradict each other, I 
usually assigned more than one code to a text fragment. Rather than choosing the 
one, which fits best, in case of doubt I assigned all which seemed to fit. An assigned 
code thereby covered up a cohering statement, which more or less expressed the 
position the code stands for. If a MP brought up an issue on more than one occasion 
within his speech, it is possible that I assigned a code more than once to this speech. I 
added the list of codes and categories, as well as a further description of it, and the 
quantities of their assignment to the research material, in the appendix. 
 In the course of the analysis I utilized the computer software ATLAS.ti, which is a 
program developed to assist qualitative analyses. The benefits and restrictions of this 
program and scientific software in general are i.e. summarized by Konopásek (2011). 
She notices that the software cannot take over the analytical work from the 
researcher, but it can be of great help in organizing the corpus of textual material. 
ATLAS.ti was developed in consideration of different processes of coding. Hence, it 
substantially helped me to realize the concept of analysis I just laid out. After 
inserting the texts into ATLAS.ti and importing the corpus of codes, it enabled me to 
carry out the assignment of the codes to the material. It furthermore helped me to 
quantify the application of respective codes, and thereby provided me with a first 
inkling of a possible result and the practicability of different codes. Through the well-
arranged listing of applied codes ATLAS.ti helped me to get an overview of the 
material. It also enabled me to connect different codes with the linguistic realizations 
of it through the different speakers (for further information see www.atlasti.com).  
After applying the set of codes and categories on the corpus of texts, the next step of 
the analysis must lie in the gradual abstraction of results. I reflected on the 
connections between different codes, and exposed these observations to the analytical 
questions presented earlier. Through the help of other scientific discussions on the 
debates of interest, I tried to arrange my results within the wider context of the 
debates. Through the chronological reconstruction of the debates on EUrope and 
Turkey, I want to show the intertextual and discursive relationships between the texts 
I analyzed. 
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6 Results 
Through the application of the methods and analytical tools that I just described, I 
intend to achieve a closer understanding of the different debates, which influence the 
answers to my research question. Besides the theoretical background, I presented in 
the first part of the thesis, and the empirical material I collected, I also have to take 
the German national context, in which the debates are placed, into account. I will 
discuss different influences, like the political party landscape, different sets of media 
or economic aspects. Other factors are based on different approaches to the German 
national identity, imaginations of EUrope, and perspectives on Turkey. I want to 
describe some of these factors in the upcoming part, by introducing the most 
important scientific assumptions about the German debates on EUrope and Turkey. 
Based on this introduction, I will present a more detailed reconstruction of the 
different party positions on EUrope, and their interconnectedness with the debate on 
Turkey. I structured this section in a chronological manner. The clear focus lies on 
the three debates and/or periods to which I restricted the research for parliamentary 
debates. Based on scientific literature and the parties’ election manifestos, I also 
reconstructed the most important events despite my focus. This presentation is 
supposed to reconstruct and illustrate how the two major discourses of interest 
developed over time. It should also show, how they are interwoven with each other, 
and point out intertextual- and discursive relationships. In this way I want to 
reconstruct how the debate on Turkey influenced imaginations of EUrope. Thereby I 
intend to demystify those imaginations of EUrope, i.e. in showing their context-
dependency and processual character. 
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6.1 German National Context 
In the following section I wish to give an introduction to the German debate on 
EUrope and Turkey. The German debates on those two issues have very different 
characters, despite the big overlap between them. For the case of German 
imaginations of EUrope, scientific commentators recognize a wide consensus 
between the public elites and important political actors. In looking at the relatively 
intensive Turkey debate very controversial positions come to the fore. The Turkey 
debate thereby makes the restrictions of the consensus on EUrope apparent. 
Before taking a deeper look at more current German imaginations of EUrope, I want 
to give a brief introduction to their longer history. It is marked by a high quantity of 
shifts and changes in imaginations of EUrope, with the end of World War Two as an 
extreme, and so far last, maximum. Starting in medieval times, Spohn (2002) shows 
the importance of religion in German imaginations of Europe. Back then Europe was 
often equated with the Western area of Roman Catholic Christianity, as opposed to 
the Eastern spheres of Greek Orthodoxy. This perspective changed with the 
development of Protestantism, which led to a new division of Europe right through 
German principalities. This triggered the development of opposed versions of Europe 
and the German role in it. The opposition is determined by confession, and the 
Prussian and Habsburg Empires played the roles of respective centers, which 
represented these Europes. This division was partly relativized and challenged by 
ideas of the Enlightenment, like secularism. That, again, heightened the variety of 
significant German imaginations of Europe. (Spohn 2002) 
The German perspectives on Europe were always connected to, and determined by, 
different constellations of power in Europe, and the German position within those. 
When German states were in a rather weak position, i.e. in relation to the rise of the 
big Atlantic colonial powers, Europe was utilized to accentuate the superiority of 
German states as European in comparison to non-Europeans. The re-strengthening 
of German states, in economic and political terms, led to an image of Europe as a 
peace order between more or less equal powers. This later version, in combination 
with Enlightenment ideas, also triggered the development of ideas about a European 
common bond and solidarity within a ‘family of peoples’. With the French 
Revolution, republicanism and Napoleonistic imperialism, new imaginations of 
Europe arose. The French ambitions were, on the one hand, framed as an incarnation 
of a new universal and unified Europe. On the other hand they threatened the idea of 
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German particularism and the development of a common German language. This 
side was represented and triggered by new German nationalism and its supporters. 
At the turn of the 19th century, Spohn (2002) observed the intensification of a 
development, in which “coexisting layers of a crystallizing German identity found 
their expression in differing images of Europe” (ibid.: 291). One of those images saw 
Europe as a power balance containing a German federation. A second one saw the 
chance for a renewed Christian Europe, with Germany as its core representative. A 
third one defined Germany’s role as a mediator between Western European 
modernism and Eastern traditionalism. The German political reality, with the failure 
of republican revolutions, the establishment of a strong and centralized monarchy, 
and economic growth, triggered the emergence of a different imagination of Europe. 
Thereby Europe was imagined as a power equilibrium. In this mindset, and in 
cooperation with the Habsburg-Empire, an Austro-German dominance in Europe 
was framed as an ideal. This development ended in the First World War, and a 
radically new situation for Germany in Europe. Germany was now, in comparison to 
other European powers, in a rather weak and inferior position. On the other hand, 
the war triggered the development of a widely shared German identity and the 
establishment of a democratic federal republic. These developments advocated very 
different imaginations of Europe; one side placed Germany as one of many parts in a 
Europe of nation states, while another developed the idea of German superiority 
through an aggressively exclusionary nationalism. The latter version gained power 
through National Socialism. It led Germany into the next World War and towards a 
new radical shift in imagining Europe. 
By looking at the development of German imaginations of Europe prior to 1945, it 
becomes clear that they were significantly influenced by different, i.e. political, 
developments in the German national context. Common to all those versions was a 
strong connection of the ways in which Germany and Europe were imagined. This 
connection becomes visible in the parallelism between imaginations of Europe and 
Germany, which is often observable. Thereby the aspect of egocentrism played a 
crucial role. Europe was often pictured with a German center and a Germanized 
Europe was seen as ideal. This discourse was radically disrupted by the end of World 
War Two. Now the German discourse was based on the trauma of their own guilt, and 
a consensually perceived need to break with this past. German nationalism had to be 
radically converted. The solution was found in imagining a EUropeanized Germany, 
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instead of a Germanized Europe. This was done in a Western and Eastern European 
version, and, again, there was a parallelism in imaginations of Germany and Europe. 
This time it widely lacked the aspect of egocentrism, since the parallelism was due to 
the commonality of a rather involuntary divide. In the further course of this chapter I 
will restrict myself widely to Western German perspectives on Europe, since they 
were the ones, which achieved dominance after German reunification. (Spohn 2002, 
Paterson 2011) 
Although the German debate on EUrope after 1945 contained a range of dissents and 
controversies, and hence a variety of imaginations of EUrope, the overall discourse is 
described as relatively undisputed and steady. There was, and is, a wide political 
consensus towards a strong role for EUrope in formulating German identity. The 
ways of imagining EUrope played a determining role for imaginations of Germany. 
This consensus was, in the words of Marcussen & Roscher (2000), marked by 
“German concepts of a social market economy, democracy and political federalism”, 
which “were central elements in the discourse of exiled German elites during World 
War II and among the entire political class subsequently. Ideas about European 
political order resonated well with these concepts. In addition, as a nationalist view of 
Germany was thoroughly discredited by militarism and Nazism, Europe provided an 
alternative identity construction and, thus, a way out” (ibid.: 349). Besides 
emphasizing the consensuality on the issue, it has to be mentioned that this dominant 
German version of EUrope was, to a large extent, the conservative, or rather CDU’s, 
one. It was represented by Konrad Adenauer and pan-European visions about a 
united continent based on Christianity, democracy and a social market economy. 
The roles of the central Others were – besides the German Nazi-past – played by 
communist ideologies and Eastern Europe. This aspect was responsible for the major 
gap between German imaginations of EUrope, whereby the SPD-version of EUrope 
did not exclude socialism. It furthermore criticized the dominant conservative 
EUrope as too small, since it excluded Eastern Europe, and in consequence also 
Eastern Germany. The SPD-perspective blamed the conservative one, for 
contradicting the ideal of German reunification. This initial disaccord in German 
imaginations of EUrope found its closure, through the failure of the SPD-vision to 
persuade big fractions of the German electorate. The marginalized position of the 
socialist imagination of EUrope was endorsed through repeated election defeats of 
the SPD. In the late 1950s this led to a change of actors within the SPD and a different 
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attitude towards EUrope. This new attitude – represented by Willy Brandt – was very 
close to the conservative one. It supported the social market economy, and the form 
of the, already ongoing, EUropean integration process. Since this time Marcussen & 
Roscher (2000), as well as Paterson (2011), attest a continuing consensus within the 
German political elite in imagining EUrope, which survived repeated shifts of 
governmental power. Also German unification, which could have led to a new and 
more self-determined imagination of Germany, did not change the perspective on 
EUrope and the role Germany should have in it. Marcussen & Roscher conclude that 
critical junctures in the perception of national identity, and hence EUrope, were 
widely absent from the political elite’s discourses. The only relevant crisis of this kind 
took place within the SPD, and ended in the assimilation of the party’s perspective on 
EUrope, to the dominant ideal, which was crafted by conservatives. 
The imaginations of EUrope in reality were however never that plain. For example 
the subordination of Germany in EUrope often is relativized through the claim for 
German leadership. This is, i.e. according to Paterson (2011), usually not formulated 
aggressively and is contextualized through noting the importance of French-German 
partnership for EUrope, as shown by a glance at election manifestos, below: 
“The core of this Europe is and will remain the Franco-German friendship.” 
(SPD 1987)i 
“The Franco-German friendship stays [...] the engine of integration and key 
to European security.” (CDU/CSU 1994)ii 
A further relativization of the German consensus on EUrope becomes obvious when 
looking at fields beyond the political elites. Although this attitude often accords with 
public opinion, the political elite has not always restricted its pan-EUropean agenda 
to it. Eurobarometer data shows, that the German public opinion on EUrope is, in 
comparison to the political elite, less enthusiastic and definite. In spring 2011 only 
38% of the German interviewees saw the EU as something rather positive. This rate is 
in the lower midfield in relation to other EUropean populations. The strength of the 
pro-EUrope attitude in German political elites is for example shown in its, quite 
unambiguous, support for introducing the Euro-currency. That is especially peculiar 
in consideration of the important role, the ‘Deutsche Mark’ played for German 
                                                   
i original German version: “Kernstück dieses Europas ist und bleibt die deutsch-französische 
Freundschaft.” (SPD 1987) 
ii original German version: “Die deutsch-französische Freundschaft bleibt […] Motor der Integration 
und Schlüsselfaktor europäischer Sicherheit.” (CDU/CSU 1994) 
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identity constructions. The popularity of the ‘Deutsche Mark’, as a symbol for the 
strength and stability of the German economy, was also reflected by majoritarian 
skepticism within the German population in the run-up to the introduction of the 
Euro. The political elite chose nonetheless the EUropean aspect of German identity 
over the popular old currency. This stands as an example for a potentially conflictive 
and unpopular EU-policy, which passed without a very intense political debate. On 
the other hand Paterson (2011) sees a diminishing of the German elite’s consensus on 
EUrope, or at least of its unquestioned character, since the 1980s. This diminishing is 
also due to the perception of Germany’s role as EUrope’s paymaster in public 
opinion. The consequences of the current Euro-crises, for the status of German pro-
EUropeanism, might be particularly peculiar, due to this perception. (Eurobarometer 
2011; Paterson 2011; Risse et.at. 1999) 
The general consensus in favor of a strong role for EUrope, which also covers the 
general ideals of political and economic organization, should not deceive that, within 
the political elite, there still are varieties in imagining EUrope. Between different 
political orientations, the base of EUrope is seen in different aspects. The ejection of 
socialism from the SPD’s imagination of EUrope does i.e. not mean that the parties’ 
views on the role that EUrope should play in redistributing wealth, do not differ. 
Furthermore, as i.e. outlaid by Spohn (2002), the conservative version more often 
bases EUrope on a historic heritage and a common culture, which is often 
represented through Christendom. Thereby a skeptical perspective towards the 
EUropeanness of Eastern Orthodox countries, and a prevalent exclusion of non-
Christian ones, comes to the fore. Another, more progressive and inclusive, version 
sees universally perceived values as defining factors of a secular and multi-cultural 
EUrope. This side, which is often represented through the SPD or the Green Party, 
often struggles with the definition of legitimately assessed boundaries, in order to 
advocate some kind of identifiability of EUrope.  
Those still existent factions between imaginations of EUrope are very present in 
debating the Turkey question. The issue of a possible accession of Turkey into the EU 
is hence a clear exception, of the overall consensual spirit in German debates on 
EUrope. It uncovers discrepancies between political actors, in imagining EUrope. 
Therefore it is debated very intensively and extensively. The issue is of high relevance 
in political debates, and, also outside the political field, widely discussed. The width 
of the debate constantly increased during the last decades. Until the early 1990s a 
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Turkish EU accession was not talked about much, outside the respective scientific 
branches. Especially towards the 1999-decision on the Turkish candidacy status, this 
changed a lot. It reached the political debate, and grew further in popularity. With 
2002 most analysts see the Turkey debate reaching the status of a key issue in 
German political debating and campaigning, which is also debated between 
laypeople. 
In looking at the principal performers of the German debate on Turkey, quite a high 
variety comes to the fore. Actors out of politics, the media, science, religion, or 
economic elites bring in their perspectives. The supporting side for a general 
possibility of Turkish membership is, in the political arena, represented by the SPD 
and the Green Party. Those two parties formed the governing coalition, when an 
intensive Turkey debate set in. The, then oppositional, CDU/CSU represents the 
opposite position. They widely oppose the general possibility of an EU enlargement 
process towards Turkey. The further parties of the German parliament, the FDP (Free 
Democratic Party, liberals) and ‘Die Linke’ (The Left, left-wing), are usually described 
as rather pro-Turkey. That is especially peculiar in case of the FDP, since it is an 
exception of their general ideological and political affinity to the conservatives. 
Besides the general congruency, of the pro- and anti-Turkey sides with the political 
party landscape, it also should be mentioned that those frontiers are relatively 
porous. There are actors of the CDU, who see a Turkish accession as quite positive, 
i.e. out of a pro-NATO or economic perspective, while some SPD-politicians accord 
with anti-Turkey positions. Within the conservative party it was especially the 
Bavarian CSU-branch who argued against the Turkish accession in the most explicit 
and extreme way. (Große Hüttmann 2005) 
Especially the anti-Turkey side that very often referred to contributions from the 
scientific field, which otherwise is seen in an ideological affinity to the Turkey-
friendly political left. Here two historians built the front line, in constructing an 
exclusive imagination of EUrope, in respect to Turkey, on cultural and historical 
terms. Thereby they find support, but also much criticism, from other fields in which 
the Turkey debate takes place. One of the most important fields is the media, where 
comments on the Turkey question are the norm, rather than the exception. In looking 
at the debate in all those fields, the German disunity in respect to a Turkish EU 
membership gains approval. Also the public opinion, as shown trough surveys, 
confirms the image of German polarization on the Turkey question. When Germans 
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in 2008 were asked, what they think about a Turkish EU accession, once Turkey 
complies with all the set conditions, only 35 % are rather in favor, while 63 % are not. 
Although public skepticism towards Turkey is existent throughout EUrope, it is 
especially high in the German case. An indicator of the high relevance and 
polarization, of the Turkey issue in Germany, are the, in comparison very low, 2 %, 
who do not know what to answer to this question. (Eurobarometer 2008) 
The debate thereby did not focus much on the issue of the form of the enlargement 
process towards Turkey, but on the question about the general possibility of a Turkish 
EU membership. It is more or less beyond debate, that Turkey should not be 
admitted in the short-term, and that there are many shortcomings of the Turkish 
compliance with relevant criteria. It is also widely agreed, that the EU itself is not 
ready for such a step in the very near future. Disagreements come to the fore, in 
questioning the general possibility of a Turkish middle- or long-term accession. 
Thereby the cultural and historical belonging of Turkey to EUrope is talked about, as 
well as questions of the Turkish advance in fulfilling the accession criteria. The in- or 
exclusion of Turkey, in imaginations of EUrope, varies thereby between, amongst 
others, geopolitical, political, historical or cultural frames. It is interwoven with the 
debate on Turkish migrants in Germany, and worries about the economic, and 
otherwise, security of Germany. The political debate is full of reciprocal allegations of 
dishonesty, foolery and irresponsibility. The decision, on Turkey’s in- or exclusion, is 
generally perceived as a decision on EUrope’s destiny. This construction is connected 
to a crisis perception: the EU and hence EUrope is seen in crisis. A Turkish accession 
would mitigate or intensify this crisis. (Madeker 2008; Walter 2008; Wimmel 2006) 
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6.2 German Debates on Turkey & EUrope 
6.2.1. pre-2004 
The German debate on the EU accession of Turkey was not always as intense and 
important, as it has been since the 2000s. The reason for this growth in popularity is 
often attributed to the fact that a Turkish accession did not, since the association 
agreement in 1963, ever seem realistic. The political condition of Turkey did not 
nearly accord with EUropean standards, and the question was therefore seen as 
rather theoretical. With Turkey’s political stabilization around 2000, and a relatively 
committed reformism, the answer to this theoretical question about the general 
possibility of a Turkish EU-membership, became one with realistic political 
consequences. Backed by this perspective the intensification of the Turkey-debate in 
Germany becomes more understandable. (Große Hüttmann 2005) 
The growth in popularity also induced the relative high originality and variety of the 
debate around the issue in Germany. Previously, the issue was often determined by 
political circumstances beyond Turkey itself. Until 1990 this circumstance was 
primarily the Cold War. Turkey was mainly seen in its role as loyal ally, and bulwark 
against Soviet Communism. EUrope was mainly defined in opposition to the Soviet 
Union and Communism, and Turkey was included within this dominant construction. 
Turkey was, due to its exposed geographical position, important in its role as 
guardian of the Dardanelles. Walter (2008), in his reconstruction of the German 
Turkey debate in German newspapers, sees on the one hand a clear inclusion within 
EUrope. On the other hand, back then Turkey was often positioned at the margins of 
the continent. This goes hand in hand with the construction of a certain difference, 
between (EUropean) Germany and Turkey, in aspects besides geopolitics. In looking 
at frames like democratization and civil rights, a certain imperfection of Turkey’s 
EUropeanness was constructed. This was often seen in connection to the – perceived 
in an Orientalist style – relatively unEUropean Turkish culture and religion. On the 
other hand Turkey was also seen as a positive example for a nation, which voluntarily 
wishes to go down the path of democratization. 
In conclusion, the German discourse on Turkey in the Cold War period was relatively 
ambivalent. There was always skepticism, in respect to the honesty and range, of 
Turkish ‘Westernization’. Turkey was and is pictured as divided between the 
relatively modern (and EUropean) seeming elite, and Muslim (and therefore 
unEUropean) masses. Turkey was seen as threatened by two scenarios: the 
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infiltration by Communist ideology, and the uprising of the primitive masses. The 
uncertainty about Turkey’s EUropeanness, in looking at Turkish democratization or 
culture, thereby did not usually stand in an interdiscursive relationship with the 
debate on a Turkish EEC-membership. Imperfections of Turkey’s EUropeanness were 
overshadowed by the need, to have Turkey as a supporting part of EUrope in the Cold 
War context. It was therefore seen as EUrope’s responsibility to keep Turkey on its 
side. This motivated the association of Turkey to the EEC, although full membership 
for the moment was unrealistic. (Walter 2008) 
Towards 1990 the overall dominance of the USSR as Other shrunk and other aspects 
became important when discussing Turkey. Now, rather than its neighborhood with 
Russia, the geographical and otherwise (i.e. cultural) proximity, to various troubled 
spots in the region, gained importance. Turkey hence was still seen as an important 
actor for the stabilization of the region. The prevalent geopolitical inclusion of Turkey 
into EUrope, triggered through the Cold War context, was nonetheless challenged in 
its relevance by other aspects. This led to a diversification of the perspectives on 
Turkey-EUrope relations, through a growth of their interdiscursive relationships 
beyond the geopolitical frame. It went hand in hand with an ever growing German 
attention towards Turkey during the 20th century. In particular, the possible 
economic consequences of a Turkish EEC membership gained attention. Besides the 
chances that a Turkish inclusion could offer, the main topic was a potential increase 
of Turkish labor migrants in Germany. 
The relatively large Turkish Diaspora in Germany is one of the main reasons for the 
significant growth of German attention towards Turkey. This development goes back 
to the successful development of the German economy after World War Two. 
Germany was, in the eyes of many analysts, one of the biggest beneficiaries of 
EUropean integration, in terms of economic growth. That soon led to a labor shortage 
and the recruitment of Turkish ‘Gastarbeiter’ (‘guest workers’). The German 
government, in cooperation with German corporations and the Turkish government, 
hired Turkish workers due to a shortage of labor. These workers were envisaged to 
stay for a restricted space of time, but it did not work out in this way. By 2006, nearly 
two million Turkish citizens, and more than half a million ethnic Turks with German 
citizenship, were living in Germany. This outnumbers every other EU country by far. 
The debate on ethnic Turks in Germany is quite intense and important. It often 
frames Turks in Germany as problem in terms of the lack of integration. It also 
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contains aspects of culturalism or racism. For example in 2010, this was shown 
through the popularity of Thilo Sarazzin’s assumptions on the ‘statistic inferiority’ of 
Turkish or Muslim immigrants. The image of Turkish labor migrants, as relatively 
alien to EUrope, is partly also assigned to Turkey itself. (Schaefer et.al.: 2005; Walter 
2008; Washington Post 2010) 
Another important factor in the German Turkey debate can be seen in the new role 
Islam played in imaginations of EUrope. Since 1978, when the Islamist revolution in 
Iran took place, Islam(ism) rose in relevance as EUrope’s defining Other. The Iranian 
Revolution heightened the perceived importance of the threat of Islamization in 
Turkey. It boosted skepticism about the compatibility of Islam with EUropean values. 
Demonstrations by Turkish students, against the ban of headscarves for women in 
the 1980s, were partly interpreted as an advance of Islam into Turkish elites and 
politics. The German attention towards those demonstrations, which often frames the 
demonstrators as opponents of Turkish EUropeanization, is connected to the often 
existent exclusion of Islam from imaginations of EUrope. The importance of Islam, in 
representing non-EUropeanness, went through ups and downs in the following two 
decades. It did not however experience the relevance Communism had, until the 9/11 
terrorist attacks of 2001. Since then it has become one of the major frames, in 
defining what EUrope is (not) about, and thereby significantly effected perspectives 
on Turkey. (Walter 2008) 
Besides growing skepticism towards Turkey in Germany, at the end of the Cold War, 
it was generally still seen to be on the way (from Islam) to EUrope. There was – i.e. 
due to geopolitical intentions – a general opposition towards an explicit exclusion of 
Turkey from EUrope. Excluding frames, like cultural or religious ones, were, 
according to Walter (2008), not often applied to debates about a possible Turkish 
EEC/EU membership. The strength of factors, such as geopolitics and security, in 
constructing EUrope, can also be seen in the election manifestos of the SPD and 
CDU. References to EUrope in 1987 were most importantly framed through the Cold 
War context, and EUrope was mainly seen as a peace project. Both parties 
constructed a strong connection between the EUropean and German development in 
this context. This is for example realized in the following ways: 
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“The division of Germany only can be superseded in a European peace order” 
(SPD 1987)i 
“We want to overcome the inhuman division, caused by Soviet imperialism, 
and work towards a state of peace in Europe, in which the German people in 
free self-determination regains its unity.” (CDU/CSU 1987)ii 
EUrope, at least in looking at the EEC, was seen as a political union, which defined 
itself through the opposition to war and the USSR. While the CDU had an explicit 
focus on the second negative, the SPD limited itself mostly to the first frame. Turkey 
was however – though not often explicitly mentioned – part of this, then dominant, 
version of EUrope. The strength of geopolitical frames in imagining EUrope did not 
only become weaker up until the end, but also after the end, of Cold War. The 
following figure shows the changing share of the codes ‘peace order’, ‘EU’s foreign 
policy’ and ‘Othering (Cold) War’, of all the codes, I assigned to the election 
manifestos of CDU/CSU and SPD over the years since 1987: 
 
This shows that the interdiscursive relationship of imaginations of EUrope to issues 
related to geopolitical discourses, relatively constantly became weaker. In this 
geopolitical frame EUrope included Turkey. Since this frame became weaker when 
discussing EUrope, this was more often challenged, and different aspects were more 
                                                   
i  original German version: “Die Teilung Deutschlands kann nur in einer europäischen 
Friedensordnung aufgehoben werden“ (SPD 1987) 
ii original German version: “Wir wollen die menschenverachtende, vom sowjetischen Imperialismus 
verursachte Teilung überwinden und auf einen Zustand des Friedens in Europa hinwirken, in dem das 
deutsche Volk in freier Selbstbestimmung seine Einheit wiedererlangt.“ (CDU/CSU 1987) 
Figure 5 (self-
creation) 
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prominently brought into the debate on a Turkish EU accession. The Cold War did 
restrict the influence of other – potentially excluding – aspects, in imagining EUrope 
within the debate about Turkey. Since the role of opposition to (Cold) war in the 
construction of EUrope constantly diminished after 1990, approaches to EUrope 
became more diverse. Different aspects gained relevance in defining EUrope and its 
qualities. Thereby the role of economic cooperation and prosperity was often given 
prominence. In this economic context the SPD formulated a vision of EUrope, based 
on social equality and solidarity, combined with further values: 
“The European model relies on freedom, democracy and human rights, 
workers’ rights and a social, and ecological, market economy.” (SPD 1998)i 
CDU/CSU accorded with the notion of a social market economy as a representative 
quality of EUrope. Besides this, the conservatives formulated interdiscursive 
connections to questions like history, culture or religion in their approach to EUrope. 
In the course of the European elections 1999, this approach also entered the CDU’s 
election manifesto: 
“We Europeans have common roots for many centuries. Through history, 
culture, religion, tradition and the understanding of values we are 
interconnected in many ways.” (CDU 1999)ii 
This is the first such argument I found within the conservative manifestos I analyzed. 
Furthermore, the occurrence of rather skeptical notions towards EUrope can be 
connected to the end of the Cold War. It reduced the pressure against the formulation 
of this kind of skepticism. While the SPD in their manifestos widely spared this kind 
of rhetoric, CDU/CSU more explicitly formulated their skepticism towards too much 
power accumulation on the EUropean level and an often detected elitism in the EU 
institutions. Those sentiments were also present before the end of the Cold War, but 
rose in prominence since then. In general both parties nonetheless clearly stayed pro-
EUropean. CDU/CSU wrapped EUroskeptic sentiments in the notion of subsidiarity 
rather than national(ist) autonomy, and tried to keep a distance from reactionary 
German nationalism beyond all doubt. 
                                                   
i  original German version: “Das europäische Modell setzt auf Freiheit, Demokratie und 
Menschenrechte, auf die Rechte der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer und auf die soziale und 
ökologische Marktwirtschaft.” (SPD 1998) 
ii original German version: “Wir Europäer haben seit vielen Jahrhunderten gemeinsame Wurzeln. In 
Geschichte, Kultur, Religion, Tradition und Werteverständnis sind wir in vielfältiger Hinsicht 
miteinander verbunden.” (CDU 1999) 
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The frame of peace order in the 1990s was recontextualized within the debate on 
Eastern enlargement. The vision of a ‘united’ EUrope went hand in hand with that of 
a united Germany. That which had once seemed impossible, now became reality. Its 
perfection through the accession of the ECECs was made into the consequential goal. 
This goal was advocated by both big political parties simultaneously, and was also 
placed in their election manifestos: 
“CDU and CSU are therefore committed, to a powerful and purposeful 
advancement of the process of European unification. The European Union is 
centerpiece of a stable peace and freedom order.” (CDU/CSU 1994)i 
“Europe reached a crossroads: Each of our countries is too small, to possibly 
solve the big problems alone. Only together we are strong. Therefore, we 
Social Democrats say yes to the European Union.” (SPD 1994b, European 
election)ii 
Both parties had a positive attitude towards the enlargement. It was seen as a 
defining moment for EUrope, and as an incarnation of a EUrope defined by peace 
and stability, common values and prosperity. The ECECs were seen as approaching 
this status of EUropeanness, which should have been supported and completed 
through their accession to the EU. Thereby the role of the EU in representing the 
dominant imaginations of Europe becomes obvious. With the approximating 
realization of enlargement, both parties more often formulated skepticism towards 
the achievements of the ECECs. That was accompanied by the endorsement of 
transitional periods in aspects, where German national interests were seen to be 
endangered. This skepticism was hence connected to the integral role that national 
identity, in comparison to EUropean solidarity, still played. This was, especially since 
their temporary displacement from government in 1998, more accurate for 
CDU/CSU, while the SPD stuck to a, widely unblemished, pro-EUropean and pro-
enlargement position. In the context of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, the image of a 
contradiction between the enlargement and further integration of EUrope gained 
popularity. In 2002 it also found entry into the conservative election manifesto: 
“The enlargement of the EU must neither overstrain the capability of the 
accession candidate nor the integrative power of the European Union and its 
                                                   
i original German version: “CDU und CSU sind daher entschlossen, den Prozeß der europäischen 
Einigung kraftvoll und zielstrebig voranzubringen. Die Europäische Union ist der Kern einer stabilen 
Friedens- und Freiheitsordnung.” (CDU/CSU 1994) 
ii original German version: “Europa steht am Scheideweg: Jedes unserer Länder ist zu klein, um die 
großen Probleme allein lösen zu können. Nur gemeinsam sind wir stark. Deshalb sagen wir 
Sozialdemokraten ja zur Europäischen Union.” (SPD 1994b, European election) 
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member countries. Flexible, time-wise differentiated by branch and region, 
and sufficiently long transition periods are necessary, until free movement of 
workers, services, and freedom of establishment may be fully granted.” 
(CDU/CSU 2002)i 
This notion was to a large extent apportioned, and also inspired, by the Turkey 
question. The question on the general possibility of a Turkish EU membership, and 
on Turkey’s EUropeanness, were now openly and explicitly referred to more often. 
Towards the turn of the Millennium the German debate on Turkey continued to grow 
in width and variety, and became more polarized. Since the early 2000s it is, also 
beyond the political and otherwise elites, one of the most popular political topics. 
There was a clearly visible polarization between including and excluding positions, 
and the Turkey question was generally seen as a decisive moment for the 
development of EUrope. In 2002 the issue also expanded into the general election 
manifesto of CDU/CSU for the first time: 
“Turkey is a reliable ally. Its strategic role again grew in changed security 
conditions. We want to promote a European orientation of Turkey. We want 
Turkey to economically, politically and institutionally be closely connected 
with the European Union outside a membership.” (CDU/CSU 2002)ii 
Although the CDU tried to approach Turkey in a rather positive way, they made it 
clear that Turkey was seen as a partner, rather than part, of EUrope. The conservative 
advance of relatively clear and definite exclusion was probably to a large extent made 
possible through their position of parliamentary opposition. The SPD, on the other 
side, took part in the EUropean decision-making process which brought Turkey 
closer to a seemingly realistic membership. They could and did not distance 
themselves from this position. In reaction to the conservative skepticism they had to 
explain their position not only within the EUropean institutions, but also in the 
German public field. On the other side Große Hüttmann (2005) comes to the 
conclusion, that it was not exploited very much in election campaigning. This is 
especially surprising in the case of CDU/CSU, who – also in consideration of the later 
                                                   
i  original German version: “Die Erweiterung der EU darf weder die Leistungsfähigkeit der 
Beitrittskandidaten noch die Integrationskraft der Europäischen Union und ihrer Mitgliedsländer 
überfordern. Flexible, zeitlich nach Branchen und Regionen differenzierte und ausreichend lange 
Übergangsfristen sind notwendig, bis Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit, Niederlassungs- und 
Dienstleistungsfreiheit in vollem Umfang gewährt werden können.” (CDU/CSU 2002) 
ii original German version: “Die Türkei ist ein verlässlicher Bündnispartner. Ihre strategische Rolle ist 
unter den veränderten Sicherheitsbedingungen nochmals gewachsen. Wir wollen eine europäische 
Orientierung der Türkei fördern. Wir wollen die Türkei wirtschaftlich, politisch und institutionell 
außerhalb einer Mitgliedschaft eng mit der Europäischen Union verbinden.” (CDU/CSU 2002) 
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official relationships of potentially conservative-led government with Turkey – 
flinched from adding too much to the polarization of the debate. Although CDU/CSU 
still were one of the most prominent anti-Turkey forces in EUrope, they – as well as 
the German debate in general – did not reach the grade of radicalism and 
emotionalism observable in other EUropean countries. The issue nonetheless 
continued to stay one of the most polarized ones of German debates on EUrope. It 
also continued to gain relevance in German contestation with, and construction of, 
imaginations of EUrope. In 2004 it reached a peak in debating the opening of 
accession talks with Turkey. That was also the time, when a Turkish EU membership 
seemed most realistic. (Große Hüttmann 2005, Walter 2008) 
Between the end of the Second World War and the start of my research period the 
interdiscursive relationships, between the discourse around Turkey-EU relationships 
and the one about EUrope, were for a long time dominated by geopolitical frames. 
Thereby Turkey was included within the West, and also within EUrope. Towards and 
after the end of the Cold War the dominance of those frames became weaker. Other 
aspects of imaginations of EUrope, which became more diverse in general, gained 
relevance in debating the Turkey-EU relationships. The interdiscursive relationships 
of interest now more often contained aspects like democratic standards, economics, 
or culture. Also other aspects of Turkey gained importance when judging its potential 
EUropeanness. The perceived, i.e. cultural, difference between Germany and Turkey 
was brought into a direct relationship with the question of a potential EU accession of 
Turkey. The formulated Self-Other relationships between EUrope and Turkey became 
more diverse. Despite the segmentary or encompassing inclusion of Turkey within 
EUrope (see 2.4), also the grammar of Othering gained relevance in discussions 
about Turkey. With the intensification of the debate on Turkey in Germany, also its 
relevance for imaginations of EUrope rose. Subsequently, I will reconstruct the 
debate on Turkey in the parliamentary plenum. Thereby I want to illustrate different 
lines of argumentation, as well as their interconnectedness with constructions of 
EUrope. 
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6.2.2 Opening Accession Talks with Turkey 
On December 17th 2004 the EUropean head of states met in Brussels, to decide on the 
opening of accession talks with Turkey. Germany was represented through the SPD-
led government around Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and took the role of a passive 
supporter for Turkey. The oppositional conservatives could not have their critical 
voices heard at the EU summit. The decision at the EUropean level was advanced, 
and was also followed, by intense debates in Germany. They were also held within the 
plenary sessions of the German Bundestag. Mostly the conservatives encouraged 
plenary debates on Turkey, which is visible when looking at the quantities of 
conservative contributions. CDU/CSU-politicians account for 9350 words, I classified 
as relevant for the debate in the Bundestag, while this number is 5550 for the SPD. 
The higher quantity of conservative statements did not result in a much higher 
quantity of arguments and topics. Both parties talked, in different magnitudes and 
with some relevant exceptions, about the same topics, although the respective 
positions mostly differed. That goes hand in hand with a slightly higher density of 
codes and categories, which I applied to SPD-texts; I tagged the CDU-contributions 
256 times and the SPD-material 176 times in total (for a full record of respectively 
assigned codes and categories see in the Appendix). In the Bundestag’s debate ten 
different SPD-politicians and 13 parliamentarians of CDU/CSU took the floor. The 
contributors in these debates came from all different levels of the party hierarchies. 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) expressed his opinion on Turkey, as well as the 
party leaders Franz Müntefering (SPD) and Angela Merkel (CDU), and other 
prominent figures like Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) and Otto Schily (SPD). The prime 
contributors were, on the SPD-side, the (then) state minister for Europe Hans Martin 
Bury, and on the conservative side the speaker for foreign policy Friedbert Pflüger 
and CSU-man Gerd Müller. The major debates took place before the decision, in the 
most intense form on October 28th and December 16th 2004. They usually were held 
on application of CDU/CSU. 
After putting the material through my corpus of analyses, it became clear that a big 
part of the debate consisted of reciprocal intertextual references between CDU/CSU 
and the government (SPD and Green Party). The parties blamed each other for acting 
irresponsibly, lying to the German population, or acting against better knowledge. 
The parties argued on behalf of German and EUropean interests, and saw their 
opponents acting against those interests. One of the more favored strategies to 
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support this criticism was the reference to prior positions of the other party or 
respective popular party representatives. In this sense CDU/CSU enjoyed referring to 
the former SPD-chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s skepticism towards a Turkish 
accession, and highlighted the SPD-affinity of the aforementioned anti-Turkey 
historians. On the other hand the SPD’s favorite practice lay in pointing out the role 
that previous conservative governments played in the Turkish approximation to 
ECC/EU, i.e. 1963 (under chancellor Adenauer) or 1997 (under chancellor Kohl). In 
this way the parties wanted to uncover inconsistencies in their opponent’s positions. 
Other references, to actors outside the Bundestag, were directed towards the 
EUropean Commission and other ‘experts’, i.e. out of a scientific context. The 
conservatives also very often referred to religious authorities. 
The conservatives liked to picture themselves as advocates of the intensity in which 
the debate on the Turkey question was held. They blamed the SPD for trying to avoid 
it. This was i.e. realized in Angela Merkel’s following statement: 
“We wanted to have the debate here in this house today [...], to talk with the 
people about the consequences of this decision. I think, on the eve of a historic 
decision for Europe, the people really have this right.” (Bundestag 2004h)i 
Thereby the SPD indirectly was pictured, as acting dishonestly behind the back of the 
German public, in fear of the people’s say. The SPD’s primary reproach to CDU/CSU 
lay in stating their breach of German reliability in EUropean affairs, on behalf of 
populist interests in electoral success, which is i.e. formulated by Gert Weisskirchen: 
“You break with a policy, which has a long tradition in Germany. This policy 
was to be reliable and to give Turkey a perspective. You break with this 
policy of reliability. Thereby, CDU/CSU take leave of the European Concert” 
(Bundestag 2004h)ii 
Both parties applied the frame ‘Schicksalsfrage’ (fateful question) on the issue, in 
order to back their own point, and to further condemn the irresponsibility of the 
other party. The high relevance of the issue is a bipartisan consensus, and Turkey’s 
integration into the EU is seen as challenging by both parties. While CDU/CSU saw 
                                                   
i original German version: “Wir haben die Debatte heute hier in diesem Hause […] gewollt, um mit den 
Menschen über die Folgen dieser Entscheidung zu sprechen. Ich glaube, darauf haben die Menschen 
am Vorabend einer für Europa historischen Entscheidung wirklich einen Anspruch” (Bundestag 
2004h) 
ii original German version: “Sie vollziehen einen Bruch mit der Politik, die eine lange Tradition in 
Deutschland hat. Diese Politik bestand darin, verlässlich zu sein und der Türkei eine Perspektive zu 
geben. Sie brechen mit dieser Politik der Verlässlichkeit. Damit verabschiedet sich die Union aus dem 
europäischen Konzert” (Bundestag 2004h) 
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that EUrope was not in a position to cope with this challenge, the SPD saw this 
possibility at least in the long-term. This is backed by respective perspectives on 
Turkey’s and EUrope’s condition. 
In judging Turkey, both parties acknowledged the progress made through the reform 
agenda of the previous years. While the SPD highlighted this success story quite often 
and as consistently positive, the CDU – on the rare occasions they admitted Turkey’s 
rather positive development – always added some skepticism towards the 
implementation and consequentiality of the reforms; exemplified below in the words 
of Friedbert Pflüger: 
“Turkey in more than 40 years has not even rudimentarily met the criteria 
[...], whose fulfilment would have been necessary for an accession or even for 
the start of accession talks. Now we have mere two years Erdogan - with 
substantial reforms that we do not at all want to question, and which we 
want to encourage and support. But Mr. Müller is right: A big part of this 
only exists on paper. And do we really know exactly, in which direction 
Turkey and the AKP will develop?” (Bundestag 2004h)i 
Thereby Pflüger utilized an argument described by Große Hüttmann (2005), which 
can be traced back to a general skepticism towards the sincerity and quality of 
Turkish Westernization. The Turkish political system is imagined as a bad copy of a 
EUropean-style state, which was involuntarily imposed on the Turks by authoritarian 
Kemalism. This argument also implies a certain suspicion about a hidden Islamist 
agenda of the AKP. It is backed by noting the absence of a civil society, and a 
problematic attitude of the political elite to individual freedoms and human rights. 
The interdiscursive relationship to these and other grievances detected in Turkey was 
i.e. realized by CSU-man Gerd Müller: 
“You take on negotiations, while the political Copenhagen criteria are not 
fulfilled. Ankara violates human rights. The Cyprus question remains open. 
International law is being violated. Ankara violates the right of religious 
freedom. [...] Yet you still declare, that all criteria in respect to democracy 
and human rights are fulfilled” (Bundestag 2004h)ii 
                                                   
i  original German version: “die Türkei [hat] über 40 Jahre hinweg nicht einmal ansatzweise die 
Kriterien erfüllt[…], deren Einhaltung für einen Beitritt oder auch nur für die Aufnahme von 
Verhandlungen notwendig gewesen wäre. Jetzt haben wir gerade zwei Jahre Erdogan - mit 
beachtlichen Reformen, die wir überhaupt nicht infrage stellen, zu denen wir ermutigen und bei denen 
wir unterstützen wollen. Aber der Kollege Müller hat Recht: Ein großer Teil davon steht nur auf dem 
Papier. Und wissen wir denn wirklich so genau, in welche Richtung sich die Türkei und die AKP 
entwickeln?” (Bundestag 2004h) 
ii original German version: “Sie nehmen Verhandlungen auf, ohne dass die politischen Kopenhagener 
Kriterien erfüllt sind. Ankara missachtet die Menschenrechte. Die Zypernfrage ist weiter offen. Das 
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Other aspects, repeatedly named by CDU/CSU, were concerned with human rights 
and torture. Turkey was – at least implicitly – not considered able to eradicate these 
shortcomings. While CDU/CSU emphasized negative and deemphasized positive 
aspects, the opposite was true for the SPD. The social democrats thereby did not often 
address the conservative objection about the current Turkish fulfillment of the 
political Copenhagen Criteria. They framed the issue as a process, and Turkey was 
seen – though not quite there – on the way to complying with the standards of 
EUropeanness; i.e. Gernot Erler noted: 
“Two years ago, the European Council had set clear conditions for the 
opening of negotiations. This has triggered impressive reform efforts in 
Ankara” (Bundestag 2004c)i 
Besides the complimenting of Turkey for having made progress, another important 
SPD-argument shimmers through this quote: the Turkish dependency on the 
accession process. In case of a rejection, the slowing-down of Turkish reformism, or 
even regression, were feared. EUrope is seen as responsible to support Turkish 
modernization, i.e. from the threat of Islamism. This shows that SPD-actors also 
shared skepticism towards the Turkish progress regarding stabilization and 
democratization. Turkey was, not only for its size and population, or its relatively 
weak economy, framed as a special candidate. Sometimes it was, also by the SPD, 
seen as different in other, rather vague, terms, as i.e. Franz Müntefering stated: 
“The negotiations will be long and difficult. Their output is open; you know 
that. Before 2014 Turkey’s accession to the EU can not be expected anyway. 
[...] Turkey is not a candidate like any other. We know about the worries and 
concerns that also exist in our country: Turkey is a very big country, a 
country with culture which has no tradition in Europe without saying, at 
least not in the same dimension as other cultures.” (Bundestag 2004h)ii 
                                                                                                                                                               
Völkerrecht wird verletzt. Ankara verletzt das Recht auf Religionsfreiheit. […] Dennoch stellen Sie fest, 
dass alle Kriterien hinsichtlich der Demokratie und Menschenrechte erfüllt seien” (Bundestag 2004h) 
i original German version: “Vor zwei Jahren hat der Europäische Rat klare Bedingungen für die 
Aufnahme von Verhandlungen formuliert. Das hat eindrucksvolle Reformbemühungen in Ankara 
ausgelöst” (Bundestag 2004c) 
ii original German version: “Die Verhandlungen werden lange dauern und schwierig sein. Ihr Ausgang 
ist offen; das wissen Sie. Vor 2014 jedenfalls ist ein Beitritt der Türkei zur EU nicht zu erwarten. […] 
Die Türkei ist kein Beitrittskandidat wie jeder andere. Wir wissen um die Sorgen und Bedenken, die es 
auch in unserem Lande gibt: Die Türkei ist ein sehr großes Land, ein Land mit einer Kultur, die nicht 
ohne weiteres in Europa Tradition hat, wenigstens nicht in der Dimension wie andere Kulturen.” 
(Bundestag 2004h) 
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Müntefering relativized the relevance of the 2004-decision. In pointing to the long-
term perspective of a potential accession, he mitigated the worries about Turkey’s 
cultural peculiarity – which he thereby acknowledged.  
The, as stated by Müntefering, exceptionality of Turkey in contrast to prior accession 
candidates, was an exception to the overall SPD-recontextualization of the 
2004/2008-enlargement within the Turkey-debate. The more usual purpose, of SPD-
references to prior enlargements, was to show that also back then many worries, 
which later proved to be wrong, were formulated, and that the same will be the case 
for Turkey. The typical conservative recontextualization of prior enlargements went 
in a quite different direction, like Merkel’s following statement illustrated: 
“The European Union of 25, soon 27 or 28, today itself is not institutionally 
consolidated and hence not capable to act. Therefore it is important that we 
not just expand [...] Europe in this form, without bothering, whether the 
integration achievements of 50 years could get damaged thereby.” 
(Bundestag 2004f)i 
Out of this perspective, the fast pace of prior enlargements did not prove EUrope’s 
absorption capacities, but led to a situation in which a rather long period of recovery 
was needed. This went hand in hand with the imagination of a contradiction between 
the enlargement and integration of EUrope. This aspect was by far the most 
prominent one in the conservative approach to the Turkey question. It went hand in 
hand with the CDU/CSU-plea for a privileged partnership as an alternative to full 
membership. They argued that the EU (at least for the foreseeable future) would not 
be able to handle a Turkish EU membership. A Turkish accession was said to 
overstrain the integration capabilities of the EU, and would only be realizable at the 
expense of the depth of integration. The main obstacle for a Turkish EU membership 
was seen in the threatening overextension and overstraining of the EU. In the most 
extreme form the admission of Turkey into the EU is seen as a last straw, which 
would mean the end of EUrope. The following two quotes should illustrate this line of 
argumentation: 
                                                   
i  original German version: “Die Europäische Union der 25, bald 27 oder 28, ist heute in sich 
institutionell noch gar nicht gefestigt und von daher noch nicht handlungsfähig. Deshalb ist es wichtig, 
dass wir nicht einfach […] Europa in dieser Form erweitern, ohne uns Gedanken zu machen, ob das 
Integrationswerk von 50 Jahren dabei Schaden nehmen könnte.” (Bundestag 2004f) 
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“To promote deepening and widening [...] at once is a political delusion. You 
cannot have both” (Gerd Müller/CSU, Bundestag 2004c)i 
“It is pretended, that this would only be about Turkey. In the most part, this is 
about us, about the future of the decades-long integration project European 
Union, about its deepening, which is connected with the transfer of 
sovereignty.” (Angela Merkel, Bundestag 2004h)ii 
In the eyes of CDU/CSU a Turkish EU membership would make the goal of a political 
union impossible. The EU would not be able to handle the negative consequences of a 
Turkish accession and at the same time advance integration. One of these, potentially 
negative, consequences was seen in the challenge for the actionability of EU 
institutions, which was already seen to be in a crisis due to the 2004/2008-
enlargement. It was highlighted that, due to its size and population, Turkey would 
have (too) much power in EU institutions. Große Hüttmann (2005) argues that it is 
feared, that Turkey would use this power to advocate interests which do not comply 
with the rest of EUrope and Germany, i.e. through a shift of emphasis from political 
to economic cooperation. 
CDU/CSU in general were quite skeptical about potential benefits of a Turkish EU 
membership, which i.e. the government brought in the debate. On the other hand – 
in the geopolitical frame, developed during Cold War times – they saw the advances 
of good relationships with Turkey in terms of defense policy and security. In this 
context they usually, again, brought forward their plea for some sort of privileged 
partnership between Turkey and EUrope. This would secure these benefits, without 
endangering EUropean integration, as i.e. Wolfgang Schäuble stated: 
“a privileged partnership is the right solution [...].Because such a partnership 
is not endangering the chances of political unity by over-stretching the 
borders and at the same time makes a close relationship between Turkey and 
Europe possible.” (Wolfgang Schäuble, Bundestag 2004c)iii 
CDU/CSU demanded the inclusion of this option within the negotiation agreement. 
Thereby they implied an automatism of accession talks, since the only possible result 
                                                   
i  original German version: “Vertiefung und Erweiterung […] gemeinsam voranzutreiben, ist eine 
politische Lebenslüge. Sie können nicht beides haben” (Gerd Müller/CSU, Bundestag 2004c) 
ii original German version: “Es wird so getan, als ginge es nur um die Türkei. Im Wesentlichen geht es 
aber um uns, um die Zukunft eines jahrzehntelangen Aufbauwerks der Europäischen Union, um seine 
Vertiefung, das mit der Abgabe von Souveränitätsrechten verbunden ist.” (Angela Merkel, Bundestag 
2004h) 
iii original German version: “eine privilegierte Partnerschaft [ist] die richtige Lösung […]. Denn eine 
solche Partnerschaft gefährdet nicht die Chancen einer politischen Einheit durch Überdehnung der 
Grenzen und ermöglicht zugleich eine enge Verbindung der Türkei mit Europa.” (Wolfgang Schäuble, 
Bundestag 2004c) 
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seemed to be full accession. The importance of the demand of an alternative 
partnership with Turkey and aspects, which stand in a close relationship with it, can 
also be illustrated through the quantities of respectively assigned codes. The 
following table shows the share of respective codes, from all the codes assigned to the 
CDU/CSU’s 2004-contributions: 
 
 
Figure 6 
(self 
creation) 
In summary codes which directly have to do with the demand of a privileged 
partnership, based on the construction of an integration/enlargement-dilemma, 
accounted for a fourth of all assigned codes in the CDU/CSU’s case. It was by far the 
most prominent argumentation line of the conservative party in the Turkey debate. 
In dealing with this conservative prime argument, the social democrats started with 
presenting an opposing perspective on the character of the accession process. They 
denied that the start of accession talks would initiate an automatism towards full 
membership, and claimed that the negotiations would be open-ended. The SPD 
pointed to the exceptionality that an explicit mention of a fallback-option would 
mean. They pleaded against treating Turkey any different from any other candidate 
country, and criticized the conservative demand as an obscure attempt to harm the 
EU-Turkey relationships. They blamed the conservative side for discouraging Turkey 
from its aspirations, to proceed with implementing the criteria of EUropeanness. 
On the other hand, the SPD usually accorded with the notion of a crisis situation of 
the EU’s actionability, due to the integration/enlargement-dilemma. In contrast to 
the conservatives they saw it as challenge, but not an impossibility, to make the EU 
capable of integrating Turkey. Hence, Angelica Schwall-Düren stated: 
“Indeed it does not only matter, that Turkey carries out its reforms, but it is 
also important, that the EU must undergo essential changes. [...] The 
strengthening of the European Union’s integration at first must be seen 
totally independent of a possible accession of Turkey; because the ability to 
Alternative partnership proposing it 6,6% (17/257) 
Accession process assuming automatism 1,2% (3/257) 
warning from continuation 1,2% (3/257) 
IntegrationEnlargement contradictory 6,6% (17/257) 
Intake capacity not given 2,3% (6/257) 
EU’s actionability endangered by T-accession 1,6% (4/257) 
political level integration endangered by T-accession 5,4% (14/257) 
  Sum 24,9% (64/257) 
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act internally and externally must also be strengthened in the context of the 
current 25 members.” (Bundestag 2004c)i 
They usually pointed to the long-term perspective of an eventual Turkish 
membership. EUrope was framed as a dynamic process and it was expected, that the 
EU would be able to increase its intake capacity by the time a Turkish accession is 
realistic, which would be in 10 to 15 years. 
Besides this challenge for EUropean institutions, the conservatives also feared other 
negative consequences. Very often they named the potentially high costs of a Turkish 
EU accession, like Bartholomäus Kalb (CSU) argued: 
“The costs [of a possible accession of Turkey] are specified with 21-35 billion 
Euros per year by reputable institutions. The biggest part of those Germany 
would have to bear.” (Bundestag 2004e)ii 
A further enhancement of the costs, Germany would have to bear in case of Turkish 
EU membership, was seen in the potential rise of migration from Turkey towards 
Germany. In the conservative’s opinion, that would, for itself, cause high costs, i.e. in 
terms of job security. They also worried that a Turkish EU accession would lead to 
further troubles to integrate the already existing Turkish Diaspora in Germany. In 
respect to these rather materialist consequences of a Turkish EU membership, the 
SPD generally also acknowledged its risks, but rated the chances higher. Thus, i.e. 
SPD-party-leader Müntefering pointed to the economic benefits, which would be 
especially high for Germany: 
“Germany is the biggest trade partner of Turkey. The growth of German 
exports also this year was striking. [...] The prospect of Turkey’s accession to 
the European Union also is in the economic interests of Germany and the 
EU.” (Bundestag 2004h)iii 
                                                   
i original German version: “Es kommt in der Tat nicht nur darauf an, dass die Türkei ihre Reformen 
durchführt, sondern es geht auch darum, dass die EU unverzichtbare Veränderungen durchlaufen 
muss. [...] Die Verstärkung der Integration der Europäischen Union ist zunächst völlig unabhängig von 
einem möglichen Beitritt der Türkei zu sehen; denn die Handlungsfähigkeit nach innen und nach 
außen muss auch im Rahmen der jetzigen 25 Mitglieder gestärkt werden.” (Bundestag 2004c) 
ii original German version: “Die Kosten [eines möglichen Beitritts der Türkei] werden von seriösen 
Instituten zwischen 21 und 35 Milliarden Euro pro Jahr angegeben. Den größten Teil davon hätte 
Deutschland zu tragen.” (Bundestag 2004e) 
iii original German version: “Deutschland ist der größte Handelspartner der Türkei. Der Zuwachs der 
deutschen Exporte war auch in diesem Jahr wieder fulminant. […] Die Perspektive des Beitritts der 
Türkei zur Europäischen Union liegt auch im ökonomischen Interesse Deutschlands und der EU.” 
(Bundestag 2004h) 
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Furthermore the SPD denounced conservative warnings from migration movements 
as populist fear mongering. The consequences of a Turkish membership for the 
integration of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany were expected to be positive. 
The SPD also formulated the fear that a rejection could make Turkey turn its back on 
EUrope, possibly even realign with Iranian-style Islamism instead, and destroy the 
positive effect a Turkish EU membership could have in geopolitical terms. A Turkish 
EU membership would contribute to the stabilization of the crisis-ridden regions in 
its neighborhood, and give the EU more geopolitical power. This point was for 
example put forward by chancellor Schröder: 
“It [is] of immense importance to the national interests of Germany, to ensure 
that Turkey becomes and remains a pro-Western factor of stability.” 
(Bundestag 2004f)i 
According to Große Hüttmann (2005), this argument stands in a relationship to, and 
is triggered by, 9/11 and the perception of Islamism as EUrope’s central Other. In this 
perspective, the SPD placed their most important pro-Turkey argument: a Turkish 
membership would prevent an eventual ‘clash of civilizations’, and be an alternative 
to the ‘war on terror’. Turkey is pictured as a bridge between Islam and EUrope. This 
bridge does not only work in terms of diplomacy and communication. It would 
furthermore prove the universality of EUropean values, or rather the possibility of 
their appliance on Muslim societies. It would dissolve the opposition of Islam and 
modernity. It could make Turkey into a role model for other Muslim societies and 
inspire democratic movements. Subsequently, I also want to summarize the 
quantities of respective codes, I assigned on the SPD-material: 
 
Figure 7 (self-
creation) 
 
These low numbers do not say so much about the, in spite of the high, relevance this 
issue had in the SPD’s take on the Turkey question, but about the character of the 
debate in general. It is due to the high share of (mostly opposing) reactions to 
conservative arguments in the SPD’s approach on Turkey, and reconfirms that the 
conservatives clearly took the thematic leadership in the debate. 
                                                   
i original German version: “es [ist] von ungeheuer großer Bedeutung für die nationalen Interessen 
Deutschlands, dafür zu sorgen, dass die Türkei ein prowestlich ausgerichteter Faktor der Stabilität 
wird und bleibt.” (Bundestag 2004f) 
Relations with Islam T-accession positive impact 2,8% (5/180) 
Security and Stability T-accession positive impact 2,2% (4/180) 
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Through pointing to the potential role of Turkey as a mediator between civilizations, 
the Turkey debate became a significant aspect in imagining EUrope. Imaginations of 
EUrope, and perspectives on the qualities EUrope is about, entered the debate. They 
were hence re-contextualized and re-constructed, and an interdiscursive relationship 
between the debates on Turkey and EUrope was established. The Turkish accession, 
in the eyes of the SPD, would be the incarnation of a EUrope which is based on 
universal values, rather than culture and tradition. A Turkish accession would prove 
and carry out this claim, as Schwall-Düren put it: 
“With the accession of Turkey those elements [would get] woven together, 
which a federated Europe should stand for: for the secularization of historical 
communities, committed to a cultural tradition, on the base of universal 
human rights, pluralism and democracy; for a safety, which increasingly 
proves as indivisible; and of course for the wealth, which links it all together.” 
(Bundestag 2004c)i 
Although the relevance of culture was accepted for the national level, the SPD tried to 
distance itself from a nationalist model in imagining EUrope. The acceptance of 
Turkey within EUrope would represent the independence of EUrope from culturalist 
notions, and most importantly from the ones about religion, as Gert Weisskirchen 
noted: 
“The European Union [is] thus not a religious project [...]. The European 
Union is also no geographical project. The European Union is a project of 
European values. It is not excluded and must not be excluded [...], that Islam 
develops so, that it takes a complementary role within European values. [...] 
It is essential, to Europeanize Islam. This is the central task of the European 
Union.” (Bundestag 2004h)ii 
Noting the independence of EUropean integration from religious, geographical, or 
similar aspects, at the same time was an accusation of CDU/CSU, to imagine EUrope 
in this way. The conservatives were blamed for being backwardly culturalist, and 
viewed EUrope as some kind of Christian club. The conservative imagination of 
                                                   
i original German version: “mit dem Beitritt der Türkei [würden] jene Elemente miteinander verwoben, 
für die das föderierte Europa einmal stehen dürfte: Für die Säkularisierung historischer, einer 
kulturellen Tradition verpflichteter Gemeinwesen auf der Grundlage universeller Menschenrechte, 
Pluralismus und Demokratie; für eine sich zunehmend als unteilbar erweisende Sicherheit; und 
natürlich für den alles miteinander verknüpfenden Wohlstand.” (Bundestag 2004c) 
ii  original German version: “die Europäische Union [ist] eben kein religiöses Projekt […]. Die 
Europäische Union ist auch kein geographisches Projekt. Die Europäische Union ist ein Projekt der 
europäischen Werte. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen und darf auch nicht ausgeschlossen werden […], dass 
sich der Islam so entwickelt, dass er innerhalb der europäischen Werte eine komplementäre Aufgabe 
übernimmt. […]Es kommt darauf an, den Islam zu europäisieren. Das ist die zentrale Aufgabe der 
Europäischen Union.” (Bundestag 2004h) 
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EUrope was seen as motivated by this kind of culturalism, although they usually 
avoid explicitness on this issue. 
CDU/CSU usually vehemently refused allegations, that they would be motivated by 
religious aspects, and formulated other points, which would constitute the Turkish 
unEUropeanness. Thereby CDU/CSU, even more then in the rest of their 
argumentation, preferred to let quotes by other actors and authorities speak through 
their mouth, in order to overcome the legitimacy-deficit those kind of arguments have 
in the German debate. One of the most popular sources was thereby found in the 
geographical school book definition of EUrope. For example Merkel noted that: 
“Therefore, I would like to quote, the former judge of the Constitutional Court, 
Böckenförde [...]: ‘Turkey is in terms of its geographic extent, population, 
national and cultural identity, economic and political structure of a 
significance and peculiarity, which makes the question about the concept and 
finalité of European integration inevitable.’ [...] You will continue to say, that 
the commitment to Turkey was also given, because it historically and 
politically belongs to Europe. Fact is, that – after a glance at the map, you 
can not get around this – for the first time in the history of European 
unification, negotiations with a country are begun, which boundaries reach 
far beyond Europe; they extent until Iran, Iraq and Syria.” (Bundestag 
2004h)i 
The geographical unEUropeanness was brought in a direct connection with the 
overall difference of Turkey to EUrope. It stated Turkey’s closeness to Islam and Asia, 
as opposed to a clear inclusion in EUrope. This difference, in the conservative 
perspective, would be of a magnitude, which makes the political integration of 
EUrope impossible. It would destroy the development of a EUropean identity, which 
would be necessary to back a political union. The base of this was the 
conceptualization of identity and culture based on historical experience, which makes 
it relatively inflexible and definite. Pflüger got to the heart of this attitude: 
“My parliamentary group and I would never say that Islam and Europe do 
not fit together [...]. But I believe that Europe also got to do with cultural 
identity, history and traditions, which have grew over centuries. To begin 
with that has nothing to do with Christianity and a Christian-Club – that 
                                                   
i  original German version: “Deshalb möchte ich den ehemaligen Verfassungsrichter Böckenförde 
zitieren [...]: ‘Die Türkei ist nach geographischer Ausdehnung, Bevölkerungszahl, nationaler und 
kultureller Identität, ökonomischer und politischer Struktur von einer Bedeutung und Eigenart, die die 
Frage nach dem Konzept, der finalité der europäischen Einigung unausweichlich macht.’ […] Sie 
werden weiterhin sagen, dass der Türkei die Zusage auch deshalb gegeben worden sei, weil sie 
historisch und politisch zu Europa gehöre. Tatsache ist, dass - daran kommt man nach einem Blick auf 
die Landkarte nicht vorbei - erstmals in der Geschichte des europäischen Einigungsprozesses 
Verhandlungen mit einem Land begonnen werden, dessen Grenzen weit über Europa hinausgehen; sie 
reichen bis zum Iran, zum Irak und nach Syrien.” (Bundestag 2004h) 
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would be a very superficial view – but with the fact that, especially in a 
globalized world, every organization and association, which wants to be a 
political union, needs something like a ‘we’-feeling. This ‘we’-feeling is more 
than a commitment to democracy and human rights. It is based on a 
centuries-old history, one must have lived through together: the Greek 
Antiquity, the Roman law, the Investiture Controversy, the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment; all of this characterizes Europe. [...] You have to work hard 
on taking the people along the way” (Bundestag 2004h)i 
Although CDU/CSU usually avoided the reference to a religious difference, they build 
a EUrope on equally inflexible and essentialist notions about culture, geography, 
historical experience, and identity. The values EUrope is about were widely similar to 
the SPD-version. They however were, first, not the only prime resource of EUrope-
constructions. Second, they were directly connected with the excluding culturalist 
argument, as i.e. a quote by CSU-man Müller shows: 
“Turkey neither geographically nor culturally belongs to the European 
Union. Mrs. Roth, Ankara violates the human rights.” (Bundestag 2004c)ii 
The cultural and geographical difference of Turkey was illustrated through pointing 
to the Turkish imperfection in fulfilling EUropean values. Thereby the alleged 
universality of these values was relativized. 
In opposition to this argument, the pro-Turkey side often pleaded for the 
renunciation from this inflexible exclusionary attitude. They wanted to give Turkey a 
fair chance, to show their ability to fulfill the standards of EUropeanness. Out of this 
perspective the issue should solely be debated on the grounds of Turkey’s progress in 
fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. This would make the question of Turkish 
EUropeanness obsolete. It is, according to Walter (2008), a legalist or technical 
understanding of EUrope. It aimed for the de-politicization of the issue, which was 
prevented by the direct opposition against the bureaucratization of the issue. 
CDU/CSU argued that this version of EUrope would not supply the needed source of 
                                                   
i original German version: “Meine Fraktion und ich würden nie sagen, dass Islam und EU nicht 
zusammenpassen [...]. Aber ich glaube, Europa hat auch mit kultureller Identität, Geschichte und 
Traditionen, die über Jahrhunderte gewachsen sind, zu tun. Das hat mit Christentum und 
Christenclub erst einmal gar nichts zu tun - das wäre sehr oberflächlich betrachtet -, sondern damit, 
dass gerade in der globalisierten Welt jede Organisation bzw. jeder Zusammenschluss, der eine 
politische Union sein will, so etwas wie ein Wirgefühl benötigt. Dieses Wirgefühl ist mehr als das 
Bekenntnis zu Demokratie und Menschenrechten. Es beruht auf jahrhundertealter Geschichte, die 
man gemeinsam durchlebt haben muss: die griechische Antike, das römische Recht, der 
Investiturstreit, die Reformation, die Aufklärung, das alles prägt Europa. […] Sie müssen sich darum 
bemühen, die Menschen mitzunehmen” (Bundestag 2004h) 
ii original German version: “Die Türkei gehört weder geographisch noch kulturell zur Europäischen 
Union. Frau Roth, Ankara missachtet die Menschenrechte.” (Bundestag 2004c) 
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Figure 8 (self-creation) 
identification and criticized its alleged unpopularity. In order to guarantee the 
possibility of a political union, CDU/CSU saw the need for a nation-style 
conceptualization of EUrope. Turkey, due to its cultural and other such differences, 
would not fit into this EUrope. 
All in all, the parliamentary debate approved the framing of the Turkey question as a 
defining moment for EUrope. This is true for both parties. Thereby CDU/CSU feared 
the end of EUrope, while the SPD saw the incarnation of a EUrope based on universal 
values in a Turkish accession. This demonstrates how important imaginations of 
EUrope were in debating Turkey. The following list summarizes quantities of the 
most frequent codes, related to different aspects of EUrope, I assigned to the parties’ 
Bundestag-contributions: 
This table contains 
different aspects of EUrope 
that the parties referred to 
in order to explain their 
positions on Turkey. I just 
listed the issues they took 
on, but only counted tags 
which accorded with the 
parties’ overall-position on 
Turkey. Hence, I only 
counted pro-Turkey 
positions for the SPD, and 
anti-Turkey positions for 
CDU/CSU; that covers nearly all assigned codes anyway. The left (SPD), right 
(CDU/CSU) or centered alignment of the names of the respective codes, is based 
upon their frequency of occurrence in the respective parties’ contributions. Figure 8 
thereby summarizes the imagination of EUrope the parties applied to the discourse 
on Turkey. For the case of the SPD this EUrope is adaptable to a Turkish accession 
and dynamic in general. It is based on a peace order and Enlightenment values which 
are independent from culture or religion. Their propagation, i.e. to Turkey, was seen 
as a central purpose of EUrope. The conservative perspective saw EUrope’s destiny in 
a deep political union, based on culture and history, with definite geographical 
borders. Turkey is no part of EUrope, neither in terms of geography, nor in terms of 
SPD   CDU/CSU 
(9/180) - Political Level 5,3% (14/262) 
(9/180) 5,0% Changeability 0,4% (1/262) 
(2/180) 1,1% Culture 3,1% (8/262) 
(4/180) 2,2% Values 1,5% (4/262) 
(2/180) 1,1% History 2,3% (6/262) 
(4/180) 2,2% Peace order 0,8% (2/262) 
(5/180) 2,8% Normative Power - (0/262) 
(1/180) 0,6% Geography 2,3% (6/262) 
(3/180) 1,7% Reliability 0,4% (1/262) 
(3/180) 1,7% Enlightenment 0,4% (1/262) 
(2/180) 1,1% Religion 0,8% (2/262) 
(0/180) - Othering Asia 1,9% (5/262) 
(3/180) 1,7% Adaptility - (0/262) 
(0/180) - Borders 1,1% (3/262) 
(0/180) - Othering Islam 0,8% (2/262) 
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history or culture. The conservative EUrope very much resembled the concept of a 
nation-state.  
This shows that there was an interdiscursive influence from the discourse EUrope to 
the one about Turkey-EU relationships. My primary research interest however lies in 
the influence that this relationship exerts in the opposite direction. In the following 
parts of my paper, I intend to show how the constructions of EUrope in the context of 
the Turkey debate left marks within the discourse on EUrope in general. Some of 
these consequences can be already conjectured through looking at the manifestos for 
the European election in 2004 and the general election in 2005. Thereby a 
differentiation of approaches towards EUrope within election manifestos can be 
observed in comparison to prior years. The SPD approached EUrope often through 
universal values, but also through the confession of social equality, which was not 
part of their argumentation in the Turkey debate. The conservatives, again, noted the 
role history, culture and religion, besides other aspects, hold in terms of EUropean 
solidarity in their European manifesto. Thereby a crisis perception on EUrope was 
very present, and EUropean solidarity was seen endangered. These attitudes were, at 
least partly, crafted within in the context of the Turkey question. The general high 
conservative attention towards Turkey also was implemented within the manifestos. 
Thereby the well-known arguments on the absent integration capacity and alternative 
partnerships were formulated again. The difference to the CDU/CSU’s attitude to the 
accession of Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia, which was skeptical but positive in 
principle, shows that Turkey is not part of their ideal of EUrope. The Turkey issue 
was not mentioned explicitly in the SPD’s manifestos, but the general plea for a fair 
and reliable treatment of accession candidates in the manifesto to the general 
elections, is clearly a reference to Turkey. This general attention, which was given to 
the Turkey question in the election manifestos, shows the high significance in 
German politics that it reached at this point. 
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6.2.3 Treaty of Lisbon 
On December 13th 2007 a reform treaty for the EU was signed in Lisbon. On April 
24th 2008 its ratification through the German Bundestag took place. The treaty was 
made necessary because of the failed ratification of the European constitution, a few 
years earlier. The new Lisbon Treaty was prepared under a German presidency in the 
European Council, and significantly crafted by the German government. During this 
time, the government was composed of a coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD, with 
conservative leader Angela Merkel as chancellor. Between the signing of the treaty in 
Lisbon and the German ratification, it was on the agenda of the German Bundestag’s 
plenary sessions on several occasions. The quantities of contributions, I classified as 
relevant for my research question in this case, were rather even between CDU/CSU 
and SPD; they added up to around 4000 words for each party. In analyzing this 
material, I assigned 114 codes to the SPD’s, and 125 codes to the conservative 
contributions. On the SPD- side parliamentarian Michael Roth, with three speeches, 
was the prime contributor amongst the nine other SPD-members who took speeches 
on the issue. Amongst them were prominent figures, like the minister of foreign 
affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier or party leader Kurt Beck. On the conservative side 
only Angela Merkel took a speech on the issue twice, while the other ten contributors, 
like party whip Volker Kauder, only spoke once. The most intense debates took place 
on the day before the signing, and on the day of the ratification of the treaty. I further 
utilized statements out of six more plenary sessions for my analysis. 
The debate between the two big parties was not very hard or controversial. That was 
not only caused by their cooperation in government, but also by the general 
consensus of the German elites on the importance and positivity of the treaty. That 
was confirmed by the lack of criticism from the oppositional parties, apart from ‘Die 
Linke’, who reconfirmed their role as an outsider in the German political debate on 
EUrope. The ratification of the treaty by the German Bundestag was rather a 
formality. Both parties insisted on their leading role in realizing the treaty. One of the 
few dissents related to the question of who contributed more. The SPD pointed to the 
long social-democrat history of supporting a united Europe, to underline their role in 
this process, while Merkel liked to picture herself as a booster of the treaty 
negotiations. The debate consisted more of commitments to the EUropean project, 
rather than a discussion of the treaty-contents. In these commitments the MPs 
nevertheless formulated visions of EUrope. These imaginations were not put against 
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each other very intensively, but the sole variety between them already makes them 
relevant for my research interest. 
The Lisbon Treaty was generally framed as a positive historical achievement. This 
might have been due to the responsibility of SPD and CDU/CSU in its realization, but 
obviously was argued on different grounds. Its historic relevance was based on a 
perceived crisis situation of the EUropean project. This crisis was seen in the lack of 
actionability of the EU institutions, after the failed constitution and the enlargement 
of the Union. The reform treaty was framed, at least partly, as a solution to this crisis. 
One of the primary agents of this positive attitude was chancellor Merkel: 
“This day marks a historic achievement for Europe and in retrospect might 
be seen as decisive milestone in the creation of more capacity to act in 
Europe.” (Bundestag 2007a)i 
While the pragmatic aim of EUrope’s actionability was especially present in the 
conservative argumentation, the social democrats often argued on different grounds 
for the historic dimension of the treaty. They mostly framed it as an important step 
towards the further integration of EUrope, and thereby towards the conclusion of the 
EUropean project or vision. This can be illustrated in quoting SPD-man Axel Schäfer: 
“For us, today [...], since we ratify the Lisbon Treaty, is day of pride, because 
a part of our historical identity – better: our visions – is coming true.” 
(Bundestag 2008e)ii 
This view, which was present at both parties’ speeches, went back to certain 
imaginations of EUrope, which were aimed for. These visions differed in parts 
between the parties, but in general the consensus on a further deepening of 
EUropean integration was still powerful. Therefore the SPD still mourned after the 
EUropean constitution, and would not give up on it, as party-leader Kurt Beck 
argued: 
“The task is set to ourselves [...], to work on the thought of a further 
consolidation and a further merging along the common values and objectives 
of this Europe. Therefore, for us social democrats the goal of achieving a 
                                                   
i original German version: “Dieser Tag markiert einen historischen Erfolg für Europa und er wird im 
Rückblick vielleicht einmal als eine entscheidende Wegmarke bei der Herstellung von mehr 
Handlungsfähigkeit in Europa angesehen werden.” (Bundestag 2007a) 
ii original German version: “Für uns ist heute [...], da wir den Vertrag von Lissabon ratifizieren, ein 
stolzer Tag, weil ein Teil unserer geschichtlichen Identität - besser: unserer Visionen - zur Wirklichkeit 
wird.” (Bundestag 2008e) 
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European constitution, remains a great vision, we will persist with.” 
(Bundestag 2008e)i 
On the other hand the parties agreed that EUrope already had achieved a lot, 
although the vision of a united EUrope was still to be reached. 
In reconstructing EUrope’s achievements, and thereby a certain imagination of 
EUrope, both parties resorted to traditional frames, like the construction of EUrope 
as a peace order. These classical notions on imagining EUrope in opposition to war, 
or communist dictatorship, were more present than in the 2004-debate on the 
Turkey question. What EUrope is about, was to a large extent defined by the 
dissociation of its past, as also Volker Kauder showed: 
“After the Second World War, we began to realize our vision, by striving after 
the development of falling barriers and the creation of a Europe without 
borders. In fact we knew: A Europe without borders will be a Europe, which 
creates peace.” (Bundestag 2007a)ii 
The opposition to war, and the German past, is common ground in Germany. The 
explicit extension of the peace order frame towards the Cold War was more present in 
the conservative argumentation. Nonetheless, the SPD also spoke of the central 
achievement to overcome the EUropean divide. Thereby the enlargement towards the 
ECECs was framed as its realization, and the Lisbon Treaty as its final conclusion. 
The centrality of EUropean unity was, amongst other things, based on the 
imagination of its simultaneity with German unity. In the words of Kurt Beck this 
sounded like that: 
“We Germans on our part understood, that we only can reach a united 
Germany in a united and free Europe. [...] Peace and freedom are a 
trademark of this community” (Bundestag 2008e)iii 
Besides highlighting the relevance of peace in the definition of EUrope, the 
opposition to the Cold War, and to communism, was also important in the 
                                                   
i  original German version: “es […] [wird] uns die Aufgabe gestellt [...], an dem Gedanken einer 
weiteren Festigung und einer weiteren Zusammenführung entlang der gemeinsamen Werte und Ziele 
dieses Europas zu arbeiten. Für uns Sozialdemokratinnen und Sozialdemokraten bleibt deshalb das 
Ziel, eine europäische Verfassung zu erreichen, eine große Vision, die wir auch weiter verfolgen 
werden.” (Bundestag 2008e) 
ii  original German version: “Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg begannen wir, unsere Vision zu 
verwirklichen, indem wir uns darum bemühten, dass die Schlagbäume fallen und ein Europa ohne 
Grenzen entsteht. Wir haben nämlich gewusst: Ein Europa ohne Grenzen wird ein Europa sein, das 
Frieden schafft.” (Bundestag 2007a) 
iii original German version: “Wir Deutsche haben unsererseits verstanden, dass wir ein gemeinsames 
Deutschland nur in einem gemeinsamen freien Europa erreichen können. […] Frieden und Freiheit 
sind ein Markenzeichen dieser Gemeinschaft” (Bundestag 2008e) 
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construction of other qualities, EUrope was seen to be about. Beck here named 
freedom, which is often equivalent to economic freedom, but also connected to values 
like democracy or human rights.  
The economic aspect is the second big achievement, EUrope was celebrated for. 
While the peace order was framed as concluded through the last enlargements, the 
economic order was not. Its importance was highlighted through constructing its 
necessity in a context of globalization. Both parties saw the ideal of EUropean 
economic organization in a social market economy. Economic cooperation was 
framed as a core quality of EUrope, and seen as responsible for its wealth. Therefore 
conservative Gunther Krichbaum stated: 
“For me it is [...] important, that for the citizens’ sake we also speak about 
other European achievements. For me that is competition and the regulation 
of this competition. After all, we owe a coherent European single market to 
these regulations.” (Bundestag 2008b)i 
Thereby EUrope was not only put in opposition to a communist economic order, but 
also to neoliberal ideas of deregulation. This second point was especially strong in the 
SPD-perspective on EUrope, like in following statement by Michael Roth: 
“For me the central momentum seems to be, that we expand, strengthen and 
intensify the European social and societal model. Here, the European Union 
is still not as far, as it actually should be.” (Bundestag 2008b)ii 
The social dimension was for both parties, in different scopes, central in the 
definition of EUropeanness. Thereby an implicit differentiation from the USA was 
obvious. Especially the SPD still saw thereby a gap between vision and reality. The 
Lisbon Treaty was framed as a central base for the eradication of these shortcomings. 
The imagination of a EUrope defined by social solidarity went hand in hand with the 
reference to other values. Those values were basically the same between the parties, 
and included notions of democracy, human rights, or equality. They were mostly 
addressed in reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was introduced 
with the Lisbon Treaty. It was framed as a further point, in which the reform treaty 
pushed EUrope closer to respective visions on it, as i.e. SPD-man Dressel pointed out: 
                                                   
i original German version: “Für mich ist es [...] wichtig, dass wir im Sinne der Bürger auch über andere 
europäische Errungenschaften sprechen. Das sind für mich der Wettbewerb und die Regelungen in 
diesem Wettbewerb. Immerhin verdanken wir diesen Regelungen einen einheitlichen europäischen 
Binnenmarkt.” (Bundestag 2008b) 
ii  original German version: “Das zentrale Momentum scheint für mich zu sein, dass wir das 
europäische Sozial- und Gesellschaftsmodell ausbauen, stärken und intensivieren. Hier ist die 
Europäische Union noch nicht so weit, wie sie eigentlich sein müsste.” (Bundestag 2008b) 
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“After the European Union already understands itself for some time as an 
area of freedom, security and justice, now Article 2 of the EU-treaty contents 
the values on which the Union is based, values such as liberty, equality, 
justice and respect for human dignity. For a community, that originally was 
founded as the European Economic Community, this development towards a 
community of values is something, that the majority of this house can only 
welcome with us Social Democrats.” (Bundestag 2008b)i 
These EUropean values now were seen as adopted within the institutional framework 
of the EU, although they were perceived as existent and powerful beyond that. The 
answer to the question if EUrope itself changed, or if it was just about the official 
adoption of EUropean values by the EU, is central in understanding how these values 
are conceptualized. It shows the difference of conceptualizing EUrope and its values 
as rather static and determined by history, or as something dynamic and potentially 
universal. While the assignment of the German parties to these poles was rather 
clear, in the context of the Turkey debate, it was not in the debate on the Lisbon 
Treaty. Nonetheless, in looking at the formulations of the implications of the reform 
treaty, it becomes obvious that the SPD saw the changes as a rather open process, 
which also gleams through the prior quote of Dressel. The conservative 
argumentation on the other hand, often framed it as merging between the EU and a 
rather pre-determined image of Europe; hence i.e. Merkel stated: 
“In it [the Charter of Fundamental Rights] the common values and 
fundamental rights are laid down, which were wrest from European history - 
also at great sacrifice, as we all know. [...] Only a Europe that stands up for 
its values will be able to successfully continue its path.” (Bundestag 2007a)ii 
The references to history, and beyond that to a static idea of culture and static 
conceptualizations of EUrope in general, were also existent in the social democratic 
argumentation in a smaller extent. In general, the party-wise conceptualizations of 
EUrope did not lie as far apart as in the Turkey debate. The difference lay in the still 
present tendential closeness of the respective parties, to the poles the parties turned 
                                                   
i original German version: “Nachdem sich die Europäische Union schon einige Zeit als Raum der 
Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts versteht, sind jetzt in Art. 2 des EU-Vertrages die Werte 
aufgeführt, auf die sich die Union stützt, Werte wie Freiheit, Gleichheit, Gerechtigkeit und die Achtung 
der Menschenwürde. Für eine Gemeinschaft, die ursprünglich als Europäische 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft gegründet wurde, ist diese Entwicklung zu einer Wertegemeinschaft etwas, 
was mit uns Sozialdemokraten der überwiegende Teil des Hauses nur gutheißen kann.” (Bundestag 
2008b) 
ii  original German version: “In ihr [der Grundrechtecharta] sind die gemeinsamen Werte und 
grundlegenden Rechte niedergelegt, die der europäischen Geschichte - auch unter großen Opfern, wie 
wir alle wissen - abgerungen wurden. […] Nur ein Europa, das sich zu seinen Werten bekennt, wird 
seinen Weg erfolgreich weitergehen können.” (Bundestag 2007a) 
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to during the Turkey debate. That went hand in hand with the imagination of 
EUrope, as a rather homogeneous nation-like community, or dynamic and voluntary 
agreement between a diverse set of associates. 
The last point gives me a bridge to debating the political organization that EUrope 
should be based on, according to SPD and CDU/CSU. Also here the perspective on 
EUrope as a rather nation-like entity was very present. Both parties called for a 
political community, beyond sole economic cooperation. The difference between the 
parties, in looking at the political level, often lay in the relation between the old 
nation-states and EUrope. This difference was, again, rather a tendential one. While 
CDU/CSU often wanted to conserve the power of the nation-states, the SPD more 
often saw the EUropean interest above the national ones. Hence, SPD-man Stefan 
Reiche stated: 
“According to the Lisbon Treaty, the citizens are the purpose of politics more 
than ever. [...] They and not the nations are the reason, why the European 
Union has been built. That must dominate the actions of all institutions of the 
national players in the first place, so they do not look first and foremost after 
the national surplus, but have the European interest in mind.” (Bundestag 
2008d)i 
The SPD emitted positivity towards a supra-national union, whereby the Lisbon 
Treaty was framed as step towards a further strengthening of the EUropean level. 
Especially the strengthening of the EUropean Parliament through the reform treaty 
was highlighted in this context. On the other hand the SPD did not argue explicitly for 
the degradation of the nation-states, and sometimes also argued for the idea of 
subsidiarity. The latter argument on subsidiarity was the most often heard 
conservative notion in this context. This was obviously motivated by a perspective, 
which wanted to keep the nations strong, and saw the need to defend them from a 
further loss of power. That was connected to certain skepticism towards EUrope, 
although it was usually not formulated explicitly. In the words of Merkel, the plea for 
subsidiarity i.e. sounded as follows: 
“I think that, in the future we more often face the task, to decide, how to 
configure the right balance between national tasks and European tasks. That 
means, we have to think about where something can be done best: in 
                                                   
i original German version: “Nach dem Lissabon-Vertrag sind mehr als bisher die Bürger das Ziel der 
Politik. […] Sie und nicht die Nationen sind der Grund, weshalb die Europäische Union gebildet 
worden ist. Das muss das Handeln aller Institutionen der nationalen Akteure in erster Linie prägen, 
sodass sie nicht zuallererst nach dem nationalen Mehrwert schauen, sondern das europäische 
Interesse im Auge haben.” (Bundestag 2008d) 
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Brussels, Berlin, Schwerin or in Mainz? [...] Let’s get ourselves into really 
developing the culture of subsidiarity in Europe! Germany has made very 
good experiences with its federal system and we also should show that in 
Europe.” (Bundestag 2008e)i 
Merkel did however neither side with the claim for a one-way transfer of competences 
from EUrope to the nations, nor the other way around. 
CDU/CSU did not invariably oppose the development of a federal union, and also 
expressed their positivity to a further strengthening of EUrope. The conservatives 
actually quite often pleaded for the deepening of EUropean integration, and the 
Lisbon Treaty was perceived to contribute to that. This apparent contradictoriness 
was connected to the imagination of EUrope through a nationalist frame. It was 
hoped that EUrope would come closer to the national model, but at the same time it 
was hoped that the old nations would not lose their power. The plea for the further 
deepening of EUropean integration, and the realization of a political union, was very 
similar to the conservative argumentation on Turkey a few years earlier. It was based 
on seeing EUrope in a crisis, which was explained with a contradiction between 
enlargement and integration, as i.e. shown by the conservatives Schockenhoff or 
Wellenreuther: 
“The agreement on the Lisbon Treaty is the expression of the political will, to 
make up the necessary steps of deepening and to continue the process of 
political integration.” (Schockenhoff, Bundestag 2008b)ii 
“All these changes were necessary, to make the European Union despite 
massive changes, like the eastward enlargement, functional and capable of 
action.” (Wellenreuther, Bundestag 2007b)iii 
Another important argument in the Lisbon debate, which seems to resonate with the 
debate on Turkey, lay within references to the identification of the people with 
EUrope. The Lisbon Treaty was seen to advocate EUropean identity, and to make it 
possible to bring EUrope closer to its people. Thereby a deepened union was called 
                                                   
i  original German version: “Ich glaube, dass wir in Zukunft stärker vor der Aufgabe stehen, zu 
entscheiden, wie das richtige Gleichgewicht zwischen nationalen Aufgaben und europäischen 
Aufgaben auszugestalten ist. Das heißt, wir müssen überlegen, wo etwas am besten erledigt werden 
kann: in Brüssel, in Berlin, in Schwerin oder in Mainz? […] Lassen wir uns darauf ein, die 
Subsidiaritätskultur in Europa wirklich weiterzuentwickeln! Deutschland hat mit seinem föderalen 
System sehr gute Erfahrungen gemacht, und das sollten wir auch in Europa zeigen.” (Bundestag 2008e) 
ii original German version: “Die Einigung auf den Lissaboner Vertrag ist der Ausdruck des politischen 
Willens, die dafür erforderlichen Schritte der Vertiefung nachzuholen und den Prozess der politischen 
Integration fortzusetzen.” (Schockenhoff, Bundestag 2008b) 
iii original German version: “All diese Veränderungen waren notwendig, um die Europäische Union 
trotz massiver Veränderungen, wie die Osterweiterung, funktions- und handlungsfähig zu machen.” 
(Wellenreuther, Bundestag 2007b) 
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for. In this respect the roles of a strengthened EUropean Parliament, or the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, were highlighted. 
Beyond that the, through the reform treaty, sharpened appearance of EUrope in 
international relations was seen as a core feature of advocating EUropean identity. 
These changes should make EUrope more actionable, distinct and visible within 
international relations, and would help it in achieving the status of a ‘global power’. 
This perspective, with the aim of turning EUrope into a more identifiable actor, was 
more often put forward by CDU/CSU, as i.e. through Schockenhoff: 
“Many years ago Henry Kissinger once asked, what the phone number of 
Europe would be. Now we finally have it. This is important for the dialogue 
with our global partners USA, Russia, China and India. But it is also 
important for the identification of our citizens with the EU and its policies.” 
(Bundestag 2008b)i 
The SPD also applauded the Lisbon Treaty’s achievements in advancing EUrope’s 
performance in foreign affairs, but highlighted different aspects. They focused not so 
much on the thereby produced image within EUrope’s population, but on EUrope’s 
appearance to the outside-world. The goal was to develop an international identity for 
EUrope, based on its potential normative power. This should be characterized by a 
diplomatic approach to conflict prevention, and the soft advocacy of universal values. 
An important aspect lay in the presentation of EUropean cooperation as a model for 
other parts of the world, which was i.e. visible in the continuation of Kurt Beck’s 
latter quote: 
“Peace and freedom are a trademark of this community, a trademark of 
which we hope, that it radiates, so that it becomes clear, that this example of 
Europe should not only be observed in other parts of the world, but that it is 
worth to search togetherness even at conflicts which seem however 
insurmountable.” (Bundestag 2008e)ii 
The connection, of the issue foreign policy appearance, to the advocacy of EUropean 
identity was closely related to the idea of EUrope’s actionability and distinctness. The 
conservative argumentation implied the need for EUrope’s closure in terms of 
                                                   
i  original German version: “Henry Kissinger hat vor vielen Jahren gefragt, welches denn die 
Telefonnummer von Europa sei. Jetzt haben wir sie endlich. Das ist wichtig für den Dialog mit unseren 
globalen Partnern USA, Russland, China und Indien. Es ist aber auch für die Identifikation unserer 
Bürger mit der EU und ihrer Politik wichtig.” (Bundestag 2008b) 
ii original German version: “Frieden und Freiheit sind ein Markenzeichen dieser Gemeinschaft, ein 
Markenzeichen, von dem wir uns wünschen, dass es auch ausstrahlt, dass deutlich wird, dass dieses 
Beispiel Europas auch in anderen Teilen der Welt nicht nur wahrgenommen werden sollte, sondern 
dass es sich lohnt, auch bei scheinbar noch so unüberwindbaren Konflikten den Weg zum Miteinander 
zu suchen.” (Bundestag 2008e) 
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enlargement, in order to provide such an identifiable image of EUrope. That was 
further suggested, through the repeat of the conservative call for alternatives to 
enlargement, in the relationship with EUrope’s neighborhood and the general 
skepticism towards further enlargement, in the Lisbon debate. Also the social 
democratic approach to EUrope’s role in international relations was similar to their 
argumentation in the Turkey debate. The approach on EUrope’s normative power as 
a role model, which suggested the universality of the EUropean model, was an 
argument practiced and shaped in debating EUrope’s responsibility towards Turkey. 
All in all the imagination of EUrope, which came to the fore in debating the Lisbon 
Treaty, in several aspects resembled the perspectives on EUrope formulated a few 
years earlier in the context of discussing the opening of EU accession talks with 
Turkey. On the other hand there were also many differences in talking about EUrope 
within those different contexts. The two debates led to the focus on different 
qualities, EUrope was seen to be about. In order to illustrate those similarities and 
differences, the following table summarizes the most prominent aspects, EUrope was 
constructed with, in discussing the Lisbon Treaty: 
Figure 9, in the same 
logic as Figure 8, shows 
the quantities of codes, 
which stand for different 
EUropean qualities, I 
assigned to the parties’ 
contributions in the 
Bundestags’ engagement 
with the reform treaty. 
The table is supposed to 
demonstrate how the 
parties imagine EUrope 
in this context. It brings 
differences, between the 
parties and the debates, 
to the fore. It shows that both parties, much more often than in the Turkey debate, 
constructed EUrope based on its (potential) role in international relations. Also the 
frame of EUrope as peace order was, like in the manifestos, and according to the 
SPD   CDU/CSU 
(6/114) 5,3% EU Foreign Policy 9,6% (12/125) 
(6/114) 5,3% Peace Order 5,6% (7/125) 
(7/114) 6,1% Social System 2,4% (3/125) 
(5/114) 4,4% Values 4,0% (5/125) 
(4/114) 3,5% Economics 4,8% (6/125) 
(2/114) 1,8% Subsidiarity 5,6% (7/125) 
(5/114) 4,4% Othering NationalISM 1,6% (2/125) 
(5/114) 4,4% Normative Power 1,6% (2/125) 
(4/114) 3,5% Fundamental Rights 2,4% (3/125) 
(4/114) 3,5% Othering War 2,4% (3/125) 
(5/114) 4,4% Changeability 0,8% (1/125) 
(1/114) 0,9% Globalization 4,0% (5/125) 
(4/114) 3,5% Supranationalism 0,8% (1/125) 
(1/114) 0,9% Othering Cold War 3,2% (4/125) 
(3/114) 2,6% Othering Neoliberalism 0,8% (1/125) 
(2/114) 1,8% Culture - (0/125) 
(0/114) - Open Borders 1,6% (2/125) 
Figure 9 (self-creation) 
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literature in most contexts, a very frequent approach to constructing EUrope in the 
Lisbon debate. In the Turkey debate this frame was, especially by the conservatives, 
not an important part of imaginations of EUrope. The table also shows that the most 
obvious differentiation between the parties’ EUropes now lay in the perspective on 
economic and social aspects. The SPD in particular brought forward their vision of a 
more social EUrope, while CDU/CSU frequently pointed to the context of 
globalization which makes EUropean free trade so necessary and central. Also this 
frame was widely absent from both parties’ approaches to EUrope in the context of 
the Turkey debate. 
On the other hand, various aspects of the imaginations of EUrope, formulated in 
discussing the Turkey question, were missing in the debate on Lisbon. Most eye-
catching is the absence of the Turkey question itself. Considering the intensity of this 
debate, a few years earlier, that might have been due to the coalition setting between 
the parties. Future enlargements in general were not prominently picked up in the 
Lisbon debate. In debating Turkey, the conservatives’ most important approach to 
EUrope lay in highlighting the importance of political integration, as opposed to a 
mere economic cooperation. Although this argument was widely absent in the Lisbon 
debate, the perspective on which it was based was still effective. Also in 2008 the 
conservative crisis construction was to a large extent based on a perceived 
contradiction between enlargement and integration. This image was to a relative 
degree crafted within the context of debating a potential Turkish accession to the EU. 
Although Turkey was not addressed directly in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty, it still 
is to a large part responsible for the strength of this image within the conservative 
argumentation. The SPD on the other hand reconfirmed their perspective on EUrope 
as a rather dynamic process around a set of values, i.e. represented through a 
commitment to fundamental rights. The latter point was to a large extent also true for 
CDU/CSU. The conceptualization of those values was, again, different between the 
parties. This time the conservatives did not bind them as explicitly on a historic 
predetermination, as in the debate on Turkey. The SPD’s argumentation, with the 
high prominence of the aspect ‘normative power’, leads to the conclusion that they 
still frame them as rather universally applicable. In general it can be put down, that 
the differences between the parties’ construction of EUrope were to a certain extent 
simultaneous between the debates on Turkey and the Lisbon Treaty, but the debates 
also picked up different aspects. There were no direct intertextual relationships 
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between the Turkey debate of 2004, and the construction of EUrope in this context, 
in the sense of explicit references. In searching inter-textual and –discursive 
relationships between the two debates, I can only rely on assumptions. There are 
obviously aspects which point to its existence, like the prominence of the perceived 
crisis of the EU’s actionability in the conservative case, and the role of EUrope as 
promoter of universal values from the social democrat perspective. 
The impression that the absence of the Turkey question from the Lisbon debate was 
rather due to a coalitional ceasefire, than to the diminishment of its importance and 
controversially seems likely at the reading of the manifestos that the parties 
composed in the context of the competition for votes in the following year. In 2009, 
the election to the German Bundestag, as well as the one to the European Parliament, 
was held. In the respective manifestos the Turkey question played an obvious role in 
their treatise of EUropean agendas. The manifestos show that the attitudes towards 
Turkey did not change a lot since 2004. They also show that aspects, which were 
prominent in the parties’ construction of EUrope in the context of debating the 
Turkey question, were also part of perspectives on EUrope in the manifestos. In the 
conservative case, this concerns i.e. the construction of historical, cultural or religious 
roots EUrope is seen to be based on. The reference to religion was again avoided in 
the direct encounter with the Turkey question. Its featuring in general contexts 
nonetheless adds to the construction of a static EUrope, which makes a potential 
accession of Turkey such an impossibility in the eyes of CDU/CSU, which was 
reformulated the manifestos. Also the SPD’s position on Turkey did not change, and 
was reformulated in their manifesto to the European elections. Again, parallels 
between the construction of EUrope between the debate on Turkey and other 
contexts became obvious. Like in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty, a certain 
perspective on EUrope’s role as normative power is visible. Also despite the Turkey 
question the typical patterns, of the German parties in imagining EUrope, are 
reformulated. That concerns i.e. the balance between economic freedom and social 
equality, and the role EUrope should play in this dimension. The manifestos show, 
like the Lisbon debate, that the Turkey question is just one of the contexts which 
trigger different understandings of EUrope. The following elaboration of various 
debates in 2011 will bring to the fore more of these contexts. 
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6.2.3 Debating Turkey and EUrope in 2011 
The last time period, I want to take a deeper look at, covers the first six months of 
2011. Thereby I do not focus on a debate regarding some specific issue. I take 
contributions to the plenary sessions out of several different contexts into account, as 
far they are to a significant extent part of the discourses on EUrope or Turkey. The 
goal of this part is, to get a more differentiated overview on imaginations of EUrope. 
Thereby I want to demonstrate how fragments, out of the prior two research periods, 
were re-contextualized in those debates. A further goal lay in the actualization of the 
results. Through looking at those current debates, I covered all possible governmental 
positions of the parties: this time the SPD constituted the parliamentary opposition 
to the government, built by CDU/CSU in coalition with the FDP. The discourse 
therefore gained in controversy, in comparison to the 2008-debate. 
Imaginations of EUrope were laid out in various contexts during the first half of 2011. 
The statements, I evaluated as relevant for my research interest, summed up to 5000 
words for the case of CDU/CSU and 4550 for the SPD. Thereby I assigned 131 codes 
to the CDU/CSU-material and 146 to the SPD’s contributions. One major context lay 
in discussing the financial crisis EUrope went through, with the bailouts of EU 
countries like Greece or Portugal. A further context, where the role of EUrope was 
relevantly debated, lay in talking about the ‘Arab Spring’ and the revolutions taking 
place, for example in Egypt, Libya or Syria. Especially in the SPD’s take on these 
events, EUrope was important. Besides those issues stood smaller ones, in which 
EUrope was reconstructed. For example both parties gave statements to the opening 
of the German labor markets towards the ECECs, who in 2004 entered the EU. Also 
the EU’s foreign policy, beyond the events in the Arab world, was important, whereby 
the focus mostly lay on the EU’s relationships to its immediate neighborhood. 
Different takes on EUrope can i.e. be reconstructed through statements on the 
countries of Former Yugoslavia, or in CDU/CSU’s statements about Russia or 
Belarus. The SPD further laid out imaginations of EUrope, through criticizing EU 
countries like Hungary or Italy. A further central context, in which imaginations of 
EUrope can be reconstructed, was the most relevant one for my case: debates on the 
EU accession of Turkey. Both parties, again, presented their positions on the 
accession process. The issue was amongst others brought to the table on behalf of the 
Green Party, who urged the government to revive the accession talks. Hence, the time 
period I chose covers the Turkey-discourse as well as other contexts, in which EUrope 
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was debated. It constitutes a supplementation and cross-check, to the two debates I 
focused on earlier. 
In looking at the parliamentary debates of 2011 it became obvious, that EUrope was, 
like in all prior contexts, perceived to be in a crisis situation and a defining moment. 
This time it was the crisis of the Euro-currency, and bankrupt member states. The 
German debate on it was more contentious than the one on Lisbon, but did not come 
near the controversy of the Turkey debate. It was – besides the resumed Turkey 
debate – the only issue, in which both parties intensively placed their imaginations of 
EUrope, during the research period. To large extents it reminded of the debate on the 
Lisbon Treaty and both parties again confirmed their pro-EUropean agendas. Both 
parties formulated their consent to the rescue packages for bankrupt countries, and 
saw the high German share to them as a necessity without any alternative. The 
disagreements between the parties did hence not refer to the bail-outs per se, but to 
accompanying measures or to the performance of the other party. The latter point 
was visible in the cross party criticism which mostly, due to their oppositional 
parliamentary position, came from the SPD. The most common critique was directed 
to the flaccidity of the government, which would not understand the gravity of the 
crisis. The government was blamed for not showing more courage, especially in 
defending EUrope in the public field. That was i.e. carried out by former SPD-
minister of finance, Peer Steinbrück:  
“You should have explained more clearly and distinctly, that and why it is a 
genuine German interest, to contribute to the stability of the Euro zone and to 
the further integration of Europe. It was clear from the beginning, that this 
contribution would cost something and that we would have to give up petty 
national selfish benefits. [...] In this competition Europe must be more than 
an economic community and a monetary union, not at least to overcome the 
gap of its citizens towards European institutions.” (Bundestag 2011g)i 
The central line of argumentation, the SPD utilized, lay in formulating their 
conviction on the positivity of EUropean integration, and, from this stance, 
questioning the opponents EUropeanism. The government was blamed for not 
explaining the necessity of the bail-outs properly, and thereby causing the alienation 
                                                   
i original German version: “Sie hätten deutlicher und klarer erklären müssen, dass und warum es in 
einem originären deutschen Interesse liegt, einen Beitrag zur Förderung der Stabilität der Euro-Zone 
und zur weiteren Integration Europas zu leisten. Es war von vornherein klar, dass dieser Beitrag etwas 
kosten würde und wir auf kleinliche nationale egoistische Vorteile zu verzichten hätten […]Europa 
muss in dieser Konkurrenz mehr sein als eine Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und eine Währungsunion, 
nicht zuletzt deshalb, um die Kluft seiner Bürger gegenüber europäischen Institutionen zu 
überwinden.” (Bundestag 2011g) 
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of the German population from the EUropean project. The construction of EUrope 
behind this argumentation took on many frames I talked about previously. In 
continuation of the 2008-argument, the SPD argued for a deeper EUrope, based on 
more supranationalism, i.e. through the European Parliament. The SPD pleaded for a 
EUrope beyond economic cooperation, what should be realized through expanding 
EUrope’s role in the social level. This can be exemplified by quoting party whip 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who – after a reference to the importance of EUrope for 
Germany – said: 
“The approval of the German public for these European policies is in danger, 
if we give the impression, that the beneficiaries of this solidarity are not the 
states and the people in the European states, but financial investors and 
banks. European solidarity must be more. In the long run it does not work 
without the contribution of the financial markets. Therefore we urge you to 
finally open the way for the financial transaction tax. Make sure, that it will 
be introduced in Europe. This too is part of a European solidarity.” 
(Bundestag 2011k)i 
The SPD’s imagination of EUrope was hence placed in opposition to neo-liberal ideas, 
deregulated financial markets and other classical capitalist enemy stereotypes of 
social democracy. This was realized trough the demand of a financial transaction tax, 
and contained the implicit framing of the government to represent, or at least 
tolerate, neoliberal tendencies. 
CDU/CSU defended their actions, and framed it – in contrast to the SPD’s charges – 
as responsible and reasonable. They forcefully rejected doubts on their pro-EUropean 
agenda. CDU/CSU formulated the positive relevance of EUrope for Germany, and 
framed their party as an important patron of EUropean integration. The 
conservatives shared the SPD’s perception of an EU-crisis in terms of public opinion 
and democratization. In contrast to the social democratic approach, of strengthening 
social equity, the conservative response lay in framing the situation as alternative-
less, in combination with the reference to the centrality of EUrope. This was often 
realized through the reference to globalization, as a reason for the necessity of 
EUropean cooperation, like party whip Volker Kauder’s argument showed: 
                                                   
i original German version: “Die Zustimmung der deutschen Öffentlichkeit für diese europäische Politik 
ist in Gefahr, wenn wir den Eindruck erwecken, dass die Nutznießer dieser Solidarität nicht die 
Staaten und die Menschen in den europäischen Staaten sind, sondern Finanzanleger und Banken. 
Europäische Solidarität muss mehr sein. Sie funktioniert auf Dauer nicht ohne Beteiligung der 
Finanzmärkte. Machen Sie deshalb endlich den Weg für die Finanztransaktionsteuer frei. Sorgen Sie 
dafür, dass sie in Europa eingeführt wird. Auch das ist Teil einer europäischen Solidarität.” (Bundestag 
2011k) 
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“Yes, we consciously apprehend the assessment of Europe in the public. In 
this respect these regulations, which we put on the road, contain the chance, 
to explain to the people, that these are not simply finance-technical measures, 
but that it quite honestly is about preserving the future viability of Europe. 
We know: Germany is our fatherland, but Europe is our future. Without 
Europe, we will never be strong enough to persist in the world in competition. 
Therefore, the measure we put on the road, is in the interest of Germany, but 
also in the interest of all Europe.” (Bundestag 2011g)i 
The conservative argument was to a large extent built upon the crisis perception. 
They tried to present themselves in the role of leadership, in the prevention of this 
existential crisis. This went hand in hand with the construction, of a more important 
role for Germany in EUrope, in the context of the financial crisis. Germany was, more 
self-confidently than previously, presented as the economic locomotive, and to a 
certain extent heart and leader, of EUrope. The takeover of the leadership-role is 
thereby still framed within French-German friendship, since there is still a 
discomfort of German elites with this role of German leadership. That is also attested 
by Paterson (2011), who, in this context, refers to the Germany’s development into a 
‘reluctant hegemon’. In this logic Germany was more or less pushed into this role 
involuntarily. 
All in all, the German debate on the financial crisis constituted an important moment 
in the development of the parties’ imaginations of EUrope. The debate also contained 
formulations of differences, in the respective takes on EUrope. The disagreements 
thereby were not as visible and contentious, as in the Turkey debate, but also not as 
small as in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty. The differentiation in this case was based 
on the very core of the parties’ ideals and genesis. In a more controversial and 
polarized way than i.e. in 2008, the parties debated about the right balance between 
social solidarity and free market ideals. In contrast to the Turkey debate, where the 
conservatives were the prime-advocate of thematizing disagreements on EUrope, 
here mostly the SPD triggered the Bundestag’s engagement with such aspects. 
Similarities with the debate on Turkey are rather hard to find, since, in spite of its 
general controversiality, the aspect of social equality did not play any relevant role in 
                                                   
i original German version: “Ja, wir nehmen die Beurteilung Europas in der Öffentlichkeit sehr bewusst 
wahr. Insofern liegt in diesen Regelungen, die wir auf den Weg bringen, die große Chance, den 
Menschen zu erklären, dass es sich hier nicht um rein finanztechnische Maßnahmen handelt, sondern 
es schlicht und ergreifend darum geht, die Zukunftsfähigkeit Europas zu erhalten. Wir wissen: 
Deutschland ist unser Vaterland, aber Europa ist unsere Zukunft. Ohne Europa werden wir nie stark 
genug sein, um in der Welt im Wettbewerb bestehen zu können. Deshalb ist die Maßnahme, die wir 
auf den Weg bringen, im Interesse Deutschlands, aber auch im Interesse ganz Europas.” (Bundestag 
2011g) 
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the Turkey debate. Beyond that this aspect always, to different extents, played a role 
in distinguishing the parties’ imaginations of EUrope, which makes it rather peculiar 
that it did not play a role at all in the Turkey debate, as a context in which different 
takes on EUrope were frequently formulated in. 
A debate, which contained more similarities to the Turkey debate, can be found in the 
Bundestag’s take on the Arab Spring. Both parties interpreted it as an historic 
moment, and, as the term Arab Spring already suggests, constructed a simultaneity to 
the fall of the iron curtain in EUrope. Nevertheless, only the SPD saw an important 
moment, for the development of EUrope, in the reaction to the demonstrations and 
revolutions in the Arab World. That became obvious through the CDU/CSU’s seldom 
reference to EUrope, when discussing the events in North Africa and the Middle East. 
In the SPD’s eyes on the other hand, EUrope was seen to have a special responsibility 
towards those, supposedly democratic, movements, as i.e. formulated by Steinmeier: 
“What we right now experience in North Africa is probably the most 
dramatic change in international politics since the fall of the Wall. That does 
not happen anywhere in the world, but to the southern borders of the 
European Union, in Europe’s closest proximity. And Europe? Europe is 
unable, to give a really powerful reply - days and weeks of silence, of general 
statements. [...] To describe what Obama described in his speech last week, 
would after all have been our job, Europe’s job.” (Bundestag 2011m)i 
This view was mostly based on two frames, which are typical for the SPD’s view on 
EUrope: the importance of EUrope’s normative power, in terms of the promotion of 
its universal values, and a certain responsibility towards its neighborhood. Like in the 
debate on the financial crisis, EUropean power centers were blamed for their lack of 
courage and unity, in fulfilling this EUropean duty. The German reservation and 
sluggishness, in expressing its support for the revolutionary movements, and the lack 
of advocacy of a common EUropean reaction, were framed as contributions to a 
failure of EUrope. They were framed as acting out of populist motivations, which 
were based on nationalist interests. This was mostly exemplified in reference to the 
reactions towards migration movements, caused by the civil war-like events of the 
Arab Spring. EUropean governments, and especially the German one, were blamed 
                                                   
i original German version: “Das, was wir im Augenblick in Nordafrika erleben, ist wahrscheinlich der 
einschneidendste Wandel in der internationalen Politik seit dem Fall der Mauer. Das passiert nicht 
irgendwo auf der Welt, sondern an den südlichen Grenzen der Europäischen Union, in der engsten 
Nachbarschaft zu Europa. Und Europa? Europa ist außerstande, darauf eine wirklich kraftvolle 
Antwort zu geben - Tage und Wochen von Sprachlosigkeit, von allgemeinen Statements. […] Das zu 
beschreiben, was Obama vergangene Woche in seiner Rede getan hat, wäre doch unsere Aufgabe, 
Europas Aufgabe gewesen.” (Bundestag 2011m) 
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for relying on nationalist protectionism, instead of the propagation of EUropean 
solidarity, in coping with the situation. 
The parallels to the Turkey debate in the SPD’s argumentation on the Arab Spring 
were quite obvious. Like in the case of Turkey, they constructed a responsibility of 
EUrope, to support the spread of its universal values, especially in its immediate 
neighborhood. This was connected to the view, that Islam does not contradict the 
implementation of those EUropean values. Although the conservatives were mostly 
conspicuous through their absence, in connecting the Arab Spring with imaginations 
of EUrope, CDU-man Andreas Schockenhoff’s following quote has at least to be 
mentioned: 
“The thesis that our system of values, characterized by an image of humanity, 
which is based on freedom, pluralism, human rights, rule of law and good 
governance, would not be compatible with an Islamic cultural circle, in the 
moment gets refuted by the events in Egypt. But this is still a fragile and 
difficult process.” (Bundestag 2011c)i 
This was the only such statement by a conservative politician. It nonetheless 
demonstrated that the parties’ imaginations of EUrope are only tendentially close to 
various poles; in this case the poles of constructing EUropean values as universal or 
particularistic. On the other hand Schockenhoff, in the same statements, also 
expressed his continuing doubts about the applicability of EUropean values on 
Muslim cultures.  
These conservative doubts, as well as the social democratic conviction, about the 
universality of EUropean values, in the context of Muslim societies, resemble the 
parties’ positions in the Turkey debate. The major role, the debate on Turkey played 
in the formation of this differentiation, can be observed in looking at the 2011-
fragment of the continuing Turkey debate in the Bundestag. Thereby it became 
visible, that the parties’ approach on Turkey did not change a lot in the last number of 
years, despite switched positions of government and opposition. This latter point, as 
well as the absence of upcoming important decisions on the accession process, might 
have contributed to the relative relaxation of the debate, compared to 2004. The 
parties’ positions were not as clear-cut as in earlier times, and the other side’s 
                                                   
i original German version: “Die These, unsere Werteordnung, geprägt von einem Menschenbild, das 
auf Freiheit, Pluralität, Menschenrechten, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und guter Regierungsführung beruht, 
sei mit einem islamischen Kulturkreis nicht vereinbar, wird derzeit durch die Ereignisse in Ägypten 
widerlegt. Aber es handelt sich noch um einen fragilen und schwierigen Prozess.” (Bundestag 2011c) 
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arguments were more often apprehended and, at least partly, accepted. Nonetheless, 
even with the relative reduction of inter-party blaming, and the reduction of the 
variety in speakers in the plenary sessions, the arguments widely stayed the same. 
The conservatives attested Turkey’s continuing shortcomings, in terms of fulfilling 
the criteria of EUropeanness, while the SPD focused on improvements. The events of 
the last few years were mostly interpreted as confirmation of the respective party-
positions, which were held since at least 2004. Hence, the Turkish development in 
the conservative perspective was rather stagnant, as Thomas Bareiß argued: 
“Whether the accession negotiations will be revived, is completely in the hand 
of Turkey, which must decide if it wants reforms or not. I think it does not 
want. [...] At all of the criteria above, Turkey has not made much progress in 
recent years. Actually, in terms of the abovementioned values, in some points 
it diverged from Europe [...]. Until Turkey has adopted these basic values of 
Western democracies not just on paper, and until also the courts and the 
people have internalized these principles, a long time will have to pass.” 
(Bundestag 2011f)i 
Bareiß confirmed the CDU/CSU-skepticism about the Turkish reforms, and 
formulated the suspicion, that Turkey is not honest in its attempts to adapt EUropean 
standards. They pointed to Turkish shortcomings in many different fields. The 
strongest focus lay on the field of freedom of religion. Thereby they especially 
deplored the suppression of Christian communities. Also the supposed contradiction 
between enlargement and integration was again important. It was still feared, that a 
Turkish membership would restrict EUropean cooperation to the economic field, and 
obstruct the advance of political integration. The reason, for the conservative belief 
that Turkey could not ever fulfill EUropean standards, was again transported – 
sometimes explicitly, but mostly implicitly – through notions on Turkey’s 
unEUropean character in terms of history or culture. The, in the conservative 
perspective, Turkish peculiarity becomes obvious in comparing it to the CDU/CSU’s 
attitude to the opening of the German labor markets towards the ECECs, which 
joined the EU in 2004, in May 2011. Regardless of the foreseen problems that it could 
cause, they simply saw it as materialization of ‘EUropean normality’. In relation to 
                                                   
i original German version: “Ob die Beitrittsverhandlungen wiederbelebt werden, liegt ganz allein in der 
Hand der Türkei, die entscheiden muss, ob sie Reformen will oder nicht. Ich glaube, sie will sie nicht. 
[…] Bei allen oben genannten Kriterien ist die Türkei in den letzten Jahren nicht viel vorangekommen. 
Sie hat sich vielmehr, gemessen an den oben genannten Werten, bei einigen Punkten von Europa 
entfernt […]. Bis die Türkei diese Grundwerte westlicher Demokratien nicht nur auf dem Papier 
verabschiedet hat, sondern die Gerichte und die Menschen diese Prinzipien auch verinnerlicht haben, 
wird wohl noch eine lange Zeit vergehen.” (Bundestag 2011f) 
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the Turkey question this perspective did not exist. EUrope was hence not seen as very 
responsible, to support Turkey in its development. The potential advantages, of the 
Turkish membership, should still be secured through an alternative partnership. One 
of these advantages was, also by the conservatives, seen in the potential Turkish role 
as mediator between EUrope and the Muslim world, which was also brought in a 
connection with the ‘Arab Spring’. 
This latter point was still more important in the SPD’s argument. In this context, 
they, like in 2004, blamed the conservatives for triggering the alienation of Turkey 
from EUrope. The most direct connection, between the Turkey question and the Arab 
Spring, was thereby made by Uta Zapf: 
“The humiliation by the attitude of certain EU countries, which offer only a 
‘privileged partnership’, sits deeply. [...] This has to alarm the Europeans and 
the USA, in consideration of the changes and risks caused by the Arab Spring. 
It must be in our interest that the foreign policies do not diverge too much. [..] 
A ‘model for the Arab world’, as some hope, Turkey will only be, if it continues 
to drive its internal democratic reforms, and if it shows great responsibility 
in a region of transition, at the same time.” (Bundestag 2011n)i 
The German government was again blamed for discouraging Turkey from the further 
enforcement of the reform process. CDU/CSU, in their opinion, did not act far-
sighted, and drew on populist sentiments. The SPD supposed religious and cultural 
prejudices, as prime motivation for their position. The stagnant reform process, and 
the re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy, was interpreted as a result of the 
dismissive attitude of several EUropean governments, especially the conservative-led 
German one. Despite that they also talked about the positive impact, the accession 
process had on Turkey’s development so far. In order to further exert this impact, the 
SPD pleaded for a fair treatment of Turkey. As positive impacts of a Turkish EU 
membership they basically repeated the same points as five years before. Besides 
rather materialist advantages, in terms of economic growth and foreign policy 
interests, the proof of the universality of EUrope’s values and of the absence from its 
religious pre-determination, were seen as positive impacts of a Turkish membership. 
                                                   
i original German version: “Die Kränkung durch die Haltung bestimmter EU-Länder, die nur eine 
‘privilegierte Partnerschaft’ anbieten, sitzt tief. […] Dies muss die Europäer und die USA angesichts 
der Veränderungen und Risiken durch den arabischen Frühling alarmieren. Es muss in unserem 
Interesse sein, dass die Außenpolitiken nicht zu sehr auseinanderdriften. [..] Ein ‘Modell für die 
arabische Welt’, wie manche hoffen, wird die Türkei nur werden, wenn sie ihre inneren 
demokratischen Reformen weitertreibt und gleichzeitig hohe Verantwortung zeigt in einer Region im 
Umbruch.” (Bundestag 2011n) 
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The aspect of normative power, and the propagation of EUropean values in non-EU 
countries, was not only strong in the SPD’s approach to Turkey. Its strength, in the 
social democratic view on EUrope, was also effective in other contexts, like in 
discussing the Arab Spring. Furthermore, in my research period it was also obvious in 
debates about countries which were already in the EU, as i.e. SPD-man Martin 
Dörmann’s statement showed: 
“Do not let us allow that Europe’s values are undermined in this way. Do not 
let us keep quiet, when the Berlusconis and Orbans in Europe want to 
determine, whether criticizing them is allowed or not.” (Bundestag 2011a)i 
This critique of internal EU shortcomings, in fulfilling EUropean standards, is 
indirectly related to the plea for fairness towards Turkey. This aspect works through 
the – in this case implicit – relativization of the Turkish deficiencies. It shows that 
EUropeanness is not predetermined, and that EUropean nations can possibly fail in 
fulfilling its standards, just as Turkey can fail. Although the normative power aspect 
was widely absent from the CDU/CSU’s approach to Turkey, as well as towards the 
Arab Spring, it was existent in other contexts. That can be exemplified through CDU-
man Karl-Georg Wellmann’s contribution: 
“We are always asked the question: Why are we more committed in Belarus, 
than in other states, where the situation of human rights is unsatisfactory? 
The answer is easy: Belarus belongs to Europe, as does Russia by the way. 
[...] In the largest part of Europe the universal values – human rights, 
democracy – are implemented. Insofar, we cannot accept that the 
government of a European country withholds these values to itself and to the 
population.” (Bundestag 2011d)ii 
The named reason, for the special responsibility towards Belarus, was obviously 
based on a culturalist and static imagination of EUrope. Belarus’s inclusion into 
EUrope was based on pre-determined aspects, and not on its current compliance with 
EUropean values. Consequently the positivity of the conservatives, towards an 
eventual EU accession of the countries of former Yugoslavia, in spite of the EU’s lack 
of intake capacity they apprehended in the Turkey context, can be understood. 
                                                   
i original German version: “Lassen wir nicht zu, dass die Werte Europas auf diese Weise ausgehöhlt 
werden. Schweigen wir nicht, wenn die Berlusconis und Orbans in Europa selbst bestimmen wollen, 
ob Kritik an ihnen erlaubt ist oder eben nicht.“ (Bundestag 2011a) 
ii original German version: “Uns wird immer die Frage gestellt: Warum engagieren wir uns bei Belarus 
mehr als bei anderen Staaten, in denen die Situation der Menschenrechte unbefriedigend ist? Die 
Antwort ist leicht: Belarus gehört zu Europa, ebenso übrigens Russland. […] Im allergrößten Teil 
Europas sind die universellen Werte - Menschenrechte, Demokratie - umgesetzt. Insofern können wir 
es nicht akzeptieren, dass die Regierung eines europäischen Landes diese Werte sich selbst und der 
Bevölkerung verweigert.” (Bundestag 2011d) 
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Figure 10 (self-creation) 
The various debates of 2011, about the role EUrope should play in its immediate 
vicinity, hence showed that the major difference between SPD and CDU/CSU on 
Turkey still existed. While the conservatives usually saw a peculiarity of Turkey, 
beyond its size and economic weakness, in contrast to other candidates for EU 
membership, the SPD did not. This peculiarity was based on different imaginations of 
EUrope, and made the Turkey question so central to differentiations within the 
German discourse on EUrope. On the other hand the 2011-debates again made clear, 
that the Turkey question was not the only field in which different imaginations of 
EUrope, of different German political parties, existed. The plenary sessions about the 
financial crisis showed frames of differentiation, which were non-existent in the 
Turkey debate.  
In order to summarize 
the imaginations of 
EUrope, presented in 
the Bundestag’s 
debates in the first half 
of 2011, I listed the 
quantities of assigned 
codes, which stand for 
different aspects by 
which EUrope was 
constructed. It follows 
the logic of the Figures 
8 and 9. I split the 
aspects, originating 
form debating the 
Turkey question, from 
other contexts. 
The wide field of 
different issues or 
rather contexts, where the parliamentarians placed their respective views on EUrope 
in, obviously revealed a more differentiated image. The debates covered issues related 
to the interior organization of EUrope, as well as its relationships with the outside. 
SPD   CDU/CSU 
(5/146) 3,4% Values 3,1% (4/131) 
(2/146) 1,4% Peace Order 4,6% (6/131) 
(5/146) 3,4% Normative Power 2,3% (3/131) 
(2/146) 1,4% Economics 3,8% (5/131) 
(3/146) 2,1% EU Foreign Policy 3,1% (4/131) 
(4/146) 2,7% EUrope central for self 2,3% (3/131) 
(2/146) 1,4% Open Borders 3,1% (4/131) 
(6/146) 4,1% Migration Regulation - (0/131) 
(0/146) - Euro-Currency 3,8% (5/131) 
(0/146) - Globalization 3,8% (5/131) 
(4/146) 2,7% Social System 0,8% (1/131) 
(1/146) 0,7% History 1,5% (2/131) 
(2/146) 1,4% Climate Policy 0,8% (1/131) 
(0/146) 0,0% Self as EUrope’s Center 1,5% (2/131) 
(2/146) 1,4% Law & Rights - (0/131) 
E U r o p e  i n  C o n t e x t  o f  T u r k e y  D e b a t e 
(2/146) 1,4% Values 0,8% (1/131) 
(2/146) 1,4% Normative Power 0,0% (0/131) 
(0/146) - Static EUrope 1,5% (2/131) 
(0/146) - History 1,5% (2/131) 
(0/146) - EUrope is Particular 1,5% (2/131) 
(2/146) 1,4% Reliability - (0/131) 
(2/146) 1,4% Religion - (0/131) 
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The summarized imaginations of EUrope hence should be more balanced than in the 
prior cases.  
Figure 10 shows that both parties saw EUrope in a central role for definitions of 
Germany. The most common notion, in constructing this EUropean (and German) 
identities, lay in reference to values. While the SPD placed this reference mostly in 
the context of the Arab Spring, the CDU did so in talking about the Eastern 
enlargement or other intra-EUropean contexts. The importance of EUrope for 
Germany was mostly placed in the debate about the financial crisis. The conservatives 
thereby pointed to the economic benefits EUrope brought for Germany, i.e. through 
the common currency. In a globalized world only a cooperating EUrope, in which 
Germany would have a leading role, could prevail. The SPD also highlighted EUrope’s 
high relevance in the context of the financial crisis. They nonetheless took on a more 
critical attitude towards the status quo. The SPD pleaded for a more social EUrope, as 
a solution to the attested alienation of the people from EUrope. They also put the plea 
for more solidarity between EUropean countries in the context of the Arab Spring, 
through calling for a fair distribution of respective migration movements. In this 
context they also placed the notion of normative power, and EUrope’s special 
responsibility in the foreign relations with its neighborhood. The conservatives on the 
other hand placed similar notions, around a common EUropean foreign policy, only 
in intra-EUropean contexts; i.e. in debating the Former Yugoslavian countries or the 
Eastern enlargement. In those debates they also highlighted the aspect of peace order 
and stability, as defining EUropean qualities. In this they also brought forward an 
imagination of a rather static EUrope based on history. This was continued and 
accentuated in talking about the EU accession process of Turkey. Thereby both 
parties basically repeated their argument of 2004, and the same is true for the 
respective imaginations of EUrope. This steadiness validates the high relevance of the 
Turkey question in constructing EUrope. It shows that the Turkey debate was rather a 
source of influence on, than influenced by, other contexts EUrope was constructed in. 
It suggests that the simultaneousness, of inter-party differences of constructions of 
EUrope, between the Turkey debate and other contexts is, at least to a large extent, 
rooted in positions towards Turkey rather than in positions on the other issues. The 
interdiscursive influences, between the discourses on EUrope and the Turkey-EU 
relationships, which were to a certain extent visible, might hence not only be directed 
in one direction. More on this thought will follow in the conclusion of my thesis. 
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7 Conclusions 
Over the course of the last 100 pages or so, I brought together various sources of 
knowledge. I was concerned with different theoretical approaches, for example to the 
construction of identity, summarized literature on the state and character of 
imaginations of EUrope, and reconstructed the relationships between Turkey and 
EUrope. Beyond this devotion to literature, I also put together a range of statements 
by German political parties or rather politicians. I tried to analyze this material with 
the tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), in order to verify, illustrate, and also 
extend the existing literature. All of these enterprises were endeavored in order to 
qualify myself for answering this question: 
How are imaginations of EUrope influenced and reconstructed through 
debates on the relationship between Turkey and the EU?  
It was clear from the beginning that there would not be a definite and unequivocally 
answer to this question. A clear answer would actually contradict the theoretical 
presumption, on which the question is based. This assumption goes back to 
constructivist approaches to social entities as dynamic and heterogeneous 
imaginations. Their construction is determined by different social factors, which 
manifest themselves in the discourses they are constructed through. As an 
introduction, I presented this and other perspectives on the terms and concepts, 
which built the base of my thesis. Most commonly these imagined representations are 
referred to with the term identity. I avoided the term identity in my context, because 
of the diffuse set of connotations the term carries, and talked about imaginations of 
social entities instead. The here relevant theoretical approaches nonetheless often are 
about identity. Therefore it made sense to look at the different perspectives on 
identities. I showed for example the frequent opposition of the constructivist 
understanding to popular conceptualizations of identity (see 2.1 & 2.2). In the 
mainstream, identity often stands for something rather stable and homogeneous. 
These imaginations are usually connected to ideas of culture, nation or ethnicity (see 
2.3). Through those familiar notions, certain identity-constructions are understood as 
matter of course or nature. The construction process and aspects of agency behind 
them get hidden. Also the polarization between universalist and particularist 
perspectives on identity is connected to approaches on, for example, culture. 
Furthermore, I presented how different approaches to Self-Other relationships 
conclude in different identity constructs (see 2.4). I showed the variety within those 
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relationships and the often fluent passage between Selves and Others. The 
constructed difference to Others and sameness within a group can be seen as the two 
sides of identity constructions. The various realizations of all these aspects lead to the 
assignment of different qualities to different groups by different actors. The 
constructivist approach intends to deconstruct these processes and uncover certain 
biases, which lead to discriminatory and privileging effects. The approach of critical 
discourse analysis, which I chose for my empirical analysis, describes those 
naturalized constructs as ideologies. It states that different such constructs mutually 
sustain each other and add up to the endorsement of certain worldviews. Discourse 
analysis places the construction process of those ideologies within the notion of 
discourse and focuses on the linguistic realization of identity imaginations. In the 
presentation of my empirical approach (see 5.1) I described CDA in more detail. I 
illustrated the interdependency between discourses and social constellations, i.e. 
through aspects of power distribution. Out of the CDA-branch I chose the discourse 
historical approach (DHA), which proposes a chronological focus on intertextual and 
interdiscursive relationships. It further asks about different discursive strategies, 
which are utilized to realize powerful and arcane identity constructions. Its goal is to 
uncover the role of power within, and discriminatory aspects of, those constructions, 
and to trigger a critical engagement with them. 
In the course of my paper, I reconstructed how those various theoretical aspects are 
realized in the case of imaginations of EUrope. I started this enterprise by 
reconstructing some of the changes imaginations of EUrope went through in history 
(see 3.1 & 3.2). This revealed the dynamic and heterogeneous character of 
imaginations of EUrope. It showed that Europe always was a product of its time, i.e. 
dependent on respective power constellations. The respective power center(s) of a 
time often determined the dominant imaginations of Europe in an egocentric logic. 
Through different centers, various qualities came to characterize Europe. This led for 
example to the introduction of the Antique Polis, and later Roman law and 
Christianity, into understandings of EUropeanness. I further illustrated meanings 
which were added in more recent centuries, like world wide-dominance through 
colonialism, Enlightenment values or chaotic warfare and cruelty. The end of World 
War Two introduced a new era of imaginations of EUrope, which was characterized 
by a new strength of pan-EUropean ideas and the Cold War order. In opposition to 
the World Wars and the USSR, it was defined by peaceful cooperation, democracy 
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and free markets. This EUrope was based on the concept of integration. Since this did 
not deliver public legitimization for the EEC/EU, its constructors started to directly 
propagate a EUropean identity. With this shift the latest, disputes on imaginations of 
EUrope directly entered the arena of EU policy-making. 
The perceived need to connect the EU’s governmental power with a EUropean 
identity resembles the nationalist model. This is also the case for various concepts, 
which are utilized in the construction of such EUropean identities. EUrope was 
thereby usually equipped with the construction of a certain history. This history-
construction can be a positive source of identification, i.e. in pointing to Christian or 
Enlightenment values. It can also be a negative for the definition of today’s EUrope, 
i.e. in distancing it from EUrope’s past of warfare. In elaborating on this aspect (see 
3.3.1), I came to the conclusion that there is not one but many histories of EUrope. 
Dependent on different, i.e. national or regional, perspectives, different (potential) 
parts of EUropean history are highlighted or mitigated. The literature detects for 
example the prevalence of Western at the expense of Eastern EUropean memories. 
Parts of EUrope’s past, like the story of colonialism, are rather neglected in EUropean 
self-portraits, while they are more prominent in non-EUropean perspectives. 
Not only the contents of this history are contested, but also the relevance this history 
should have for today’s EUrope. This is rooted in the incorporation of different 
theoretical approaches (see 3.3.2). I reconstructed how imaginations of EUrope, like 
identity constructions in general, swing between universalist and particularist 
conceptualizations. The differences between perspectives on EUrope are not only due 
to different contents, but also to questioning where these contents came from and to 
whom they apply in which way. From the universalist perspective EUropean qualities 
potentially apply to all humanity. EUropeanness is rather a dynamic ideal to long for, 
than a definite and stable identity feature. The opposite is true for the particularist 
approach, which bases EUrope on certain originality. EUrope’s roots are thereby for 
example seen in a common culture, history, or religion. The particularist EUrope 
describes a rather static and exclusive entity with definite borders. It resembles an 
object of identification EUropeans are very familiar with: nationalism. The closeness 
to the nationalist model is strength and weakness of the particularist approach to 
EUrope (see 3.3.3). It provides a clear object of identification but also leads to an 
often perceived conflicting situation with national sources of identification. In such a 
competition for loyalty the cards obviously would be stacked against EUrope. 
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The many nationalisms in EUrope further make it hard to fill the imaginations of 
EUrope with contents which accord with all of them, since “it is impossible to find a 
cultural trait that is shared by all Europeans and not shared by any non-Europeans” 
(Neumann 2006: 9). This is true for all identity constructions, but does not diminish 
the power of i.e. nationalism in the same way, as perceived in the EUropean context. 
Hence, there must be ways to deal with it. As one such way I presented the 
imbalances in imaginations of EUrope; when for example Eastern EUropean 
peculiarities are faded out of dominant versions of EUrope, they lose some of this 
heterogeneity. The construction of a EUropean originality also becomes easier by 
limiting the context in which it is seen. Those contexts are often constituted by 
different Others, to whom EUrope is compared in different situations. The most 
significant Other was always the East, i.e. represented by Russia or Islam, but also 
other differentiations, i.e. from the USA, play a relevant role. I further showed that 
processes of Othering are not only directed to supposedly extra-EUropean objects. 
The center can only define the perfection of its EUropeanness in opposition to the 
periphery’s imperfection. This periphery is often represented by the ECECs, who 
however, despite their attested deficiency, were unopposed included in imaginations 
of EUrope. The success of the ECECs in gaining EU membership after the Cold War 
was to a large extent due to this inclusion. It was framed as re-unification of EUrope, 
and for this reason pictured as a moral duty. 
Despite this power of imaginations of EUrope in different political contexts, the 
summary of literature about them brought forward their enormous variety and 
diffusivity. It showed that definitions of EUrope not only varied between different 
times. They also vary between different actors or perspectives; between in- and 
outside-, and also inbetween-perspectives on EUrope. They vary between different 
national contexts, and also between elites and public perspectives. Further they are 
differentiated dependent on of different political ideologies. In different contexts they 
are debated in, different qualities are highlighted or mitigated. This variation 
manifests itself, and is fortified by, different theoretical conceptualizations of identity 
and similar ideas. It leads to disunity in drawing the borders of EUrope, which 
manifests itself in enlargement debates. While the ECECs benefited from their 
unequivocal inclusion within imaginations of EUrope, this argument loses weight in 
going further east. Thereby it is not unequivocally clear where EUrope ends and Asia 
begins. This leads to an intensification of the debate on EUrope, and brings different 
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polarizations in the EUrope discourse to the fore. Turkey is part of this interspace, 
whose EUropeanness is disputed. While different perspectives on EUrope did not 
lead to different conclusions in debating the EU enlargement towards the ECECs, 
they did so in the Turkish case. This debate on the relationship between Turkey and 
the EU, constituted the second aspect of my research interest. Therefore I first 
reconstructed scientific views on the relationship between Turkey and the EU itself 
and, second, literature about the debates in EUrope on it. 
This revealed a long history of relationships between Turkey and EUrope, and 
illustrated the significant role perceptions of EUrope and EUropeanness played for 
the Turkish development (see 4.1). At the latest from World War One on, Turkey’s 
strong orientation towards a EUropean role model is observable, and significantly 
inspired Atatürk’s concept of Kemalism. This applied for the political and juridical 
organization of the Turkish state, as well as for questions of culture and tradition. 
After World War Two it concluded in the Turkish affiliation to the Western alliance in 
the Cold War. That was accompanied by the institutional integration within the 
NATO, and an association agreement with the EEC. Due to the political and economic 
instability of Turkey until the 1990s, the geopolitical inclusion within EUrope, 
through the Cold War context, did not conclude in further progress towards an 
EEC/EU accession. This changed with the stabilization of Turkish politics in the late 
1990s, and the still effective EUropean orientation of Turkey concluded in a revival of 
the EU perspective. In 1999, Turkey was accepted as an official EU accession 
candidate, which was followed by further political reforms in Turkey. In contrast to 
previous times Turkey’s EUropean alignment was no longer carried forward by the 
Kemalists, but by a new form of moderate political Islam. After their government 
takeover by Erdogan’s AKP, the Turkish reform process significantly accelerated, 
which concluded in the opening of EU accession talks in 2004. Nonetheless the 
Turkish accession process, as well as its reforms, slowed down after this success. This 
was partly due to a stagnant reform process within Turkey. The literature sees the 
reasons for this in a missing consensus between the political and social forces of 
Turkey, and often detects a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. On the other 
hand, rising in extent and intensity, the skepticism towards a Turkish EU 
membership in EUrope is seen as cause for this stagnation. 
This rising skepticism is approved by the literature (see 4.2 & 4.3). When the Turkish 
accession became a seemingly realistic option through the 1999- and 2004-decisions, 
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the EUropean debates about it intensified. In some national contexts they entered the 
field of political campaigning, which is connected to strong skepticism of public 
opinions. While the acknowledgement of Turkish reforms by the European 
Commission and the accordance to EU-norms led to progress of the accession until 
2004, more and more skeptical attitudes came to the fore on the national level. I 
reconstructed various aspects of the debates on Turkey, whereby i.e. concerns about 
Turkey’s size, demography or economic condition were formulated. While the pro-
Turkey side saw these points as rather positive in terms of chances in i.e. geopolitical 
or economic terms, the anti-Turkey side mainly pointed to the high costs it could 
cause. In summarizing the literature about the EUropean debates on Turkey it was 
obvious that they were traversed by imaginations of EUrope. Not only the modalities 
of a potential Turkish accession, but its general possibility and desirability was 
debated. This dispute was often concerned with questioning Turkey’s EUropeanness 
as a generally accepted criterion for EU membership. Different imaginations of 
EUrope, i.e. in reference to history, culture, values, religion or geography, led to 
different positions in the Turkey debate. The exclusive version of EUrope was often 
built upon a particularistic, static and homogeneous conceptualization. The inclusive 
side most commonly pointed to universal values, as a base of a dynamic and 
heterogeneous EUrope. In the context of disputing these imaginations of EUrope, the 
Turkey question was often framed as a defining moment. It would link the EU with 
one of these imaginations of EUrope, and abolish the other. The wrong choice could, 
in the perspective of many actors on both sides, lead to the dissolution of EUrope. 
Debates on Turkey often brought different opinions about EUrope to the fore. They 
often intensified discourses on EUrope, and influenced the ways in which EUrope is 
imagined in. This is not true for every debate about Turkey within EUrope. The 
intensity of debates varied across EUrope, and they did not always lead to a 
significant clash of different imaginations of EUrope. While Turkey is, for example, 
included in all relevant imaginations of EUrope in British politics, it is nearly always 
excluded from Austrian ones. German politics reveal a more polarized political debate 
on Turkey, which is a major reason that I chose it for my empirical case study. This 
polarization goes hand in hand with an intensive political debate, which was amongst 
others held between CDU/CSU and SPD. For technical reasons I narrowed down my 
empirical research to these two main parties of Germany. Further reductions of my 
research field were concerned with the time frame and genres (see 5.2). The time-
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wise focus lay on the period, in which a Turkish EU accession became relevant for 
German debates on EUrope, after the late 1990s. The genres I analyzed were debates 
in the plenary sessions of the German Bundestag and the parties’ election manifestos 
to German general and European elections. For technical reasons, I further limited 
the focus for the parliamentary debates to three relatively short time periods. I, first, 
covered contributions of the parties’ MPs to the debate about the opening of 
accession talks with Turkey in 2004, and, second, to the one about the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2008. I further summarized respective statements about the Turkey question and 
imaginations of EUrope, which were put to protocol in the first half of 2011. The aim 
of this exercise lay in reconstructing of imaginations of EUrope within different 
thematic contexts. According to the DHA, I intended to uncover the interdiscursive 
impact of the debate about Turkey on imagining EUrope in later and other contexts. 
In order to realize this plan, I utilized different methods of qualitative research and 
analysis (see 5.3). These were partly inspired by CDA and DHA, and amongst others 
supplemented with inputs by the grounded theory’s approach to coding. 
Although I already had summarized the literature on imaginations of EUrope and the 
relationship between EUrope and Turkey on a general level, I started the realization 
of this research design with one more literature review. This was necessary due to the 
strong impact, different national contexts have on these debates. In preparation of 
this analysis, I hence summarized literature about the German debates on EUrope 
and Turkey (see 6.1 & 6.2.1). In the first instance this revealed various upheavals of 
dominant German perspectives on EUrope, throughout history. These upheavals 
usually were connected to the changing German power position within EUrope. 
Imaginations of EUrope changed and differed in the way they placed Germany in 
them, and were strongly determined by constructions of German national identity. 
The end of World War Two was the last radical upheaval and was followed by a 
relatively strong continuity of German imaginations of EUrope. This continuity was 
characterized by a strong consensus within Germany about the importance and 
positivity of EUropean cooperation. A EUropeanized Germany was seen as a way to 
distance Germany from past visions about a Germanized EUrope. The restriction of 
German power in this constellation was accepted in remembrance of German warfare 
and National Socialism. EUrope was most importantly seen as peace order. The 
general consensus did not initially cover the approach to the Cold War order, since 
the SPD did not exclude socialism in the same way, like the dominant conservative 
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imagination of EUrope did. This dissent did not last very long, and soon the SPD 
widely turned into the conservative version of EUrope, which shaped the already 
ongoing integration process. This EUrope was based on democracy, a social market 
economy and Christendom. In geopolitical terms it was defined in opposition to the 
USSR. Germany was subordinated within EUrope, although a certain claim for 
leadership was often formulated through the notion of French-German friendship. 
The conservative’s pro-EUropeanism was relativized by the prominence of 
subsidiarity in imagining EUrope. This was sometimes connected with a federalist 
model, but often also to skepticism towards power accumulation on the EUropean 
level. Nonetheless, the pro-EUropean consensus was and is remarkably strong within 
German political elites, despite its occasional discordance with public opinion. It also 
survived German unification and the replacement of the popular Deutsch-Mark with 
the Euro. Besides the relative strength of this consensus on the positivity of 
EUropean cooperation, the parties still disagreed in debating the form this EUrope 
should take. This was for example the case for approaching the balance between 
social solidarity and a free market economy. On a more general level the parties 
differed in the theoretical conceptualization of EUrope and EUropeanness. While the 
conservatives usually saw EUrope in rather particularist terms, the other parties of 
the Bundestag often constructed a rather universalist EUrope. 
These differences did not conclude in a dissent about the enlargement towards the 
ECECs after the Cold War, which was welcomed by both sides and widely framed as a 
re-unification of EUrope. The limitation of the German consensus on EUrope became 
apparent during the debate about the potential EU accession of Turkey. In reference 
to scientific views on these debates, I illustrated the intensity and variety of the 
German debate on this question. This is the case since the late 1990s, when a Turkish 
EU accession became a more realistic option. Before that, the German perspective on 
Turkey was rather unexcited and widely determined by geopolitical concerns. In the 
context of the Cold War, Turkey was seen as an important ally and for this reason was 
widely included within imaginations of EUrope. Perspectives on Turkey also 
contained its otherness, but this was usually not brought in connection to its 
exclusion from EUrope. With the diminishing relevance of the Cold War for 
imaginations of EUrope German perspectives on Turkey’s EUropeanness changed 
and became more differentiated. Aspects such as the growing Turkish Diaspora in 
Germany, the Islamist revolution in Iran, or political turmoil in Turkey, got more 
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important. The geopolitical inclusion of Turkey was more often challenged by its 
perceived otherness, for example in political or religious terms. Since a Turkish EU 
accession was not realistic until the late 1990s, the debate on these aspects did not 
reach an intensity, which could trigger a reconsideration of Turkey’s inclusion within 
EUrope. This changed with the acceptation of Turkey’s candidacy status in 1999, and 
especially towards the opening of accession talks in 2004. While the SPD-led 
government backed those decisions in favor of the Turkish accession at the EU-level, 
the conservatives were more often skeptical. This skepticism was not only concerned 
with the Turkish shortcomings in fulfilling the accession criteria, but also questioned 
the general desirability of a EUrope, that includes Turkey. The polarization regarding 
Turkey was not only restricted to the political field, and also pertained actors of 
media, science, religion, or economics. The debate was also held on a mainstream 
level between laypeople, which is connected to much public skepticism towards a 
Turkish accession. Different authors come to the conclusion, that the German debate 
on Turkey was to a large extent one between different imaginations of EUrope, and 
framed as a decisive moment for EUrope. 
This was also apparent in analyzing the debate in the German Bundestag about the 
opening of EU accession talks with Turkey in 2004, like my analysis illustrated (see 
6.2.2). Thereby the conservatives endorsed their role as thematic leader and 
instigator of the debate. They also consciously saw themselves in this role, and 
blamed the SPD-led government for dishonestly attempting to duck out of a public 
debate. Both parties blamed each other for irresponsibly acting against German 
and/or EUropean interests. The occasional dramatics, assigned to the debate, went 
hand in hand with the importance that both parties attached to the issue. It was 
frequently framed as a defining moment for the destiny of EUrope. In explaining 
their respective positions, both parties agreed that the debate was not only about 
Turkey’s, but also about EUrope’s constitution. This perspective was however based 
on an attitude, which sees Turkey as rather peculiar, i.e. in comparison to prior 
accession candidates. Both parties saw a Turkish EU integration as challenging. 
While the SPD saw EUrope able to cope with this challenge, the conservatives 
thought differently. These contrary judgments in the first place were explained with 
contrary evaluations of the Turkish general constitution and reform process. While 
the SPD highlighted Turkey’s achieved progress, CDU/CSU put more prominence on 
continuing deficiencies. The conservatives also formulated a general suspicion 
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towards the sincerity and sustainability of Turkey’s reforms. The SPD shared the 
perception of Turkish instability to a certain extent, through formulating Turkey’s 
dependency on the process and perspective of EU accession. They formulated a 
responsibility of EUrope to support Turkey in its quest for political, and otherwise 
forms of, stabilization. The conservatives did not directly deny this argument, 
although the formulation of such a responsibility towards Turkey was widely absent 
in their statements. The contrary positions on the Turkey question were also 
explained with prognoses of the costs and benefits that a Turkish accession would 
bring for Germany and/or EUrope. CDU/CSU focused on the potential costs, i.e. 
through direct financial payments or enhanced migration movements towards 
Germany. The SPD in contrast highlighted potential benefits, i.e. in terms of 
geopolitical power or trade. The SPD frequently framed Turkey as a bridge to 
EUrope’s neighboring regions and cultures. This bridge should work for example in 
terms of diplomacy. A Turkish EU membership was seen as a potential for mitigation 
of the perceived conflict with the Islam World. This also implied a certain inbetween-
position of Turkey, which was explicitly formulated by conservative MPs. For this and 
other reasons, CDU/CSU pleaded for a privileged partnership between the EU and 
Turkey, as an alternative to full accession. This should secure the potential benefits 
without accepting the negative effects. These negative effects were seen to conclude in 
an overstraining of EUropean integration capacities and in the impossibility of the 
realization of a political union. This point was based on a perceived contradiction 
between integration and enlargement. The SPD argued against the goal of a 
privileged partnership, since it would constitute an unfair and unequal treatment of 
Turkey, in comparison to other candidate countries. They blamed the conservatives 
for discouraging Turkey from their EUropean quest, and suspected hidden motives 
for this exclusionary attitude. The SPD suspected religious and cultural prejudices as 
the basis of the CDU/CSU’s position, and positioned EUrope in opposition on 
universal values. Although CDU/CSU usually refused these allegations, conservative 
MPs frequently excluded Turkey from EUrope through the explicit reference to 
historical, cultural or geographical aspects. In this context CDU/CSU feared that a 
Turkish accession would undermine the development and promotion of a strong 
EUropean identity, and thereby increase the EU’s legitimization problems. 
The German parliamentary debate, about the opening of EU accession talks with 
Turkey, was to a large extent characterized by the formulation of different 
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imaginations of EUrope. I tried to illustrate these imaginations through the following 
word clouds. They show the prominence of various aspects in conceptualizing 
EUrope, according to my analysis and coding of the parliamentary debates on Turkey. 
The varying size of the terms points to the respective strength of the aspect. The gray 
bubbles encircle aspects, which stood in close relationships to each other within the 
respective statements. Also the overlaps between the various gray bubbles point to 
relationships and intersections of the issues and concepts they stand for. 
 
 
In reference to Figure 3 (p54), these word clouds describe the interspace between the 
EUrope discourse and the Turkey-EU discourse. It shows how different perspectives 
on Turkey triggered the formulation of different imaginations of EUrope. CDU/CSU, 
in reference to the integration/enlargement dilemma, saw Turkey as too peculiar for 
EU integration. The SPD estimated this otherness, and the strains it would put on the 
integration project, as less dramatic, and pointed to EUrope’s flexibility and 
adaptability. The SPD thought that Turkey is able to implement EUropean values, 
which thereby were framed and highlighted as defining qualities of EUrope. They are 
seen in contrast to a rejected determination of EUrope by culture, history, geography 
or religion. The task to promote these values and peace, in the logic of normative 
power, was a further aspect of the SPD’s imagination of EUrope. This aspect is rather 
mitigated in the conservatives’ respective approach to EUrope. CDU/CSU 
prominently placed the goal of political integration, in connection with a strong 
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EUropean identity, in their argument, what they saw in opposition to a Turkish EU 
accession. In this context they warned of an overextension of EUrope’s borders, and 
put EUrope in opposition to Asia. Turkey’s otherness in geographical terms was 
connected to other fields of difference. Thereby CDU/CSU often included a 
historically grown EUropean culture into their imagination of EUrope. 
Debating the opening of EU accession talks with Turkey in 2004 triggered the 
formulation of, in comparison to the German discourse on EUrope in general, very 
peculiar imaginations of EUrope. Although they resembled the general German 
positivity towards EUropean cooperation, many aspects, which characterized 
imaginations of EUrope in prior times, were absent on behalf of other aspects. Both 
parties did not talk much about economic and social qualities, which often were the 
main trigger for dissents between their imaginations of EUrope in other contexts. 
This absence might have been caused by the conservative argument, that a Turkish 
membership would reduce the EUropean project to sole economic cooperation on 
cost of more political cooperation. This also might have led to the absence of the 
otherwise, in the conservative argumentation, prominent notion on subsidiarity. The 
conservative constructions of EUrope also widely left out geopolitical frames, which 
in prior times mainly triggered the inclusion of Turkey within EUrope. 
All in all, the Turkey debate brought forward many polarizations between the 
imaginations of EUrope of SPD and CDU/CSU. These polarizations stand in contrast 
to the generally quite consensual character of German debates about EUrope. The 
imaginations of EUrope, which were brought forward in the context of the Turkey 
question, revealed hence a very peculiar image. My research interest was, to find out 
if and how those differences provoked a change in imaginations of EUrope, beyond 
the limitations of the Turkey context. For this reason I looked at different debates in 
the German Bundestag, which contained imaginations of EUrope. I was concerned 
with the debate about the Lisbon Treaty, and about various other issues in 2011. 
These parliamentary debates looked dissimilar to the ones on the Turkey question, 
and did not contain nearly as much polarization. The debates about the Lisbon Treaty 
were especially characterized by a strong consensus between the major parties, which 
both formed the coalition government at this time. Both parties, and two of the three 
opposition parties, welcomed the Lisbon Treaty. It was seen as a vital step to stabilize 
and pursue the EUropean project. Thereby both parties expressed their positive 
attitude towards EUropean integration. This is also true for the debates in the first 
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half of 2011. In analyzing those debates, I illustrated how the parties constructed 
EUrope in various contexts. One was the financial crisis, and resembled the debate on 
the Lisbon Treaty, although the polarization between SPD and CDU/CSU on 
questions of social solidarity was more intense and visible in this context. Another 
issue was the Arab Spring, whereby the SPD placed its imagination of a EUrope based 
on normative power. The notion of EUrope as promoter of universal values was also 
apparent in conservative statements about the relationships with i.e. Belarus or the 
Countries of Former Yugoslavia, or in SPD-statements about Italy or Hungary. 
Those and other aspects were revealed, in my analysis of the German parties’ 
construction of EUrope, within those various contexts. In the following Figure 12 I, in 
the logic of Figure 11, summarized those aspects. This figure gives an overview on the 
various imaginations of EUrope, which the parties formulated in the debates on 
Lisbon and on the various issues of 2011. The variety of the debates, which are 
included within this figure, gives it a relatively high representativeness of the variety 
of German imaginations of EUrope. 
 
 
The impressions of these world clouds resemble the literature about German 
imaginations of EUrope much more than the ones resulting from the analysis of the 
Turkey debate. They illustrate the German consensus on the positivity and centrality 
of EUropean cooperation. This was often realized through highlighting the quality of 
peace, as opposed to EUrope’s and Germany’s past of division, warfare and aggressive 
nationalism. Figure 12 also illustrates the reconceptualization of this aspect within 
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the notion of prior enlargements, i.e. towards the ECECs. In this context the parties 
often referred to EUropean values, and their promotion through EUropean 
cooperation. EUrope’s necessity was further argued for, by pointing to the 
importance of a common occurrence in foreign politics. Another important 
connotation of the term EUrope was about EUrope’s economic benefits. 
All these aspects were acknowledged and, to different extents, highlighted by both 
parties, which reflects the perception of a German consensus on EUrope. The 
realization and concrete implementation of these aspects however, contained various 
differences between the parties. Figure 12, further contains aspects, which were 
prominently picked up by only one of the parties. In the conservative case, this would 
be for example the notion of subsidiarity, and in the social democratic one, the 
emphasis of social solidarity. This, as well as differences in conceptualizing various 
aspects, is connected to a variance of the issues, in which the parties did (not) place 
their imaginations of EUrope. This is for example obvious for the notion of normative 
power, as a defining EUropean quality. While the conservatives formulated this 
aspect in talking about i.e. Belarus or the countries of Former Yugoslavia, the SPD 
mostly placed this notion in debating the Arab Spring. This illustrates, that the 
conservatives tendentiously restricted the promotion of EUropean values to a 
predetermined construction of EUrope, while the SPD, independently from such a 
predetermination, extended it to neighboring regions. This suggests that the SPD, in 
contrast to CDU/CSU, constructed those values as rather universally applicable. In 
the reconstruction of this approach, I illustrated a parallel to the Turkey debate. 
Another such parallel was for example observable in general attitudes towards 
EUrope’s foreign policy appearance. In conservative imaginations of EUrope also the 
centrality of the enlargement/integration dilemma, in connection with the goal of a 
deeper union, was to a certain extent recontextualized within the debates of 2008 and 
2011. The same is true for references to aspects like culture or history, which are also 
independent from the Turkey debate more prominent in the CDU/CSU’s statements 
than in the SPD’s. The conceptualization of different aspects, and also the relevance 
that the parties applied to them, and the ways, they (de)emphasized different issues 
in constructing EUrope, partly resembled the Turkey debate. 
Before I can possibly estimate if these similarities represent changes of imaginations 
of EUrope due to the Turkey debate, I should know to which extent these aspects 
even represent changes in general. A source, which enabled me to reconstruct such 
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changes, were the parties’ election manifestos. In the logic of Figure 11 & 12, I 
illustrated the quantitative share of various concepts and qualities, in representations 
of EUrope within the manifestos. For each party I split those word clouds into the 
time periods of 1989-2002 and 2004-2009. This is supposed to illustrate the changes 
of imaginations of EUrope between times when the Turkey question was not a major 
issue of German political disputes, and times when it was. According to the literature, 
I specified the appearance of this change with 2002. 
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These word clouds illustrate several changes of the ways in which EUrope was 
approached within the parties’ election manifestos between those two periods. In the 
case of the SPD, especially the rise in prominence of social solidarity, in opposition to 
neoliberal deregulation, is eye-catching. Apart from that, most other aspects, which 
significantly changed, were to a certain extent also part of the Turkey debate. In 
carrying on the social democratic case, this would be the rise in prominence of 
EUrope’s role in foreign relations, in combination with the notion of normative power 
and the positivity towards further enlargements. In contrast to this, the conservatives 
continued to highlight prior enlargements. That was connected to the construction of 
an integration/enlargement dilemma and skepticism towards further enlargement. 
The CDU/CSU’s more current constructions of EUrope, further display a stronger 
role for aspects like culture, (enlightenment-)values or history. Also the aspect of 
EUrope’s appearance in foreign politics rose in prominence over the years. 
For most of these changes, I illustrated certain correlations to the debate about 
Turkey, over the course of my paper. Such a correlation is quite obvious, for the 
heightened role of culture or history, in conservative imaginations of EUrope. The 
same is true for the prominence of the integration/enlargement dilemma, or the 
SPD’s rather inclusive approach to further EU enlargement. It is less obvious in the 
case of EUrope’s foreign policy appearance. Thereby I made the point, that the 
conservative notion of it is often connected with the wish, to create a more visible 
EUrope on the global stage, in order to provide a better object of identification for 
EUrope’s population. The SPD on the other hand is more concerned about the dent 
EUrope makes in extra-EUropean perspectives, which is often seen as connected to 
the execution of normative power.  
All in all, similarities in constructions of EUrope, between the contexts of discussing a 
potential Turkish accession, and the other debates I included into my analysis, were 
frequently obvious. Very often these aspects are connected to general changes of the 
parties’ ways to imagine EUrope. The arguments constituting this correlation, were 
definitely also crafted and utilized within many contexts beyond the Turkey debate. 
For example the integration/enlargement dilemma, as well as the frame of EUrope’s 
responsibility in the promotion of universal values, was also existent when debating 
the enlargement towards the ECECs. On the other hand these issues did, according to 
the literature, not cause major disagreements between SPD and CDU/CSU, in 
contexts beyond the Turkey question. It hence can be assumed that those issues did 
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not touch differences between the parties’ imaginations of EUrope. They did not 
trigger a challenge of the German consensus on EUrope. The debate about Turkey on 
the other hand caused such conflicts, and thereby triggered the intensification of the 
German discourse on EUrope. The polarization between SPD and CDU/CSU, on the 
question if Turkey should or can become part of EUrope, triggered the formulation of 
differing imaginations of EUrope. In this respect, I would like to echo the similarities, 
Küçük (2008) described between the Turkey debate and the Valladolid debate. The 
latter one was held in the 16th century between the Catholic bishop Las Casas and 
philosopher Sepúlveda. They disagreed about the way Spain should treat the 
‘Indians’, which inhabited the new Spanish territories overseas. While Sepúlveda saw 
no reason to treat the Native Americans like regular human beings, and saw no moral 
problem in enslaving them, Las Casas, in reference to a Christian principle of 
egalitarianism, espoused the possibility of their Christianization. However, there was 
no dissent on the existence of a difference of the ‘Indians’ to the Self; in the one case 
they differed as inferior barbarians, and in the other as non-Christian pagans. Hence, 
it was not so much the difference, or its degree, which initiated the disagreement, but 
the criteria of constructing the Self. While in Las Casas’s opinion it was enough to 
adopt Christianity, to become an equivalent human being, this was quite impossible 
in Sepúlveda’s conceptualization. It is hence a debate between two different views on 
the qualities of collective identity; between the one which is potentially inclusive, and 
the one which is definitely exclusive. Similarly, the German debate on Turkey 
triggered such a clash of universalist and particularist imaginations of EUrope. It 
brought polarizations to the fore, which differed from prior imaginations of EUrope. 
This observation alone does not answer the question if, and how, discussing the 
Turkey question changed imaginations of EUrope in general. Through the analysis of 
the debates on various issues in the Bundestag, I illustrated that, as a matter of fact, 
imaginations of EUrope are changing. EUrope is something dynamic and 
heterogeneous. EUrope is changing, and although these developments are not one-
directional and irreversible, there are certain tendencies to be observed. The 
directions of these tendencies vary between different contexts, in which EUrope is 
constructed, but there are also many similarities between the different contexts. It 
hence can be said, that EUrope in general was and is changing in the German political 
parties’ perspective. The relevant context here is the Turkey debate, in contrast to all 
other issues through which EUrope is contextualized. It can be stated as factual, that 
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there is, to a certain degree, simultaneity, between imaginations of EUrope in the 
Turkey context and the overall debate on EUrope. The crucial moment for this paper 
lies in the question, if this simultaneity constitutes a causal relationship, which comes 
from the Turkey debate. The honest answer at first must be that I do not really know. 
I cannot really know, since there are so many influences on the discourse of EUrope, 
that it is virtually impossible, to definitely single out the influences of the discourse 
on the Turkey-EUrope relationships. The important word of the latter sentence is 
definitely; although I cannot answer definitely, how the Turkey question influenced 
imaginations of EUrope, I, under consideration of certain observations, illustrated 
the probability of causality in this or that aspect. One such observation was the 
exceptional nature of the extraordinary polarization between CDU/CSU and SPD, 
and German elites in general, in the debate about a possible EU integration of 
Turkey. That stands in a striking contrast to the generally strong consensus in 
EUropean agendas, which the literature and the analysis of other debates attested for 
Germany. The Turkey question was hence a major field, in which differentiations 
between German imaginations of EUrope were developed, debated and shaped. 
Under consideration of all the sources of knowledge, I summarized over the course of 
this thesis, I can finally state, that discussing Turkey changed EUrope. It changed the 
ways in which EUrope was imagined, at least for the cases of the German political 
parties SPD and CDU/CSU. It did so when it provoked the outcropping of differing 
conceptualizations of EUrope. CDU/CSU sharpened their construction of a 
particularist EUrope, while the SPD tightened its alignment with a universalist 
imagination of EUrope. This left marks on the parties’ takes on EUrope, in contexts 
beyond the Turkey debate. The conservatives strengthened their attachment to the 
nationalist model of political organization, which suggests the imagination of a 
homogeneous and static community as a basis for governance legitimization. The 
perceived integration/enlargement dilemma was, in the context of the Turkey-
question, translated into an identity/enlargement dilemma, and strengthened the 
conservative desire for a finalized version of EUrope, i.e. in terms of EU enlargement. 
This perception was escorted by a rising prominence of essentialist notions on 
EUropean history and culture, in the CDU/CSU’s imagination of EUrope. In reaction 
to this development of conservative imaginations of EUrope, the SPD distanced itself 
from such excluding and essentialist notions, and strengthened their universalist 
conceptualization of EUropean qualities. They further intensified their opposition, to 
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the definition of EUrope independent from Christendom. In accordance with their 
position on the Turkey question, the SPD verified the dynamic and heterogeneous 
character of their imagination of EUrope. When the SPD highlighted the 
responsibility of EUrope to promote the spread of its universal values in the context 
of the Turkey question, their opposition to definite and exclusive EUropean borders 
was fortified. All or at least most of these differences between CDU/CSU and SPD 
were probably already existent in times before the intensification of the Turkey 
debate. Nonetheless it was the Turkey debate, which pushed them to the fore, and 
heightened their relevance for the respective imaginations of EUrope. Thereby it 
changed the parties’ imaginations of EUrope in general. I can only state this for the 
German case, which constituted the focus of my empirical case study. Not everywhere 
in EUrope the debate on Turkey was held in such an intense and polarized manner, 
which is likely to trigger a significant change of the ways in which EUrope is 
imagined. In consideration of the literature it nonetheless can be put down that the 
German debate about the Turkey question was not exceptional. In many aspects my 
observation of the German parliamentary debate resembles the literature’s 
reconstruction of EUropean debates on Turkey in general. This suggests that there 
also might be similarities in the ways it changed imaginations of EUrope outside 
Germany. 
I hope that I overtly illustrated, in a replicable manner, how I arrived at this 
conclusion. One of my primary intentions for this exercise was the demonstration of 
the dynamic and heterogeneous character of imaginations of EUrope. Thereby I put 
my paper within the range of constructivist approaches on EUrope. Along these lines, 
EUrope can only be what we (or whosoever) make out of it. The notion of EUrope can 
be utilized to promote solidarity in a predetermined and limited context, which 
excludes everything beyond the Bosporus, Christianity, or whichever borders might 
be drawn. But it can also be utilized to promote a much more inclusive solidarity, 
which is orientated on a general humanism. Personally I prefer the second option. In 
contrast to CDU/CSU’s argument, I do not think that its chances for success are any 
smaller than for the first option. I do not think that it provides a less appealing source 
of identification, than an exclusivist and particularist EUrope. This is at first due to 
the mere fact of the factual falsity of those approaches, which I illustrated over the 
course of this thesis. Through the utilization of aspects like culture or religion, they 
suggest a homogeneity and continuity of EUrope, which does and can not exist. Just 
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like most nationalisms, this is based on, and concludes in, the exclusion and 
discrimination of groups with low power access. That was apparent in the 
CDU/CSU’s exclusion of Turkey from imaginations of EUrope. In order to make the 
best out of the notion of EUrope, it is, in my opinion, necessary to overcome the 
nationalist bias of imaginations of EUrope, and to create a new form of identity. In 
contrast to a EUrope which frantically searches for clear-cut borders, the EUrope I 
would prefer is based on the declared belief in universal values. These universal 
values should solely be based on the formulation of human rights, independent from 
culture, nationality, religion, or any other potentially exclusionary notion. The central 
task of EUrope lies in the promotion of these values, which at the same time should 
conclude in its continuous expansion. In this sense I want to express my alignment 
with the inclusivist side of the Turkey debate. I want Turkey to get a fair chance to 
prove their EUropeanness, independently from any cultural or religious prejudices. 
And I would like EUrope to support Turkey in this process as much as possible. In my 
empirical case study, this side was mostly represented by the SPD. I want to end this 
thesis by again echoing the following quote of former SPD-parliamentarian Gert 
Weisskirchen, which illustrates a central reason for this alignment: 
“The European Union [is] thus not a religious project [...]. The European 
Union is also no geographical project. The European Union is a project of 
European values. It is not excluded and must not be excluded [...], that Islam 
develops so, that it takes a complementary role within European values. [...] 
It is essential, to Europeanize Islam. This is the central task of the European 
Union.” (Bundestag 2004h)i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
i  original German version: “die Europäische Union [ist] eben kein religiöses Projekt […]. Die 
Europäische Union ist auch kein geographisches Projekt. Die Europäische Union ist ein Projekt der 
europäischen Werte. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen und darf auch nicht ausgeschlossen werden […], dass 
sich der Islam so entwickelt, dass er innerhalb der europäischen Werte eine komplementäre Aufgabe 
übernimmt. […]Es kommt darauf an, den Islam zu europäisieren. Das ist die zentrale Aufgabe der 
Europäischen Union.” (Bundestag 2004h) 
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Appendix: Codes and Categories 
Following, I added the complete list of codes and categories, which constituted the 
base of my analyses. As described [in chapter 5.3.2], it is made up by, first, topics and 
concepts, and, second, respective positions the statements, to which they were 
assigned, represented. In the following table the topics are written bold. 
Furthermore, I differentiated the system of codes based on a more general level: 
• E_Europe 
Topics and concepts which got to do with the construction of EUrope; they are rather 
related to the construction of Europe, than with perspectives on the EU, although the 
overlap is big 
• L_Lisbon treaty and European institutions 
Topics and concepts which are brought up in debates about the institutionalized version 
of EUrope; hence, they are in relation to the EU-institutions, and other European 
institutions; since, in my research context, they were most frequently brought up in the 
debate on the Lisbon treaty, I assigned a according title; frequently those codes refer to 
statements on the failed European Constitution as well, whereby I used the terms 
Constitution and Lisbon treaty simultaneous in the list 
• T_Turkey 
Topics and concepts related to perspectives on Turkey; they were brought up in debating 
the state of Turkey’s development, i.e. in the reference to its fulfilment of EUropean 
standards 
• P_Prognoses on a potential Turkey-accession 
Topics and concepts which were brought up in talking about the consequences a Turkish 
accession would bring; these consequences might affect the state of Turkey or EUrope 
• S_further Strategies and issues 
Topics and concepts which are not assignable to one of the other sub-groups; very often 
they point to different rhetorical and other strategies and typical arguments of inter-
party- controversies 
The figuration of this schema is obviously one with big overlaps, between the sub-
groups, but also within the topics and issues, and the respective positions. The codes 
stand rather for different poles, the statements, they got assigned to, are closest to. 
The table also shows the quantities of the assignments of respective codes and 
positions to the empirical material. I broke this up into the parties, and the respective 
debates I analysed, hence into material out of the party manifestos, the 2004 debate 
on Turkey, the 2008 debate on Lisbon, and the 2011 debates. The quantities show, 
first, the absolute number of assignments, and, second, the respective share of total 
assignments to the parties’ statements in the debates. 
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E_Europe
E_Adaptability
++ Universal 3 1,7%
-- Particularistic 1 0,8% 2 1,5%
E_Benefits of EU
+- more benefits 2 1,4%
+- more costs
E_Borders
-- relatively exclusive 2 0,7% 3 1,1%
++ relatively inclusive
+- highlighting open borders 2 1,6% 4 3,1% 2 1,4%
E_Changeableness
++ dynamic 1 0,8% 9 5,0% 5 4,4%
-- static 1 0,4% 1 0,4% 1 0,8% 2 1,5%
E_Climate policy 0,0%
+- central 6 2,2% 1 0,8% 1 0,9% 1 0,9% 2 1,4%
E_Culture
+- not central 2 1,1%
-- central 2 0,7% 8 3,1% 2 1,5%
++ central
+- central 5 1,8% 1 0,8% 2 1,7% 2 1,8%
E_Defining Moment/Crisis Topos
-- central 1 0,4% 7 2,7% 2 1,5%
++ central 11 6,1%
+- denying it
+- central 5 1,8% 2 1,6% 2 1,5% 2 1,7% 4 3,5% 1 0,7%
E_Diversity
++ central 1 0,9% 1 0,7%
-- not central
+-  central 8 2,9% 1 0,8% 5 4,3%
E_Economic level
-- central
++ central 1 0,8% 1 0,6%
+- not central
+- central 14 5,1% 6 4,8% 5 3,8% 2 1,7% 4 3,5% 2 1,4%
E_Enlargement
+- further enlargement desirable 2 0,7% 1 0,4% 1 0,8% 3 2,6% 2 1,4%
+- against too far enlargement 4 1,4% 1 0,4% 1 0,8%
+- positivity towards prior enlargement 13 4,7% 3 2,4% 3 2,3% 11 9,6% 1 0,9% 1 0,7%
+- preferring alternative partnerships 1 0,4%
+- concerns about performance at prior enlargements 1 0,9%
E_Enlightenment
-- central & exclusive 1 0,4% 1 0,4%
++ central & inclusive 3 1,7%
+- central 4 1,4%
E_EURO
+- central 5 1,8% 5 3,8% 1 0,9%
+- not central
E_Foreign EU Policy
+- central & desirable 6 2,2% 1 0,4% 7 5,6% 2 1,5% 5 4,3% 3 2,6%
+- not desirable
+- EUrope as global power 6 2,2% 3 2,4% 2 1,7% 1 0,9%
+- not against USA 5 1,8% 1 0,4%
+- concerning aid
+- focus on neighbourhood 1 0,4% 1 0,8% 1 0,8% 1 0,9% 2 1,8% 3 2,1%
+- focus on defence/military 1 0,4% 1 0,8% 1 0,8%
E_Geography
-- central & exclusive 6 2,3%
++ central & inclusive
+- not central 1 0,6%
E_Globalization
+- makes EUrope necessary 5 1,8% 5 4,0% 5 3,8% 6 5,2% 1 0,9%
+- makes EUrope not necessary
E_History
-- central & exclusive 1 0,4% 6 2,3% 2 1,5%
++ central & inclusive
+- not central 1 0,8% 2 1,1%
+- central 4 1,4% 2 1,5% 1 0,7%
E_Integration/Enlargement
-- Integration vs. Enlargement 5 1,8% 17 6,5% 3 2,3%
++ Integration vs. Enlargement 1 0,8%
++ Integration & Enlargement 0,0% 1 0,9% 1 0,6%
+- challenging but possible 4 1,4% 4 3,2% 2 1,7% 2 1,1% 1 0,9% 1 0,7%
+- no (relevant) connection
E_Law & Rights
+- central 1 0,8% 1 0,9% 1 0,7%
+- highlighting fundamental rights 2 0,7% 3 2,4% 4 3,5% 1 0,7%
E_Migration regulation
+- central 3 1,1% 1 0,9% 6 4,1%
+- not central 1 0,8%
E_National identity & autonomy
+- vs. Europe 3 1,1% 1 0,8%
+- & Europe 1 0,4% 1 0,8%
+- not important
CDU/CSU SPD
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E_Normative power
++ central 5 2,8% 2 1,4%
-- central
+- central through enlargement 1 0,8% 2 1,7%
+- central 5 1,8% 2 1,6% 3 2,3% 2 1,7% 5 4,4% 5 3,4%
E_Othering
+- Islam 2 0,8% 1 0,8%
+- Communism 4 1,4% 1 0,9%
+- Neoliberalism 1 0,8% 3 2,6% 3 2,6%
+- War 7 2,5% 3 2,4% 3 2,6% 4 3,5%
+- Cold War 4 1,4% 4 3,2% 6 5,2% 1 0,9%
+- Nationalism 2 0,7% 2 1,6% 1 0,8% 2 1,7% 5 4,4% 1 0,7%
+- Asia 5 1,9% 1 0,7%
E_Peace order and security
-- central 2 0,8%
++ central 4 2,2%
+- not central
+- central 19 6,9% 7 5,6% 6 4,6% 15 13,0% 6 5,3% 2 1,4%
E_Political level
-- central 14 5,3% 1 0,8%
++ central
+- central 3 1,1% 1 0,8%
E_Reliability 
++ central 1 0,9% 3 1,7% 2 1,4%
-- central 1 0,4%
E_Religion
-- central 3 1,1% 2 0,8%
+- central 4 1,4% 1 0,8%
++ not central 1 0,4% 2 1,1% 2 1,4%
E_Science & Technology
+- central 1 0,8% 1 0,8%
E_Self-placement in EUrope 
+- fully EUropean 1 0,4% 2 1,5%
+- EUrope central but not exclusive 1 0,9% 2 1,4%
+- simultaneity between self and EUrope 8 2,9% 2 1,6% 1 0,8% 2 1,7% 1 0,9% 2 1,4%
+- self as centre 6 2,2% 2 1,6% 2 1,5% 1 0,9%
+- Europe as contrast of comparison
E_Social system 0,0%
+- central 6 2,2% 3 2,4% 1 0,8% 8 7,0% 7 6,1% 4 2,7%
+- not central 1 0,4%
E_ Subsidiarity
+- central 16 5,8% 7 5,6% 5 4,3% 2 1,8%
+- central and not given 1 0,4%
+- vs. national sovereignty
E_Symbols
+- central 1 0,9%
+- not central
E_Values
++ central and universal 4 2,2% 2 1,4%
-- central and particularistic 1 0,4% 4 1,5% 1 0,8%
+- not central
+- central 7 2,5% 5 4,0% 4 3,1% 4 3,5% 5 4,4% 5 3,4%
L_Lisbon Treaty & EUropean Institutions
L_Accession wish (pointing to)
+- to prove Europe's benefits 1 0,8%
L_Competences (distribution)
+- EU got too many 2 0,7%
+- EU got not enough 2 1,8%
L_Constitution and/or reform treaty
+- good 1 0,4% 1 0,8% 4 3,5%
+- bad
+- historic/defining 1 0,4% 3 2,4% 1 0,9%
+- step towards vision conclusion 2 1,6% 1 0,9%
+- stabilization 1 0,8%
+- keeps EU actionable 4 3,2% 1 0,6%
+- not necessary
+- aiming for real constitution 2 1,8%
L_Constitution/Enlargement
+- constitution vs. enlargement
+- constitution & enlargement 4 3,2% 1 0,9% 1 0,6%
+- Turkish accession makes treaty necessary 1 0,6%
L_Elitism (accusing)
+- accusing EUrope 1 0,4% 2 1,4%
+- against elitism 4 1,4% 1 0,8% 1 0,9%
L_European Parlament
+- strengthening positive 2 1,8% 2 1,4%
+- too strong
L_Flexibility of EU
+- call for it
+- opposing it 2 1,6%
L_Representation tasks (of EU)
+- EU represents citizens 1 0,8% 6 5,3%
+- EU represents nation-states
L_Supranationalism/Intergovernmentalism 
+- pro Supranationalism 1 0,4% 1 0,8% 2 1,7% 4 3,5% 1 0,7%
+- anti Supranationalism 1 0,8% 2 1,7%
2004 2008 2011
CDU/CSU SPD
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L_Tasks of EUrope
+- Europe as political community 1 0,8% 1 0,9%
+- Europe more than free trade area 1 0,4% 2 1,4%
T_Turkey
T_Comparison with other Countries
-- Turkey less EUropean 2 0,8% 1 0,8%
+- Turkey as EUropean
++ Turkey more EUropean
T_Copenhagen (political) Criteria 
-- no sufficient fulfilment 4 1,5% 1 0,8% 1 0,8%
++ sufficient fulfilment 2 1,1%
T_Cyprus conflict
-- major problem 2 0,8% 3 2,3%
+- positive development 1 0,6%
+- grievance on both sides
T_Democracy
-- grievance 2 0,8% 2 1,5% 1 0,7%
+- positive development 1 0,4% 1 0,7%
T_Demography
++ young and dynamic 1 0,7%
-- too young and dynamic 2 0,8%
T_Dependency on Europe/accession
+- not dependent 2 0,8%
-+ dependent 1 0,6% 2 1,4%
+- partly dependent 1 0,8% 1 0,7%
T_Economy
++ economic growth 1 0,8% 1 0,7%
-- relatively weak GDP 1 0,4%
+- positive development 1 0,4% 1 0,6%
T_Fredom of Expression
-- grievance 1 0,4% 1 0,8% 4 3,1% 2 1,4%
+- positive development 1 0,6%
T_Gender Relations
-- woman suppressed 2 0,7% 2 0,8% 2 1,5% 1 0,6%
++ egalitarian
+- positive development
T_Genozide
-- missing acknowledgement 1 0,8%
+- positive development 1 0,8%
T_Human Rights
-- grievance 7 2,7% 2 1,8%
++ no (too big) grievance
+- positive development 1 0,6%
T_Identity of Turkey
++ EUropeanness given
-- EUropeanness not given 1 0,4% 5 1,9% 2 1,5%
-+ EUropeanness partly given 1 0,6%
-+ EUropeanness irrelevant
T_Justice
-- impact of Courts too strong
-- arbitrariness of Justice
+- positive development 1 0,8% 1 0,6%
T_Kemalism
-- leads to autocratic structures 1 0,4%
++ leads to modernity/Westernization 1 0,6% 1 0,7%
+- positive development
T_Law Code
-- grievance 1 0,8% 1 0,6% 1 0,7%
++ no (too big) grievance
+- positive development 1 0,8% 2 1,1% 1 0,7%
T_Military
-- impact of military too strong
++ strengthening of West (i.e. through NATO) 2 0,7% 1 0,6%
+- positive development 1 0,6%
T_Minorities
-- grievance 2 0,7% 1 0,4% 1 0,8% 2 1,5% 1 0,7%
+- positive development 2 1,1%
T_Political 'Culture'
-- problematic 1 0,4% 2 1,5% 1 0,6%
++ unproblematic
T_Reform process
++ positive eager to reform 2 0,8% 4 2,2% 2 1,4%
-- ceasing of reforms 3 2,3%
T_Religion
-- too strong impact on politics 1 0,4% 1 0,6%
-- too strong suppression of religion 2 0,7% 1 0,4%
-- no freedom of religion 3 1,1% 2 1,6% 5 3,8%
++ freedom of religion given
++ secularism works 1 0,6%
-- secularism does not work
+- positive development 2 1,1%
P_Prognoses on a potential Turkey-Accession
P_Actionability of EU
+- not in danger 2 1,1%
-- vs. Turkey-accession 4 1,5%
Manifest. 2004 2008
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P_Border security
++ would be strengthened
-- EU-external-borders to Iraq/Iran/etc.
P_Common Agriculture policy
-- negative impact
++ doable
+- challenging but possible
P_Development of Turkey
++ would strengthen positive development 1 0,8% 8 4,4% 2 1,4%
-- would not strengthen positive dev. 4 1,5%
P_Economic impact on Europe
++ positive 1 0,6% 1 0,7%
-- negative
P_Energy policy of Europe
++ increased energy autarky 1 0,7%
-- no increased energy autarky
P_EUropean identity
++ would strengthen it
-- would weaken it 4 1,5%
P_Financial consequences on EUrope
-- too high (short-term) costs 3 1,1%
++ future (long-term) financial benefits
++ (short-term) costs not too high 1 0,6%
P_Further EU-enlargement
-- would promote indefinite expansion 2 0,8%
++ would not have a negative impact
P_Intake capacity of EUrope
-- central & not given 3 1,1% 6 2,3%
++ central & (potentially) given 4 2,2%
+- not central
P_Job preservation in EUrope
++ not in danger 1 0,6%
-- in danger 1 0,4%
P_Migration to EUrope
-- would increase Migration 5 1,9%
++ would decrease Migration 1 0,6% 1 0,7%
+- would not in- or decrease relevantly 1 0,6%
P_Power Distribution in EU
-- big impact 2 0,8%
++ big impact
+- not central
P_Security and Stability of EUrope
++ would increase Security/Stability 1 0,4% 1 0,4% 1 0,8% 4 2,2% 2 1,4%
-- would decrease Security/Stability 1 0,4%
P_Turkish Diaspora in EUrope
++ would advocate integration 2 1,1%
-- would dilute integration 3 1,1%
P_West-Islam-Relations
++ would advocate West-Islam-Relations 1 0,8% 1 0,9% 2 1,1% 1 0,7%
-- would not advocate West-Islam-Relations 6 2,3%
+- Turkey example for Muslim Countries 1 0,9% 1 0,6%
S_Further Strategies and issues
S_Accession/negotiation process (attitudes to)
+- strict and controlled 1 0,4% 2 1,7% 2 1,1% 2 1,4%
+- uncontrolled 3 1,1%
++ warning from stop 1 0,6%
-- warning from continuation 3 1,1%
++ pledge for fair treatment 1 0,9% 2 1,4%
+- pledge for improvement of mechanism 1 0,9%
S_Alternative Partnerships for Turkey
-- proposing it 8 2,9% 17 6,5% 3 2,3%
++ opposing it 2 1,1% 1 0,7%
S_Arab spring (pointing to)
+- Europe as example 2 1,5% 2 1,4%
++ Turkey as example 1 0,7%
+- Europe has special responsibility 8 5,5%
+- calling for Turkish involvement 1 0,8% 2 1,4%
+- vs. clash of civilizations 1 0,8%
S_Clearness (claiming, accusing of lack)
+- neutral 2 1,4%
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope 1 0,7%
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive Europe 1 0,4%
S_Communication to public
+- calling for concerning Turkey 4 1,5%
+- calling for concerning EUrope 4 1,4% 1 0,9% 1 0,9% 4 2,7%
+- accusing of lack
S_Contrib. in T/E-rel.sh.  (claiming, accusing lack)
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope
S_Courage (claiming, accusing of lack)
+- concerning EUrope 5 1,8% 3 2,4% 3 2,3% 1 0,9% 6 5,3% 5 3,4%
++ pro-Turkey
-- anti-Turkey
S_Credibility and duties (pointing to) 
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope 4 2,2%
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope 1 0,8%
Manifest. 2004 20082008 2011Manifest. 2004
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S_Cross-party support (pointing to)
+- concerning Turkey
+- concerning EUrope 1 0,9%
S_Dishonesty (accusing of)
++ pro-Turkey 6 3,3% 3 2,1%
-- anti-Turkey 13 5,0% 1 0,8%
+- concerning Europe 3 2,1%
S_Emotions (pointing to) 
++ pro-Turkey 2 1,1%
-- anti-Turkey 3 1,1%
S_Engagement/isolation in EUrope
+- claiming engagement 1 0,7%
+- denying isolation
S_Experts & other outside actors (pointing to) 
++ pro-Turkey 5 2,8%
-- anti-Turkey 17 6,5% 1 0,8%
+- concerning EUrope 1 0,9%
S_Facts, i.e. of process (pointing to)
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope 1 0,6%
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope
+- concerning EUrope
S_Ir/Responsibility (accusing of/claiming)
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope 7 3,9% 2 1,4%
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope 9 3,4%
+- concerning EUrope 4 1,4% 4 3,1% 3 2,1%
S_long accession process (predication of)
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope 7 3,9% 2 1,4%
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope 1 0,8%
++ opposing long negotiations
S_Moral (claiming, accusing of lack)
++ pro-Turkey/inclusive EUrope 3 1,7%
-- anti-Turkey/exclusive EUrope 2 0,8%
+- concerning EUrope
S_National interest (pointing to) 
++ pro-Turkey 1 0,4% 5 2,8% 2 1,4%
-- anti-Turkey 3 1,1%
+- concerning EUrope 7 2,5% 1 0,8% 2 1,5% 3 2,6% 1 0,7%
S_Other EU-Countries/Governments (pointing to)
++ pro-Turkey 1 0,6%
-- anti-Turkey 3 1,1%
+- concerning EUrope
S_Populism (accusing of)
++ pro-Turkey 5 2,8% 1 0,7%
-- anti-Turkey 2 0,8%
+- concerning EUrope 3 2,1%
S_Prior enlargements (pointing to)
++ pro-Turkey 5 2,8%
-- anti-Turkey
S_Public opinion (pointing to)
++ pro-Turkey
-- anti-Turkey 5 1,9%
+- pro Lisbon/constitution 2 1,6% 1 0,9%
+- anti Lisbon/constitution
+- concerning EUrope 1 0,8% 1 0,8% 4 3,5% 5 3,4%
S_Radicalism (accusing of) 0,0%
++ pro-Turkey 1 0,6% 2 1,4%
-- anti-Turkey 1 0,4%
+- concerning EUrope 1 0,4%
S_Realism (claiming, accusing of lack)
++ pro-Turkey 1 0,7%
-- anti-Turkey 6 2,3% 1 0,8%
+- concerning EUrope
S_Risks and Chances
++ more Chances 3 1,7% 1 0,7%
-- more Risks 1 0,4%
+- both 1 0,6%
S_Transitional restrictions after acces.
++ positive impact 3 1,7%
-- no (positive) impact
++ not necessary
S_Turkish interests (pointing to)
++ pro-accession/inclusive EUrope 5 2,8%
-- anti-accession/exclusive EUrope 3 1,1% 1 0,8%
2008 2011Manifest. 2004 2008 2011
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Abstract 
Based on the constructivist assumption of collective identities as dynamic, 
heterogeneous and agency dependent,  the text at hand reconstructs if and how the 
debate about a possible EU accession of Turkey changed imaginations of EUrope. 
Beyond a literature review, which uncovers the changing meanings of EUrope and 
different perspectives on the Turkey-EUrope relations, it approaches the research 
question on debates in the German Bundestag. The empirical study follows the 
approach of Critical Discourse Analyses, and exemplifies how the polarization 
between the conservative and social democratic party on the Turkey question 
undermined the generally strong German consensus on EUropean agendas. The text 
attempts to illustrate the arbitrariness of the idea EUrope, and concludes with the 
plea for an inclusive and open understanding of EUrope.  
 
 
kurzer Abriss 
Aufbauend auf dem konstruktivistischen Verständnis von kollektiver Identität als 
dynamisch, heterogen und Handlungs-determiniert, rekonstruiert der vorliegende 
Text ob und wie die Debatte über einen möglichen EU-Beitritt der Türkei 
Vorstellungen von EUropa verändert. Neben einer Zusammenfassung 
entsprechender Literatur, was die sich ändernden Bedeutungen von EUropa und 
verschiedene Perspektiven auf Türkei-EUropa Beziehungen zeigt, wird die 
Forschungsfrage auf Debatten im deutschen Bundestag angewandt. Mit dem Ansatz 
der Kritischen Diskursanalyse veranschaulicht dieser empirische Teil, wie die 
Polarisierung zwischen Konservativen und SozialdemokratInnen in der Türkei-Frage, 
den im Allgemeinen starken deutschen Konsens in EUropäischen Angelegenheiten 
schwächte. Der Text versucht die Willkür der Idee EUropa aufzuzeigen, und schließt 
in einem Plädoyer für eine inklusive und offene Auffassung von EUropa. 
 
 
 
